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Preface
This report is an expression of Community Fareeha Sultan, project manager for CAMP's Rule 
Appraisal and Motivation Programme's (CAMP) of  Law Programme,  deserves  specia l  
mission to understand the people of the appreciation for coordinating numerous 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in activities and achieving some very ambitious and 
Pakistan; their way of life, and their way of difficult targets for the project. I appreciate 
resolving conflicts. In developing this Masood Dawar, field researcher, for assisting 
understanding, many people have contributed to Riazulhaq, our programme manager for 
this report, whose compilation would not been research, in coordinating field activities in 
possible without the active involvement and Islamabad as well as in Peshawar. 
intellectual insight of 1500 common men and 
I am very grateful to Riazulhaq, who greatly 
women of FATA who are most familiar with the 
assisted this research in terms of coordinating 
subject. They were extremely helpful in sharing 
field work, organising regional consultations and 
their knowledge of, and insight into the 
focuse-group discussions, supervising and 
institution and dynamics of Jirga and the tribal 
managing the data gathering and data feeding, 
way of life, which have remained a mystery to 
and, finally, providing me with cleaned data sets.  
outsiders until this day. Their willingness to 
Habibullah Baig, the legal advisor on this project, contribute to this report helped CAMP develop a 
Jirga deserves special gratitude for his role in giving perspective on various aspects of  that is 
technica l  input ,  moderat ing  reg ional  also the focus of this report. 
consultations and conducting in-depth 
I am equally grateful to the 70 key informants, 
interviews. 
200 participants from the focus-group  
My special thanks go to Mariam A. Khan, CAMP's discussions, and around 200 participants of 
programme manager for advocacy, for doing the regional consultations, who willingly shared 
preliminary editing of this report, and Rabia their knowledge and experience on the subject, 
Jahangir Khan, a project officer who helped to without which it was not easy to acquire a 
Jirga organise and coordinate the field work. I perspective on the pros and cons of  
appreciate Marjana and Humera Khalid for institution. The 20 enumerators from FATA, male 
taking care of proof reading. I am equally grateful and female, deserve special recognition for their 
to Shahid Ali our graphic designer for designing commitment in carrying out the survey in rather 
this report.difficult conditions and in some remote areas of 
FATA. We are extremely grateful to their 
Without the generous financial support of the 
contribution. 
German Embassy [Islamabad], this research 
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would not have been possible; I am extremely 
grateful. I extend my special gratitude to Mr. 
Ferdinand Jenrich, Second Secretary Political and 
Mr. Andreas Dauth, Third Secretary Political for 
their constant support and encouragement. 
Finally I must thank the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, 
Heidelberg, Germany, for partnering with us on 
this interesting project. At the Max Planck 
Institute I am especially thankful to Dr. Tilmann 
Roeder for his valuable feedback and technical 
backstopping throughout the project period, and 
Theodor Shulman for editing the report.
The report was reviewed by Dr. Ali Wardak at the 
Centre for Criminology, University of Glamorgan, 
UK, to whom I am very grateful.
All views expressed in this report are solely mine, 
as are any mistakes and errors.    
Naveed Ahmad Shinwari
Chief Executive
Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme 
(CAMP)
Islamabad, Pakistan
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Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has approached to resolve conflicts and to ensure 
been described as a mysterious borderland for peace, stability and communal harmony within 
historians, writers, travellers and journalists. the local communities or tribes. Such institutions 
Although much has been written about it, it are often useful and suitable in circumstances in 
remains surprisingly misunderstood. When bad which they operate, as they satisfy the local 
things happen, the Frontier fascinates the world; cultural and religious sentiments. Such 
when wars are won, for example against the circumstances often make them more successful 
Soviets, attention falls elsewhere. than the contemporary or modern justice 
system. 'Jirga' is one such traditional or tribal 
Despite of the world-wide attention on FATA, 
justice system, being practiced by the Pakhtun 
there is a complete void of any discourse on 
ethnic group that lives in Pakistan and 
understanding its culture, tribal structure, 
Afghanistan. 
institutions and dynamics. People across FATA 
know their minds. Whether illiterate or literate, Pakhtuns inhabit an area of more than 100,000 
they have views. Little attention has been given square miles bisected by the Durand Line since 
to underpin the widespread misperception of 1893. In Pakistan, over 30 million Pakhtuns live in 
what prevails across FATA. Little effort has been Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Federally 
made to understand how the archaic, colonial Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). When it comes 
administrative and justice system has affected to justice, the traditional 'Jirga' is still the most 
the lives of the people of FATA. preferred form of informal or parallel 
justice/dispute resolution mechanism in many 
With financial support from the German Foreign 
Pakhtun dominated areas of Pakistan. However, 
Office, and technical assistance from the Max 
Jirga is still the formal mechanism for dispensing 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
justice and resolving conflicts in the FATA under 
International Law in Heidelberg, Germany, 
the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). 
Community Appraisal  and Motivat ion 
Programme (CAMP) conducted a detailed Although the Jirga may be preferred for many 
research assessment over a period of six months: reasons cited in this report, it also has various 
'Assessing the Jirga System in Pakistan's Tribal inbuilt systemic issues. In cases of murder, Jirga 
Areas' may recommend direct vengeance or badal, or 
1
swara . Thus, Jirga decisions may sometimes 
In many parts of the world, traditional way of 
result in the violation of human rights, especially 
just ice  or  loca l ly  integrated conf l ic t  
the rights of women and ethnic/religious 
transformation/resolution institutions are 
minorities. Although Jirga is deeply rooted in 
Executive Summary
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Pakhtun society and has been used since times the modern justice system for the Pakhtun 
immemorial, it is only recently that a debate on community. 
the flaws of this system has started. The 
Underestimating the efficiency and effectiveness 
traditional Jirga deals with varying issues in the 
of the traditional mechanism of conflict 
tribal areas including conflicts on land and 
resolution would be a mistake, especially since it 
property, inheritance, alleged violation of 
plays an essential role in the maintenance of 
'honour' and intra-tribal or inter-tribal killings. 
social order and has proved successful in the 
While the complete lack of involvement of 
past. It is generally acknowledged that traditional 
women and ethnic/religious minorities in the 
approaches to conflict resolution are able to deal 
proceedings is one flaw, the other major 
with conflict before they spread. 
drawback is the occasional violation of human 
This study is based on the outcome of material rights (especially women rights) due to the 
gathered through various research tools such as a decisions made by Jirga. Although decisions are 
perception survey of 1500 tribesmen and considered objective (as the decision maker is 
women in FATA, 200 respondents of 19 focus-nominated by both sides) and are based on 
group discussions with different groups, tradition and religion, critics believe that 
including women, men, youth and disputants, decisions are based on what it is acceptable to 
consultations with elders, maliks, religious society, many times going against women and 
leaders, and youth of FATA, some 200 ethnic/religious minorities. The Pakistani 
participants of regional consultations and in-Constitution states in Article 247(7) that the 
depth interviews with some 70 key informants, jurisdiction of the higher judiciary, that is the 
including retired and serving civil servants, provincial High Courts and the Supreme Court, 
retired judges, serving judges, journalists, NGOs does not extend to the FATA, which makes Jirga  
leaders, women leaders, parliamentarians from the only formal justice system available to the 
FATA, etc.tribal society. 
However, there are certain limitations to this The above-mentioned facts make it quite 
study. Very limited literature is available on  difficult and unfeasible for the policy makers and Jirga
mechanism, and most of the available literature civil society organisations to abolish Jirga 
is based on secondary information. CAMP has altogether from the tribal areas; this is not only 
been operational in FATA for the last nine years, because it is rooted in Pakhtun history and 
working through its seven field offices (one in tradition, but also because it is a widely 
each Agency). The intense fighting since April respected and accepted form of justice and 
2009 has made access to most areas of FATA even dispute resolution mechanism in the tribal areas. 
more difficult than before. However, due to its 
On the other hand, the modern justice system is 
contacts in FATA, field offices in all seven 
not very promising. Generally speaking, the 
agencies, engagement of locals in the survey 
Pakistani public lacks confidence in the justice 
project and local knowledge, made it possible for 
system, which has undermined the rule of law 
CAMP to undertake the field work on this survey. 
and contributed to rising violence, including 
CAMP was able to conduct face-to-face 
crime, terrorism and human rights abuses. For a 
interviews with the sample respondents in all 
large majority of Pakistanis, the formal justice 
seven agencies, including difficult areas like 
system is seen as expensive; has no provision for 
Upper Kurram, North and South Waziristan 
compensation for victims; is slow and widely 
agencies. 
perceived as corrupt, biased and dominated by 
Most of the FATA residents interviewed for this rich people  making a conducive environment for 
report went beyond simple survey responses and Jirga to remain the only preferred option over 
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provided first hand accounts of their perceptions interviewees were most aware in 
on different aspects of Jirga institution, tribal descending order  are: FCR Jirga system or 
way of life, justice dispensation and its costs, other informal dispute resolution 
credibility and reliability of different Jirga mechanisms; general courts in Pakistan; 
systems, and administrative issues related to FCR religious seminary boards; Federal Sharia't 
Jirga, etc. The perception survey was presented Court; specialized Anti-Terrorism or 
to respondents as a project of CAMP. The poll N a rc o t i c s  C o u r t s ;  H u m a n  R i g h t s  
questionnaire was labeled “Jirga Perception Commission of Pakistan and Federal 
Survey 2011.” The respondents were told that Ombudsman.  
the survey purpose is to gather information on 
 With respect to their assessment of 
their perceptions on formal and informal Jirga 
particular institutions: 41.80% of FATA 
systems, state's courts, Taliban courts, and other 
respondents opined that provincial police 
institutions and related issues so that it could be 
authorities take bribes for their services, 
shared with the policy makers to properly plan 
while 35.30% did not know much about the 
strategies and programmes for the betterment 
provincial police authorities; 14.40% 
of the justice system in FATA. 
believed that court officials and judges take 
The following is a brief overview of the results bribes when deciding a case in general 
generated from the perception survey: courts, and 14.00% respondents believed 
that general courts can be influenced by the 
 With respect to sources of information and 
powerful and the weaker party may not 
media use, generally speaking, more 
receive their due justice; more than half of 
people of FATA have access to Pakistan 
the respondents, 59.60%, did not know 
radio, friends and family, neighbours, 
about specialized Anti-Terrorism or Anti-
printed press and TV as compared to 
Narcotics Courts, and the overall opinion of 
foreign and private media channels. The 
those who did know of them was not 
most valued sources of information were 
favorable; since Federal Sharia't Courts do 
the formal media, including the Pakistani 
not exist in FATA, 59.10%, did not have an 
Press, Radio and TV.  Amongst newspaper 
opinion on them, but of those who did,  
publications, 'Mashriq', an Urdu language 
14.90% believed that Federal Sharia't 
daily newspaper, followed by the daily 'Aaj', 
Courts were affordable to the poor, and 
another Urdu newspaper, had the widest 
7.00% believed that these courts are quick 
readership.  Almost 40.0% of respondents 
in dispensing justice to the people; with 
did not a have preference for a particular TV 
respect to religious seminary board, 32.10% 
channel, but amongst those who did, the 
believed that they are affordable and 
public PTV channel was identified as the 
10.10% believed they deliver speedy 
most watched, followed by the private 
results; since the office of Federal 
Pashtu channel AVT Khyber and another 
Ombudsman does not exist in FATA, the 
public channel, ATV. Radio listenership is 
majority of the respondents either did not 
more popular than the TV and printed press 
know or had a good opinion of it; 62.90% of 
as  a  source of  information,  and 
interviewees said that they did not know 
respondents identified the popular Pashtu 
about the existence of Human Rights 
radio Dewa (Voice of America), followed by 
Commission of Pakistan; about 43.30% of 
BBC Pashtu service and Radio Pakistan as 
respondents - much higher than for any 
the most preferred radio channels.
other institution - believed that informal 
 The institutions and actors of which dispute resolution mechanisms are 
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affordable, and 9.50% believed it provides a Olasi Jirga was believed to be more 
quick dispensation of justice; and finally, effective in resolving civil cases as opposed 
over half of the FATA respondents, 55.90%, to criminal cases. Almost three-quarters of 
mentioned that the services of a religious respondents did not know or have any 
leader in the community could be acquired opinion about the Taliban Jirga, while a 
without much cost, as they are accessible small fraction said that Taliban Jirga is 
and affordable for all. effective in resolving civil cases. 
 A r o u n d  3 8 . 7 0 %  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s   While the FCR Jirga was generally deemed 
experienced legal issues of some form. The to be fair by many respondents, almost 
top ten legal issues experienced by 40.00% thought it was unfair and it had little 
interviewees  from most common to least - credibility and acceptance within the tribal 
were the following: victim of theft or fraud; society in FATA. Comparatively, an 
injured in a motor vehicle accident; assault overwhelming majority of respondents, 
or torture by FC or army; arrested without a 70.13%, believed in the fairness of the Olasi 
warrant by the political administration Jirga, and a much smaller percentage of 
2
respondents felt that Taliban style Sharia'  is under FCR; found involved in tribal/family 
fair. clashes; purchase or sale of movable 
property; victim of domestic abuse; bribery 
 Three quarters of the respondents believed 
by Khasadar or levies force; victim of 
that Jirga plays a proactive role in 
assault; and unlawful detention, search or 
preventing conflicts. Little over half of the 
arrest by the political administration. 
respondents agreed that FCR Jirga 
 decisions are influenced by the more With respect to order of actions taken, the 
powerful party to a dispute.  Almost one top three institutions that the respondents 
third of respondents agreed with the notion who had experienced legal issues 
that Jirga members take bribes. There was approached first to resolve their problem  
Jirga r o u g h l y  e q u a l  a g r e e m e n t  a n d  in descending order  were: ; the local 
Jirga( K h a n s  o r  M a l i k s ) disagreement with the notion that  l e a d e r s  ,  a n d  
Mullah/Imam members are intimidated by the more  of their area. 
powerful party to a dispute. A higher 
 Respondents' level of satisfaction with 
percentage of interviewees believed that 
respect to various justice actors was 
Jirga members are influenced by local 
gauged, and they were most satisfied with 
Political Administration. Almost half of the 
the following institutions: Jirga; local 
respondents believed that Jirga members 
leaders (Khans or Maliks); Mullah/Imam of 
remain impartial while one-third felt that 
their area.  Their level of satisfaction with 
they could be easily influenced to 
the Taliban and with state courts was quite 
manipulate the Jirga process and decisions. 
dismal. 
The majority of the respondents supported 
Jirga the notion that FCR  should be Among interviewees, the most trusted type 
Jirga Olasi conducted under Sharia' law, while almost of  for resolving disputes was 
JirgaJirga Jirga Jirga 60.00% supported the idea that FCR   (informal ), with FCR  a 
RiwajJirga should be conducted under local  distant second and Taliban  being 
(local customs), and almost 70.00% agreed trusted by a minimal  number of  
that it should be conducted under a mixture respondents.  The respondents were more 
Jirga of the two. The majority of respondents in favour of the FCR  settling criminal 
opposed the idea of involvement of cases as compared to civil cases, while the 
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government officials in Jirga proceedings, role neither as a party nor witness or to be a 
and disagreed with the notion that Jirga Jirga member On the issue of womens 
fails to resolve disputes effectively. Over involvement in the process of Jirga, a large 
two-thirds of respondents disagreed that number of respondents believed that 
Jirga violates women's rights while almost women should be given an equal chance to 
two-thirds disagreed with the statement participate in the Jirga process. However, an 
that Jirga violates minorities' rights or basic equal number of respondents did not agree 
human rights. The majority of respondents with the notion and believed that women 
agreed that Jirga provides a fair and public can be represented through their male 
hearing opportunity to key parties involved family members. Looking at the results, it is 
in the dispute, and that it makes lasting quite encouraging to see that a large 
peace among disputants. On the other number of respondents (including men) 
hand, roughly 40.00% agreed that Jirga has realised the importance of women 
the potential to prevent violation of women participation in the Jirga process. We also 
and minorities' rights. Roughly half the received positive reaction from the 
respondents agreed that Jirga maintains respondents during the focus-group 
social order and restores harmony to discussions. However, the participants of 
village/community, contributes to the rule consultations attended by key informants 
of law, is organised, well established, were not ready to accept this and were of 
transparent and an efficient institution, and the view that Pakhtun tribal culture does 
is well placed to resolve civil disputes only.  not allow the participation of women in the 
On the other hand half of respondents also Jirga process. 
believed that Jirga resolves serious crimes.  
 On the issue of Swara, two-third of the 
Around 40.00% affirmed that Jirga 
respondents believed that Swara practice 
reintegrates offenders back into the 
violates women's rights and should end 
community and around 45.00% confirmed 
immediately. The survey results and data 
that they believe Jirga is well placed to 
from focus-group discussions reveal that 
resolve both civil and criminal disputes. 
the people had a negative perception of 
Over half the interviewees opposed the 
Swara and believed that this custom is no 
collective punishment [under the FCR] as 
more in practice, while a small proportion 
means to implement Jirga decisions.  There 
of respondents still believed that Swara can 
were mixed views with roughly equal 
resolve some very complex family feuds. 
percentages of respondents agreeing and 
Half of the respondents believed that Swara 
disagreeing with the idea that during FCR 
practice should be replaced with head 
Jirga proceedings, every member of the 
money, cattle or land.
Jirga has the right to express his views in a 
 There are a few religious minorities that democratic way.  On the other hand, when 
Olasi Jirga have been living in FATA for a long time. discussing the  proceedings, the 
They include Sikhs in Waziristan, Khyber majority agreed with a similarly worded 
and Orakzai agencies, while the Christian question about democratic expression in 
community mainly lives in Khyber and the process.
Kurram agencies. On the question of the 
 In some parts of Afghanistan that border 
role of religious minorities in the Jirga 
FATA, women are given a role in Nanawati 
process, close to half of the respondents 
as well as witnesses in the Jirga process. 
believed that religious minorities should be 
However, in FATA, women are not given any 
given an equal chance to participate in Jirga 
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decision-making process. This is quite Political Agent faces severe criticism not 
encouraging and gives hope, which only from the people of FATA, but also from 
indicates that the tribes in FATA may allow the civil society, including NGOs, media and 
the involvement of religious minorities in human rights activists. Nearly two-third of 
Jirga process. There is, however, a lack of the respondents supported the idea of 
knowledge among people in FATA on curtailing the powers of the Political Agent. 
international human rights standards, the Compared to the level of criticism that we 
Constitution of Pakistan, democracy etc, see against Political Agent's powers, the 
which shows that there is a need for response is still not overwhelming. This 
education on these issues. question was raised during the focus-group 
discussions and consultations with FATA 
 At present, there is no complete and 
respondents who severely criticised the 
independent judicial system in FATA. On the 
role of the Political Agent and demanded 
question of judicial independence, an 
that his powers be curtailed considerably.
overwhelming majority (82.67%) agreed 
that the judiciary should be independent in 
FATA.
 FCR does not allow the people of FATA to 
have the right to fair trial, making FCR Jirga 
more incompatible with the fundamental 
guarantees enshrined in the Constitution of 
Pakistan. On the question whether the 
respondents believed in the 'right to fair 
trial', an overwhelming majority (82.00%) 
agreed. 
 Under Article 247 (7) of the Constitution of 
Pakistan, the jurisdiction of superior courts 
(High Court and Supreme Court) is not 
extended to FATA. The Supreme Court of 
Pakistan therefore cannot protect the 
fundamental rights of the people of FATA 
enshrined in the Constitution. The survey 
recorded that over half of the respondents 
supported the extension of superior 
judiciary to FATA. Support to this question is 
not overwhelming compared to the 
responses received for 'the right to fair 
t r ia l ' ,  and  ' the  r ight  to  jud ic ia l  
independence'. This also reflects that 
people support other rights but are not very 
eager to see superior courts being extended 
to FATA. 
 The Political Agent in FATA holds judicial, 
executive and revenue collection powers, 
making him very powerful. The position of a 
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Chapter 1
Research 
Methodology
qualitative research tool helped in documenting Research methodology and sample 
views of diverse respondents representing 
plan
different age groups, gender, tribes, economic 
status, disputants and observers of Jirga 
proceedings, etc. Participants were chosen so 
This research paper is based on both qualitative 
that they would have knowledge and experience 
and quantitative data. For the qualitative 
of Jirga as a problem-solving tool. Furthermore, 
information, 19 focus-group discussions, four 
Maliks, elders and Mullahs were also chosen to 
regional consultations, and 70 in-depth 
sit in all consultations and share their experience 
interviews were used to gather opinion. Minutes 
and knowledge, as they are respected people 
were recorded, analysed and utilised to write this 
within their circles. The goal was to provide all 
report. Background and historical material used 
the informants substantial opportunity of 
in the report came from a review of historical 
expressing their viewpoints so that they would 
books, newspapers, reports, articles, journals, 
help provide informed and representative 
etc, which are detailed in the bibliography 
perspectives on key issues related to the judicial 
system in the FATA region. An average of 10 The quantitative data was collected through a 
participants attended each FGD. A total of 19 perception survey of 1500 respondents of FATA 
FGDs were held. (see table 01)with the help of structured questionnaires. The 
objective was to sample adult males and females 
Stakeholders' consultative dialogues
to ascertain their opinion on key issues related to 
Region-wise, four stakeholders' consultative the Jirga mechanism in FATA.  Because gender 
dialogues were held in Islamabad to generate plays such an important role in public opinion, 
debate on the above-mentioned issues, the sample was designed to interview equal 
document the views of the key informants from numbers of males and females in each 
FATA, and to gather their recommendations for community. 
further reform in Jirga system. 
Research Methods and Instruments
These events were attended by participants from 
I. Qualitative  
relevant backgrounds and experiences, including 
the government, and were briefed by some well-Focus-group discussions (FGDs)
known speakers from FATA who had political, 
The organisation of focus-group discussions as a 
Chapter 1
Research Methodology
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tribal, religious and technical backgrounds. consulted as reference material.
Desk review Themes of the qualitative discussions and 
dialogue
As mentioned above, the research report 
includes the historical background of the people The themes included: the constitutional status of 
and the area, facts about the governance system FATA; Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR); FATA's 
of FATA, judicial system in FATA, constitutional present social, political, economic and 
standing of FATA, and analysis of FCR Jirga, etc. administrative structure; development pace; 
For this purpose, various books, newspapers, participation of the people in development 
reports, articles, journals, articles, etc. were opportunities; FATA's current law and order 
S # Region
 
Agencies/
FR 
Date
 
Gender
 
Age 
Group 
Disputant
 
Obser
vant 
Perce
ption 
1
 
Region -2 
Kurram  
Agency 
17/01/2011 Male 46-55 √   
17/01/2011 Male 18-26  √  
21/01/2011 Female 18-30   √ 
Orakzai  
Agency 
18/01/2011 Male 36-45 √   
18/01/2011 Male 27-35  √  
22/01/2011 Female 31-45   √ 
FR Kohat   
  
2
 
Region -1  
Khyber 
Agency 
19/01/2011 Male 18-26 √   
19/01/2011 Male 46-55  √  
24/01/2011 Female 18-30   √ 
Mohmand 
Agency 
20/01/2011 Male 27-35 √   
20/01/2011 Male 36-45  √  
25/01/2011 Female 31-45   √ 
Bajaur 
Agency 
21/01/2011 Male 46-55 √   
21/01/2011 Male 18-26  √  
24/01/2011 Female 18-30   √ 
FR Peshawar      
3 
3 Region -3 
North 
Waziristan 
Agency 
22/01/2011 Male 36-45 √    
22/01/2011 Male 27-35  √   
FR Lakki   
  
4 Region -4  
South 
Waziristan 
Agency 
23/01/2011 Male 36-45 √    
23/01/2011 Male 27-35  √   
FR D.I.Khan      
Table 01. Focus-group discussions Agencies/FRs
A total of 19 FGDs were held as per the following plan (ordered according to dates)
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situation; an in-depth analysis of present called for a sample of 1,500 interviews with adult 
government's decisions in the aftermath of 9/11; men and women.  Current population statistics 
judicial system in FATA; trust on the type of Jirga for FATA are not available, so the first assumption 
systems, FCR and Olasi; importance of Jirga in was that the 1998 census would be accurate 
dispute resolution in FATA; selection of criteria enough.  
for a Jirga member; level of satisfaction on the 
The sample size of 1,500 was drawn from the 
type of judicial system; formal and informal  
total FATA population of 3.17 million (1998 
justice system of Jirga; economic incentives for 
Census Report). 1,200 people were selected from 
Jirga members; customs and Sharia' in Jirga; 
seven agencies and 300 from six Frontier Regions 
custom of Swara and the possibility of women 
of FATA by using a Proportionate Stratified 
and minorities involvement in the Jirga process; 
Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure a 
Jirga and fundamental guarantees, etc
representative sample from the entire 
II Quantitative population. The following table shows the 
sample size for each Agency and Frontier Region.
Aside from the Questionnaire, the key to 
successful social research is in the sampling One of the practical advantages of quantitative 
frame.  If well designed, the population and methods is the use of small samples of people to 
segments of it will be represented by a make inferences about larger groups. The 
manageable number of interviews. The objective researcher uses information gathered from the 
was to sample all of FATA with a sample size so survey to generalise findings from a drawn 
that the margin of error would be small. The sample about the sampled population, and 
desired margin of error of less than +2% was accepts planned limits of random error.  
arbitrarily chosen. This number, in reference to 
Margin of Error The overall margin of error with 
the estimated population of less than 4 million, 
all interviews pooled under “people of FATA” for 
Agency Population Sample size Margin of error 
Bajaur   595,227 243 6.30 
Khyber   546,730 223 6.60 
Kurram   448,310 183 7.20 
Mohmand   334,453 135 8.40 
North Waziristan   361,246 148 8.10 
Orakzai   225,441 92 10.20 
South Waziristan   429,841 176 7.40 
FATA Agencies Total 2,941,248 1,200 2.80 
Frontier Region    
Bannu 19,593 50 13.90 
D.I.Khan  38,990 50 13.90 
Tank 27,216 50 13.90 
Lakki 6,987 50 13.90 
Peshawar 53,841 50 13.90 
Kohat 88,456 50 13.90 
Frontier Regions Total 235,083 300 5.70 
FATA (Total) 3,176,331 1,500 2.50 
Table 02. Sample size for each Agency/Frontier Region
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single questions of a “Yes/No” nature is Bias due to Inaccessibility
approximately +2.5% at the 95% confidence 
As pointed out in the description of the selection 
level.  That is, if a random sample were drawn 
of villages, access to all villages was limited due to 
100 times, one would expect there to be less 
conflict and the threat of violence. Thus, the 
than a 2.5% plus or minus difference around a 
sample was created in more peaceful areas of 
sample result in 95 of the cases.
each Agency and FATA in general. One would 
Once the data set is partitioned, a look at specific expect, therefore, that not including people in 
FR or Agencies within those units shows that the the conflicted areas lead to a bias in the 
margin of error increases because of the smaller conclusions. Unfortunately, except for the ex-
population size and the proportional sample size. IDPs, we do not know in which direction the 
The right-hand column in the table 02 opinion of those areas would swing the results. 
summarizes the margin of error. The characteristics of the un-sampled villages are 
not known, but one could assume that they are 
Sampling Plan and Field Implementation
more rural and remote and would consequently 
Accessibility change the demographics and cultural 
perspective of the survey.
At the beginning of this project, CAMP gathered 
information on the accessible areas within FATA Selection of Respondents 
and a list of villages, towns and tehsils that were 
Method of selecting starting points 
not accessible because of security concerns, 
government imposed curfews, and/or extreme In villages, the survey universe was divided into 
weather conditions. four areas, i.e. two for male and two for female 
enumerators. In each area, two starting points 
Two stages were used to select the sample. In the 
were selected by male and two by female 
first stage, CAMP randomly selected accessible 
enumerators. Male and female enumerators 
tehsils. In the second stage, CAMP randomly 
interviewed three respondents from one point 
selected 150 villages/towns in the tehsils that 
and two from the other point. These starting 
had been selected in the first stage. CAMP 
points were local landmarks such as the Hujra of 
selected these 150 villages for Jirga perception 
a prominent Malik, famous shops, mosques, an 
survey in consultation with the local field 
Imam Bargah of Shiite community, schools and 
enumerators and supervisors. CAMP's FATA-
health facilities, etc. The enumerators (both male 
based field staff in different parts of FATA verified 
and female) would interview five respondents at 
the list. 
each point. 
A total of 10 interviews were assigned to each 
After selecting starting points, the male 
village. The gender balance in the overall sample 
enumerators selected a household on their left 
was achieved by setting gender quotas. In every 
hand while female enumerators selected a 
village and town, half of the respondents were 
household on their right hand. In some areas 
male and half were female. Because of the 
where the houses were scattered and this rule 
culture of the region, female enumerators 
could not be properly applied, the survey 
interviewed females and male enumerators 
enumerators made note of the difficulty on the 
interviewed males. 
contact sheet.
The resulting sampling frame is documented in 
Bias due to “Starting Point” Methodology
table 03.
The enumerators would interview five 
respondents by counting off every third door or 
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compound. This approach biased the sample Guidelines for replacing respondent originally 
towards the centre of villages: typically, the selected if unavailable (substitution)
wealthy or more established families are located 
During the respondents' selection, if a desired 
at these locations (case of the Hujra) or in close 
respondent was not available, the enumerators 
proximity. These would be the more urban and 
skipped three houses and knocked on the fourth 
educated citizens of the community and their 
door. Later on, the interviewer tried to contact 
status probably influences statistics such as 
the person who was not available initially. If the 
literacy, the use of media, educational status 
person was still not available after three 
when compared with a more general population 
attempts, the interviewer substituted the 
in those same villages and, of course, other parts 
contact person by applying the selection criteria 
of FATA and Pakistan. 
mentioned above. 
Method of respondent selection 
In summary, the overall sampling was robust and 
Before selecting the interviewees, the limited the margin of error for FATA-wide 
enumerators made sure that the respondents statistics. When specific agencies or FRs are 
were 18 years old or above, that they were noted, the margin of error must be considered.  
Pakistanis belonging to FATA, and were from the Overall, the urban and accessibility biases must 
Agency and from that particular village. The be kept in mind when reviewing the findings.
survey enumerators also ensured that the 
respondents had not participated in any survey 
in the last six months. 
S. #
 
Agency/FRs
 Total sample 
size X villages 
Total sample
 
A Agencies   
1 Khyber 10 X 22 223 respondents 
2 Kurram 10 X 18 183 respondents 
3 Mohmand 10 X 14 135 respondents 
4 North Waziristan 10 X 15 148 respondents 
5 South Waziristan 10 X 18 176 respondents 
6 Orakzai 10 X 9 92 respondents 
7 Bajaur 10 X 24 243 respondents 
B Frontier Regions   
8 Bannu 10 X 5 50 respondents 
9 Tank 10 X 5 50 respondents 
10 Peshawar 10 X 5 50 respondents 
11 Kohat 10 X 5 50 respondents 
12 Lakki 10 X 5 50 respondents 
13 D. I Khan 10 X 5 50 respondents 
GRAND TOTAL 150 villages 1500 respondents 
Table 03. Sample frame for Agency/FR
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Questionnaire field methodology for data collection. Their 
understanding on house skipping pattern and 
For this survey, CAMP used a structured 
following the left hand/ right hand rule was also 
questionnaire with both opened and closed 
at par. The supervisors were able to handle the 
response possibilities.  
field supervision through different checking 
Interviewer training methods. Feedback related to the substance and 
structure of the questionnaire was shared with 
Prior to conducting the survey, enumerators 
the senior management of CAMP.
were trained by independent consultants under 
the supervision of the CAMP's senior Data entry and cleaning
management, who observed the interviewer 
Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP 
training and pre-test interviews. The training was 
entered data for 1500 questionnaires in a 
conducted on the Questionnaire, methodology 
programmed database which was cleaned and 
and pre-testing from 23-24 December 2010.
put through using SPSS.
The pre-testing aimed to:
Survey Management and Monitoring
 Determine the time/length of the interview 
CAMP coordinated the survey project through a  Check the questionnaire's content  
Project Manager (PM) and project officer based 
 Check the skipping and coding patterns 
at the Regional Office in Peshawar. CAMP's PM 
 Correct and improve translation
The pre-tests were conducted with adult 
Pakistani males and females aged 18 and above 
in suburbs of Islamabad (Pakhtun residents 
areas) on 24 December 2010. The average time 
of the interview during the pre-tests was 40 
minutes. The minimum time taken to complete 
the interview was 35 minutes, while the 
maximum time was 50 minutes. Hence, the 
general understanding of the enumerators on 
the questionnaire was found to be satisfactory. 
The enumerators were able to handle the 
questionnaire well and they read out the 
questions to the respondents as written on the 
questionnaire without introduction of bias. 
Enumerators were also able to comply with the 
Table 04. Back-checking
Method of Back-check/Control   Frequency Percent 
Direct supervision during interview 117 7.80 
Back-check in person by supervisor 332 22.10 
Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central 
office 
70
 
4.70
 
Not subject to back-check 981 65.40 
Total 1500 100.00 
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Direct supervision
during interview
Back-check in
person by
supervisor
Back-check by
telephone by
supervisor or
the central office
Not subject to
back-check
4.70
22.10
7.80
65.40
Percent
Figure 1. Monitoring and evaluation of
interviews conducted
and project officer coordinated the initial focused mainly on Jirga and respondents 
training of the enumerators, the pre-tests as well appeared wil l ing and happy to 
as the field implementation. During the participate in this study.
implementation of the survey, CAMP's head 
3. As the sampling plan was based on the 
office regularly followed up with the PM and his 
feedback received from the field teams, 
project officer. The regional office, in turn, 
the areas where these interviews took 
coordinated itself closely with the field teams to 
place were relatively safe and accessible 
monitor the progress of the survey as well as to 
to the enumerators.
make sure that the survey and sampling plan was 
being implemented properly. Back-checking and method of contact
CAMP has field offices in Mohmand, Kurram, Table 04 provides the breakdown of the number 
Orakzai, Khyber, North Waziristan, South of questionnaires back-checked per Agency. 
Waziristan, Bajaur Agencies and FR Kohat of Back-checking was done by CAMP's five field 
FATA. These field offices were used for offices in FATA as well as from CAMP's regional 
supervising the survey. office in Peshawar. In table 04 is a summary based 
on the contact sheet used by the enumerators
Description of field team:  
Back-checking of the data collection process was 
1. The enumerators were from the areas 
conducted through different methods. 10.8% of 
where they interviewed respondents.
the total interviews were personally observed by 
2. The content of the questionnaire the supervisors during the interviews. 69.4% 
Table 05. Number of contacts and their verification by CAMP
Name of 
Agency/FR
 
Total 
contacts 
number  
Total 
calls
 
Confirmed
 
Telephone 
not 
responding 
Not 
present 
at home 
Refused
 
Orakzai 5 5 2 3 0 0 
Khyber Agency 64 35 22 7 5 1 
Mohmand Agency 19 14 10 3 1 0 
Bajaur Agency 7 5 3 1 1 0 
Kurram Agency 25 15 12 2 1 0 
North Waziristan 
Agency 4 4 0 2 2 0 
South Waziristan 
Agency 13 10 3 5 2 0 
FR Peshawar 14 7 3 2 0 2 
FR Kohat 10 6 3 1 1 1 
FR Bannu 7 5 2 1 2 0 
FR Lakki 5 3 1 0 1 1 
FR Tank 10 6 2 2 1 1 
FR D.I. Khan 27 15 8 3 2 2 
Grand Total 210 130 71 32 19 8 
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were back-checked by the supervisors during the field offices, local elders, and other contacts. 
data collection process by revisiting the villages 
Note: CAMP can provide the contact number of 
and obtaining a confirmation from the 
the local leaders/elders and other resource 
respondents, their family members or locals. 
persons for verification. 
3.10% of the interviews were back-checked and 
confirmed through telephonic contacts from 
CAMP regional office in Peshawar. 16.70% of the 
interviews were not back-checked and assumed 
that these were really conducted.
Apart from this, CAMP Peshawar office has also 
monitored the field data collection through their 
CAMP can also call and bring randomly chosen 
respondents from each Agency/FR to Islamabad 
for verification.  
Back-check by CAMP on 10 February 2011
CAMP regional office senior staff also made 
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Table 06. Contact Sheet & Reponse Rate.
S. # Agency 
Sample
 size  
No 
response
/ door 
locked  
Refused 
to 
cooperate
 
Age 
not 
required
 
Gender
not 
required
 
Nation
ality 
not 
required
Interrupted
interview
Successful
interview
1
 
Bajaur 
Agency 
243 44 0 0 0 0 27 243 
2
 
Mohmand 
Agency 
135 21 15 0 0 7 3 135 
3
 
Khyber 
Agency 
223 0 0 0 0 0 2 223 
4
 
Orakzai 
Agency 
92 3 1 0 0 0 2 92 
5
 
Kurram 
Agency 
183 10 13 0 20 1 0 183 
6
 
North 
Waziristan 
Agency 
148 8 11 0 0 0 0 148 
7 
South 
Waziristan 
Agency 
176 12 0 0 0 0 9 176 
8 FR Peshawar 50 1 15 0 0 0 0 50 
9 FR Kohat 50 0 16 0 0 0 0 50 
10 FR Bannu 50 0 1 9 3 0 0 50 
11 FR Lakki 50 1 1 2 2 0 0 50 
12
 
FR Tank
 
50 0 1 0 0 0 0 50 
13
 
FR D.I.Khan
 
50 5 0 0 0 0 2 50 
Total  1500  105  74  11  25  8  45  1,500 
Table 06. Contact sheet & reponse rate
contacts with respondents through telephone on the near future as well as the generally 
February 10-11, 2010. There are a total of 210 more conservative environment in these 
questionnaires carrying telephone numbers; two agencies as the primary reasons due 
these have been recorded in the database. Out of to which women were not being allowed 
210 respondents' contacts, 130 respondents to interact with survey teams. However, in 
were contacted. Out of these, 71 confirmed that our interaction with the field staff, we kept 
interviews had been conducted with them.  32 emphasising the need to interview 
respondents could not be reached because of women without jeopardizing the security 
weak network signals or because their mobile of the enumerators. The field teams were 
phone networks were blocked by a military eventually able to interview women in 
operation in the area. 19 respondents were not North and South Waziristan through 
at home at the time of the call and 8 refused to female enumerators. 
share this information because of the fear of ISI 
 Although there was unrest in Orakzai 
or Taliban. (Such conspiracy theories are being 
Agency during the time the survey was 
floated by vested interest groups to create a fear 
being fielded, CAMP did not experience 
among the local population). 
any delays there. 
Issues faced during back-checking
 Intermittent imposition of curfew in North 
Network Problem: In Kurram Agency, some Waziristan resulted in a slight delay in 
people use Afghan cell companies that are also delivery of the completed questionnaires, 
difficult to contact. Network signal strength while road blockades in Kurram led to a 
remains the main hurdle in contacting these substantial delay in the delivery of 
respondents. questionnaires.
Contact sheet and response rate
Successful Interviews / Successful Contact as 
per specification
Problems during field work and data entry
Below is a summary of major issues that emerged 
during field work causing some delays:
 There was a delay due to the military 
operation and curfew in parts of Khyber 
Agency, and CAMP had to wait a few extra 
days for things to settle down before they 
could complete interviews there.
 Initially, CAMP had difficulty interviewing 
female respondents in both North and 
South Waziristan. CAMP completed 
interviews with the male population 
relatively early in the project schedule. 
CAMP cited the deteriorating security 
situation, the local apprehensions 
regarding a possible military operation in 
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Chapter 2
Political and 
Administrative
Framework of FATA
3 thirty-seventh Lineal descendent of Saul of Introduction to Pakhtuns
8
Israel ”. Qais was a saintly warrior who lived near 
Any discussion of the Jirga system cannot be fully Ghur in Afghanistan in the seventh century. He 
understood without being aware of the culture converted to Islam and received blessing from 
and region where it is practiced. the Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). After this, 
his descendents moved to Kandahar. His three 
The Pakhtun roots are difficult to trace before the 
sons Sarbani, Ghilzai and Ghurghusht  became 
eleventh century AD, as the research is 
9
the three great branches of the Pakhtun race.complicated by migration, invasions and legends 
associating them with Greeks, Turks, Persians, However, most believe that Pakhtuns stem from 
4
Arabs and Hebrews.  However, it is generally the Aryans, who laid the foundation of this new 
10accepted that their culture and traditions were culture in around 1500 B.C.  Most modern 
firmly established between the twelfth and researchers of this theory agree that  the birth 
5
 fifteenth centuries.  place of Aryans liesbetween the Pamirs and Oxus 
11
which is known as Bakhtar.  The Dravidians, the People living on both sides of the Durand line 
6 residents of the area, were subjugated by Aryans, 
identify themselves as Pakhtuns.  The origin of 
fled the area and migrated to other parts of India. 
their language, Pakhtu (or Pashtu), is not clear in 
At that time, Aryans gradually settled in parts of 
spite of the tireless efforts of linguists and 
India, Afghanistan and Iran. It is also believed that 
historians. Their history has been laboriously 
Aryans formed three parts and that the one living 
reconstructed and pieced together from coins, 
in Bakhtar became the origin of Pakhtuns who 
inscriptions, and occasional glimpses of 
had settled in Balkh, Hirat, Kabul and Gandhara. 
fragmentary records written by envoys and 
7
geographers.  Two different theories, one based 
Pakhtun struggle against invaders
on religion and the other posited by ethnologists, 
are used to explain the origin of the Pakhtuns. In order to understand present-day FATA, it is 
important  to know the tribal Pakhtuns' constant 
Some believe that Pakhtuns are descendents of 
 struggle against invaders from Alexander the 
Israel; for instance, James W Spain claims that 
Great to the British, and their willing accession to 
Pakhtuns are the descendents of “Qais, the 
Chapter 2
Political and Administrative
Framework of FATA
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the present-day Pakistan. The present border is A. D without ever consolidating his empire 
16
there.not a chance growth but has evolved through 
centuries of political struggle between the 
In 1186, Mohammad Ghori from Afghanistan 
empire of India and those of Western and Central 
attacked Punjab and Benares, and defeated 12
Asia.  The frontier region has never been 
Rajputs before laying the first foundation for a 
stabilised due to the continuous invasions from 
Muslim state in India. The same route was 
the West, which resulted in the shifting of the 
followed first by Chengez Khan (Genghis Khan) in 
region from one empire to another. 
1212 A.D., when Sultan Altutmish ruled India, 
Well established records indicate that the lands and then in 1398 by Amir Timur Lane who 
that are now Afghanistan and Khyber wrought enormous destruction on the region 
Pakhtunkhwa have seen perhaps more invasions before being expelled. In 1526, Zaheeruddin 
in the course of history than any other country in Babar, the first Mughal emperor, came from 
13
Asia or indeed in the world.  At different points Afghanistan and defeated Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi in 
of its history, the area was part of India, then the battle of Panipat and laid the foundation of 
Persia, then again India, then Afghanistan, and the Mughal Empire in the Indian Sub-continent. It 
17
finally British India.  lasted until 1764.
Over long periods of time, the line of the Indus, or The Mughal Empire started to erode with the 
the escarpment of the mountains west of it, has death of the last powerful Mughal Emperor 
represented the boundary of constantly shifting Aurangzeb Alamgir in 1707, as his weak 
14
kingdoms or empires.  During those shifts, the successors were unequal to the task of holding 
Pakhtuns were sometimes subjugated, but at the empire together. Thus began the first, 
other times they themselves formed the tribal modern, Pakhtun consolidation known as the 
basis for the establishment of a small empire Durrani Federation. In the early 1700s, the 
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military leader of one of the principal Pakhtun ruling over other ethnic groups.  
groups, the Sadozai, led by the military leader 
When Alexander the Great invaded India in 323 
Ahmad Shah Durrani, had brought a second 
B.C., he conquered Afghanistan and then 
Pakhtun group, the Ghilzais, into the federation. 
advanced through the western part of the sub-
They went on to conquer and form the Durrani 
continent, where he faced resistance from the 
Empire that consolidated not only the other 
Pakhtun tribes. Alexander's Army, under the 
Pakhtun tribes on both sides of the Hindu Kush, 
direction of Gen. Seleucus, subdued the Pakhtun 
but also went on to try to conquer and hold parts 
tribes and the region became part of the 
of present day Iran, Northern Afghanistan, 
Macedonian Empire. Ashok the Great, in 250 
Kashmir and South into present day Sindh and 
B.C., also ruled over what is present-day 
Delhi in India. This vast empire was not possible 
Afghanistan and Western Pakistan. 
to sustain because the Sikhs, the Uzbeks, the 
Tajiks and others rebelled and pushed back in the In the ninth and tenth centuries A.D., there were 
late 1700s, and, internally, leaders in Kabul, Muslim invasions from Central Asia and 
Qandahar, Herat, Quetta and Peshawar always Afghanistan. At that time, these areas were 
18
under the control of Hindu Rajputs. Raja Jaypal contested power.
was the last Hindu to rule over the Pakhtuns 
In 1826, Dost Mohammad of the Mohammadzai 
when he was defeated by Mehmud Ghaznavi in 
family took the throne of Kabul. According to 
Peshawar. Mehmud Ghaznavi had followed the 
Fraser-Tytler, Dost Mohammad sent troops 
traditional invading route from Central Asia 
under his eldest son, Mohammad Akbar Khan, 
through the Khyber Pass and would invade India 19
through the Khyber to attack the Sikhs  in 1837 
on seventeen occasions between 1000 and 1026 
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during his struggle to regain territories lost to the had annexed most of the remaining independent 
Sikhs and to liberate his fellow men from the Sikh parts of India; the subcontinent's administrative 
20
yoke. borders followed its geographical boundaries, 
remaining thus until the time of independence 
Aided by Pakhtun tribesmen, Akbar's army 24
and partition in 1947.  The Second Afghan War, 
defeated the Sikhs under Hari Singh outside the 
like the First, was considered a fiasco by many 21
walls of Jamrud.  The first Afghan War (1839-42) 
Englishmen. However, from the stand point of 
was the result of the lack of cooperation by the 
the Frontier, the most important result of the 
British with Amir Dost Mohammad in his struggle 
Second Afghan War was that the British were 
to capture Hirat from the Persians. Four years 
now in possession of the Khyber, the Kurram and 
earlier, the Russians had promised Amir Dost 25
the Bolan Passes.  Note that these passes 
Mohammad that they would help him in 
continue to be links between the major routes of 
capturing Hirat as well as to regain territories of 
the old Silk Road that consisted of two routes: 1) 
Peshawar from the Sikhs, because they belonged 
the Kabul-to-Qandahar route and 2) the 
to Afghanistan. 
Peshawar-to-Quetta route.  These routes were 
Splitting the Pakhtun cultural area the highway system during the Durrani Empire 
and continue to be so for the Pakhtun culture of 
These struggles show how the Pakhtun areas on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; they also connected 
both sides of the Hindu Kush served as a buffer 
the rural and urban Pakhtun areas.
zone between the ancient cultures. Later, the 
26
Pakhtun culture area was not seen as a nation Both the Amir  of Afghanistan and the British 
and only the 'Afghanistan' north of the Hindu Government of India were desirous to  settle the 
Kush became the buffer between British India frontier of Afghanistan. Therefore on 12 
and the Russians in what became known as “The December 1893, the Agreement was signed by 
Great Game”. In order to counter the Tsarist Sir M. Durand and Amir Abdurehman. The agreed 
designs on 'Afghanistan' and to protect the line, bearing Durand's name, was drawn and can 
North-Western flank of India, the British made an be considered one result of the Second Anglo-
alliance with Sikhs and the deposed Shah Afghan War. The agreement brought the Khyber 
22
Pass and the highlands around Quetta within the Shujah  against Dost Mohammad. Shah Shujah 
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was promised the throne of Kabul while British-Indian sphere.  The cultural area of the 
possession of Peshawar would go to the Sikhs. In Pakhtun and the Durrani federation was split, 
a short time, the allied forces had captured Kabul and, to this day, the Pakhtuns have remained  a 
and other parts of Afghanistan, and Shah Shujah buffer between nations.
was briefly made Amir of Afghanistan  By January 
Way of life of the tribal Pakhtuns 
1841, both the British and Shah Shujah had been 
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Each Pakhtun tribe is comprised of various clans completely driven from the country.
(or Khels), sub-clans and finally extended 
By 1843, Dost Mohammad had returned from his 
families. Tribal society consists of many 
exile and  regained the control of his country. 
characteristics that provide a sense of unity and 
From then on, Dost Mohammad never 
cohesion. It is based on its inter-family linkages 
cooperated with British India in relieving the 
that then unite sub-clans, clans and tribes in a 
pressure of the fellow Pakhtun hill tribes on the 
web of kinship relationships. The family structure 
Frontier.
is the most complex feature of Pakhtun tribal 
society that shares family honour, property and The Second Afghan War of 1878-1880 was fought 
intra-familial relationships. under the command of Brigadier General Sir 
Neville Chamberlain. By that time, British India 
Each family is headed by an elder male, who, by 
25Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
ascribed status, is respected and whose Pakhtunwali
decisions are obeyed by the entire family. The 
Pakhtuns have preserved their centuries old 28
Maliks  head the sub-clans and clans. The Malik 
culture and tradition; they are men of guns 
position is hereditary; at times,  Political Agents 
through which they protect their honour. 
grant this title with the consent of the Governor. 
Pakhtunwali  is strictly observed and quoted with 
Maliks and Lungi holders are responsible for 
pride, being the Pakthun's dearest value and 
maintaining peace in their areas and for 
conducting and controlling their routine lives, 
providing valuable information about their areas 
behaviour and attitudes. There are three main 
to the Political Administration; they are 
obligations of Pakhtunwali on a Pakhtun 
responsible and accountable to the political 
elaborated in the following lines. 
administration in case of any conflict. The 
political administration pays allowances (Mojib) Milmastya: This principle describes the open-
and subsidies to these Maliks and Lungi holders handed hospitality and protection accorded to all 
for their services. who may or may not demand it. This custom is 
one of the greatest demands of Pakhtunwali. 
These descriptions of the traditional tribal 
Sometimes, protection (or hospitality) may be 
hierarchy and the FATA structure show how 
extended to an enemy as long as he remains in 
British colonial rule was grafted onto the tribal 
the host community; he is provided with an 
structure. The British used the existing structure 
escort that is called a Badraga. During the British 
of the society and made “Malik” an official title 
times, the status of Badraga was officially given 
under FCR 1901, thus giving the Maliks 
to local escorts called levies. According to the 
considerable prominence and a substantial role 
spirit of the term Milmastya, the guest is never to 
in their sub-clans, clans or tribes. 
be hurt, both because of the obligation of the 
Pakhtuns live as a pluralist community, living high regard for Milmastya and because the 
close to each other in kala (or qala'a), a fortress- obl igat ion  of  Badal  ( revenge)  would  
like compound comprising of many houses automatically be placed upon the host if he were 
occupied by an extended family. An extended to lapse in providing safety. There are numerous 
family consists of an elder head of family, incidents where hosts to strangers or even 
married sons and wives, unmarried sons and enemies have died or been injured when 
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daughters plus grandchildren.  James W. Spain defending their guests. James W. Spain, in his 
writes: book “The Pathan Borderland,” writes that a 
British Frontier Administrator  wrote into his 
“the Pathan is above all an individualist, despite 
official reports: 'Any person who can make his 
the rigid behaviour standards prescribed by clan 
way into their (Pakhtuns) dwellings will not only 
membership. Nonetheless, there are important 31
be safe, but will be kindly received. ”  
traditional and social factors which guide 
community life and in many cases influence or Badal: This concept is the set of customs and 
even determine the action of individuals. These actions concerning revenge.  The custom gives an 
mores vary considerably in different parts of the offended person the right to and necessity for 
Pathan area, and codification of them is virtually revenge by retaliation regardless of the 
impossible. However, certain of them are almost consequences. Originally, Badal could only be 
universal, and some knowledge of these is taken by the victim or, in case of a murder, by the 
essential to an understanding of what the Pathan victim's family against the individual or family 
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is and how he got that way. ”  who had committed the hurt or insult. Pakhtuns 
are generally perceived as a martial race and 
This un-codified set of rules, which guides the 
therefore, believe in revenge in his own way 
Pakhtun way of life, is called Pakhtunwali. 
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obligatory by the concept of Badal under the offended person or family forgives the 
Pakhtunwali. There have been feuds among person, that family will also defend the offender 
families, clans and intra-clans due to the non- from further punishment by both tribal and also 
mitigated concept of Badal; they may last for political administrators.  Thus, Pakhtunwali may 
years and sometimes for decades, going from be at odds with civil law and the formal 
generation to generation. In his book, Sir Wylly administration of justice by the state. 
writes the following about the tribal blood feuds: 
Jirga: Jirga refers to a practice and to the 
The Pathan enlists freely into our services  institution. In a few words, a Jirga is a gathering of 
there are at present moment something elders, convoked by an intermediary between 
like eleven thousand Pathans in the contesting parties, a Jirgamaar, to hear the 
Indian Army, and probably the recruiting arguments of the parties. The process is similar 
among the tribesmen was never brisker to binding arbitration because both sides of the 
than during the operations in Tirah of discussion agree to abide by the decision of the 
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Jirga1897-98. One thing, however, the elders.  The  is a conflict resolution process. 
Pathan recruit does not give up, “but 
Hujra: The Hujra is a male social centre and a 
brings with him to his regiment, keeps 
place where the unmarried males also sleep. 
through his service, must have leave to 
Visitors may be housed in this space, and food 
look after, will resign promotion to 
and tea will be served there. The Hujra as a room 
gratify, and looks forward to retiring to 
or area within a compound has been rooted in 
thoroughly enjoy  and that is  his 
Pakhtun culture and civilization forever. It is 32
cherished feud, ” 
considered as a mark of prestige not only as a 
Nanawati: There is a considerable confusion not furnished, but as a social area.  The main features 
only among English writers but also among of a Hujra are an opened patio-like area a 
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“Chopal”  where bed-like seats are arranged, writers from settled districts of Khyber 
and a couple of rooms. Village folk singers sing Pakhtunkhwa (former North West Frontier 
37
Tapa  on winter nights and during festivities Province - NWFP) as to the definition of this 
RababPakhtun using musical instruments like  and concept, which is also practised in other  
38
Mangey.  Nowadays, television and radio are areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and 
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HujraNanawati important components of a , and some may Afghanistan.  Although the sprit of  
include internet and computers. A Hujra may has faded in urban areas with the passage of 
belong to a rich man of a village who happens to time, it is still practised in the rural areas of 
Malik KhanPakhtuns be a  or .  However, it may also be  , especially in FATA and Afghanistan. 
common property of the village. In the Hujra, any 
Nanawati literally means to enter into a house 
and all matters of civil affairs are discussed and 
'begging for a pardon or forgiveness'. When a 39
may be resolved through a Jirga.  Marriage 
person realises that he has been at fault in a 
parties, funerals, and other rituals are celebrated 
killing, injury or insult of another person, he goes 
in a Hujra. Hujras are also used for raising 
to the Hujra, house or mosque of the aggrieved 40
Lakhkars  when needed. The Hujra is the place 
family and puts himself at their mercy, confessing 
where warring tribes or clans meet to agree on 
his fault and begging a pardon from the person or 41
Teega  to stop further bloodshed. 34
family whose sense of honour he had injured.  
 The political and administrative structure of On such occasions, the offender brings tokens or 
FATAgifts such as sheep or goats, and is accompanied 
by his family women as well as the  Qur'an in 
The Indian Independence Act of 3 June 1947 
order to show both his humility and sincerity. If 
abrogated all the special treaties. What was later 
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known as Pakistan opted not to base troops in the President or, as the case may be , the Governor, 
FATA region because 200 Maliks, during a Loya may direct that the law shall ,in its application to a 
Jirga, signed an instrument of accession with Tribal Area, or to a specified part  thereof, have 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and first effect subject to such  exceptions and 
Governor-General of Pakistan, in return for modifications as may be specified in the 
continued allowances and subsidies. direction.
On 14 August 1947, when Pakistan was created (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in 
as a sovereign Muslim state, it also recognised the Constitution, the President may, with respect 
the semi-autonomous status of the Pakhtun to any matter within the legislative competence 
tribes of FATA and the instrument of accession. of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] and the 
The 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions of Governor of a Province, with the prior approval of 
Pakistan retained the same agreements the President, may with respect to any matter 
recognising the special status of the FATA with within the legislative competence of the 
very few changes. Provincial Assembly make regulations for the 
peace and good Government of Provincially 
In Article 1 (c) of the 1973 Constitution of 
Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof , 
Pakistan, FATA is included as one of the territories 
situated in the Province.
of Pakistan and Article 246 (c) stipulates some 13 
tribal agencies and frontier regions (FRs) that (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in 
comprise the FATA. Article 247 prescribes the the Constitution, the President may, with respect 
manner and method of administering FATA and to any matter, make regulations for the peace and 
states that the executive authority of the good government of a Federally Administered 
Federation extends to FATA and that the Tribal Area or any part thereof. 
Governor of the North West Frontier of Pakistan 
(6) The President may, at any time, by Order, 
(now named Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), as directed 
direct that the whole or any part of a Tribal Area 
by the President of Pakistan, shall administer it. 
shall cease to be Tribal Area, and such Order may 
The other sections of Article 247 state that: contain such incidental and consequential 
provisions as appear to the President to be 
(2) The President may, from time to time, 
necessary and proper. Provided that before 
give such directions to the Governor of a Province 
making any Order under this clause, the 
relating to the whole or any part of a Tribal Area 
President shall ascertain, in such manner, as he 
within the Province as he may deem necessary, 
considers appropriate, the views of the people of 
and the Governor shall, in the exercise of his 
the Tribal Area concerned, as represented in the 
functions under this Article, comply with such 
Tribal Jirga.  
directions. 
(7) Neither the Supreme Court nor a High 
(3) No Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the 
shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal 
Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless 
Area or to any part thereof unless the President 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law otherwise 
so directs, and no Act of  [Majlis-e-Shoora  
provides:  
(Parliament)] or a Provincial Assembly shall apply 
to a Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, or to (8) Provided that nothing in this clause shall 
any part thereof, unless the Governor of the affect the jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court 
Province in which the Tribal Area is situated, with or a High Court exercised in relation to a Tribal 
the approval of President, so directs; and in Area immediately before the commencing day.
giving such a direction with respect to any law the 
Most of the civil, criminal, electoral and fiscal 
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laws have only been extended to the General' and then created a Secretariat headed 
'administered areas' or 'protected areas' of by the Provincial Governor instead of a 'Chief 
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FATA  through presidential ordinances; Commissioner of the Punjab;' finally, the title of 
however, no serious efforts have been initiated Political Agents replaced the 'Political Officer' as 
43 45 46
to properly implement these laws.  Besides, as the link to the tribal Malik  and Lungi holder.   In 
per the constitutional arrangement, the that way, aside from the upper and lower house 
President may, subject to ascertaining the views members with questionable powers, the 
of the tribal Jirga, abolish the status of a given Constitution retained the nondemocratic 
FATA region/Agency and convert it into a settled structure of appointees. 
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area.  The President may, from time to time, 
The renaming of the NWFP to 'Khyber 
issue directions to his agent, as stipulated in 4 7 t h
Pakhtunkhwa' (KP)  through the 18  
Article 145 of the Constitution. No Act of 
Constitutional Amendment of April 2010 
Parliament or any part thereof is extended to 
corrects two historical perspectives: 1) the 
FATA unless the President so directs, while Clause 
North-West Frontier perspective was based on 
7 of Article 247 bars the extension of superior 
the British Colonial view from central India as to 
courts, including Supreme Court and High Court, 
the relative location of the area, and 2) the 
to FATA unless the Parliament so provides under 
perspective that relegated or only recognised the 
a law. 
Pakhtuns as the people living in the region. When 
the Pakistani National Assembly approved this The President may make regulations with 
name change, they recognised the extent of the respect to any matter for the peace and good 
culture, area and implicitly the link between the governance of FATA or any part thereof. FATA is 
rural and urban areas of the Pakhtuns.represented in the Lower (National Assembly) 
and Upper (Senate) Houses of the Parliament by 
The structure of FATA administration
12 and 8 members, respectively. However, 
 
The British moved in to the area in the second because the parliament has no jurisdiction over 
th
FATA, it is not clear what importance the FATA half of the 19  century with the aim to keep 
representatives have. FATA is geographically Tzarist Russia away from the British India. The 
contiguous with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; however, people living in this region used to live in 
it has no representation in the provincial accordance with their own time honoured 
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parliament. customs and traditions.
The Constitution of 1973 does not allow the Soon after their ingress into the region, the 
people of FATA to fully participate in the political British realised the need for a framework of laws 
process. The Adult Franchise Act was only for a more repressive administration of the area 
extended to FATA in 1996 and was exercised in and its people. The consensus was reached that 
1997 general elections, while the Political Parties the existing system be codified in order that 
Act of 2002 has yet to be extended. This has kept there be no deviation from the manner in which 
the people of FATA away from the mainstream the people had lived for centuries  An 
politics of the country. According to the important aspect of the administration system 
government's official rules of business, the devised by the British was that the government 
responsibility for the “overall administrative and would not come into direct confrontation with 
political control of FATA” falls under the federal the tribes on issues that were contentious and 
ministry of states and frontier regions (SAFRON). divisive. An indirect system of administration was 
thus created for the FATA region. 
Hence we see how the Constitution substituted 
the President of Pakistan for the 'Governor- To implement the Constitutional provisions 
50
.
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described above, the President must be linked to government, while 'non-protected' areas are 
local, tribal structures through the office of the administered indirectly through local tribes. 
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Political Agent.  In most Colonial structures Protected areas are those areas where 
where tribal societies existed, the external government has invested in infrastructure such 
structure takes control of the local leadership as roads, hospitals, schools, grid stations, 
and hence annexes the tribal structure. The government offices, etc. 
region has a peculiar system of administration. 
Lack of participation in the process of socio-
The people are governed through their local 
economic development
chieftains called Maliks and through financial 
compensation controlled by the Federal The dated governance system in FATA does not 
Government and exercised by a Political Agent. It allow for the popular participation of local 
is this structure that has kept the transition from communities in the political and development 
Colonial to Constitutional times intact. Each sub- processes. The political vacuum paves the way 
division (Tehsil) is headed by its Assistant Political for obscurantist elements to fill the gap and 
Agent. The PA performs several functions at the exercise the authority that, otherwise, belongs to 
same time: he acts as an executive, a judge and a the state. This is exactly what has happened in 
revenue collector. He also heads the Agency FATA. Decades of exclusion from the mainstream 
Council and overseas development projects socio-political and economic development have 
while all line departments come under his alienated the people of FATA. 
authority.
Socio-economic indicators remain abysmally low, 
Present day FATA comprises of seven Agencies with literacy level at 17.40%, the male literacy 
and six Frontier Regions (FRs). They are: rate being at 29.50% and the female rate a pitiful 
3.00%. Health indicators are unavailable,  Khyber Agency
however, judging from the 1998 Census, one 
 Bajaur Agency
doctor is available for 7,670 people in FATA, 
 Mohmand Agency which indicates poor health conditions. Where 
 Orakzai Agency hospitals and clinics are running, they are 
generally low staffed, poorly equipped and  Kurram Agency
unhygienic. The majority of the people turn to 
 North Waziristan
traditional treatment or 'quacks'. There are 
 South Waziristan either no facilities for clean drinking water, and if 
 FR Peshawar they exist, they are mostly in a terrible 
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condition. FR Kohat
Nearly 60% of the population in FATA lives below  FR Bannu
the poverty line. With very limited economic  FR Lakki
opportunities, most of the population is engaged 
 FR Tank
in primary-level sustenance activities such as 
 FR D.I Khan agriculture and livestock rearing, or local small-
 scale businesses. Others are involved in trade The population of FATA is 3.17 millionas per 1998 
within the tribal belt or move down to other census report and its total area is 27,220 square 
48 areas of the country in the hope for better kilometers.  
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economic opportunities.
 FATA is divided into the administrative cateogries 
As mentioned in the proceeding chapter, policies of 'protected' and 'unprotected' areas. Protected 
for Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are areas are regions under the direct control of the 
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made at the federal level and local voices have 
never been properly incorporated. Although 
development plans exist and programmes have 
been implemented, most of them have been 
piecemeal and quick fixes. The Finance Minister 
announced an increase in FATA's Annual 
Development Plan from PKR 8.6 billion to PKR 15 
billion in June 2010, and an additional PKR 30 
billion were given to lawmakers from FATA in 
January 2011. According to a news report, 
“Interestingly, most corruption cases show that 
such projects (in FATA) are executed in such a 
manner that the money ultimately ends up in the 
pockets of parliamentarians and a few 'favourite' 
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local contractors. ” 
This approach has clearly benefited the elite, 
leaving little or no opportunities for the majority 
of the population to be economically or socially 
empowered. Women in particular have 
remained out of the folds of development due to 
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the tradition of 'Purdah' , while youth and 
minorities (both ethnic and religious) have little 
or no opportunity to express themselves or 
participate in the planning processes. 
Poverty has, to some extent, made the 
population vulnerable to extremist tendencies 
and criminality. In the absence of viable options 
to earn a living, the lure of illicit activities such as 
smuggling (consumer goods across the border), 
local firearms production, smuggling, and drug 
trafficking is as difficult to resist as the call of 
extremist Islamist elements. (FATA Sustainable 
Development Plan 2006-2015). 
Despite the difficult living conditions and lack of 
economic opportunities in FATA, there exists a 
strong and cohesive tribal structure that can be 
used to explore indigenous opportunities; the 
'tradition of local ownership and control of 
natural resources' is a strength among the local 
communities in FATA that motivates them to take 
part in managing their own resources in a 
sustainable way. Locals would contribute 
positively if ownership were to be developed 
from the beginning.
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Chapter 3
Jirga and the
Rule of Law in FATA
The following chapter deals with the mechanism may have settled the international discussion, 
of Jirga and its importance for the people of but there remained the internal problem for the 
FATA. A historical review and detailed definition British Colonial rule. The frontier area was a 
of Jirga system is given for its understanding in continuous source of trouble and a threat to the 
present times. Comparative studies about the stability of British India including access to the 
legal frameworks of different types of Jirga are passes through the Hindu Kush. To try to check 
included in this chapter. The functions and this threat, British India formulated a policy of 
organisation of FCR Jirga, Oalsi Jirga and persuasion, control, and armed interventions in 
Loya/Grand Jirga is an important subject of this these areas. Between 1849 and 1939, there were 
chapter. The information includes the perception approximately 58 military campaigns against the 
56
Pakhtun tribes by British India.of people and the legal existing system for FATA 
so that an analytical view of Jirga in different 
Several implementing agreements were added. 
situations can be drafted. 
One important  arrangement was the 
introduction of the Frontier Crimes Regulation Over the years, there has been lot of debate on 
Jirga (FCR) in six occupied Frontier districts of the legal reforms for  among different 
Pakhtuns in 1848. Initially, the ordinary civil and committees; legal experts are also included for a 
Jirga criminal law, in force in British India, had been critical view of  in FATA. Reports from Justice 
extended to such districts. However, the rate of Naimat Ullah Committee, Shiekh Abdul Hamid 
conviction under the ordinary criminal Commission, Mr. Justice S.A. Rahman law 
reforms Commission, Justice Hamood ur 
Rehman Commission and FCR reforms 
Committees of 2005-2009 are part of this 
chapter. The recommendations in these reports 
are addressed to have a legal perspective of the 
Jirga system in FATA. 
The agreement between Afghanistan and Britain 
law was 
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too low.   This led the British administration to 
devise a special law for the whole Pakhtun 
region, and, in 1871, a more encompassing set of 
FCR was enacted. They were modified in 1873 
58
and again in 1876.  These modifications 
continued through 1901 when the entire North-
Western Frontier region of British India was 
placed under the rule of the Governor-General of 
Chapter 3
Jirga and the Rule of Law in
FATA
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India, who governed it through the Chief sentiments. Such circumstances often make 
Commissioner of the Punjab Province and his them more successful than the contemporary or 
Political Officers of the British Civil Service. In modern justice system. The existing body of 
summary, the FCR has been operative for more literature confirms that the nature and causes of 
than a century as a special law prescribing trial conflicts and the mechanisms for resolving them 
procedures for offenses and civil disputes in the are deeply rooted in the culture and history of 
tribal areas. The judicial system enshrined in the every society; they are in many important ways 
FCR of 1901 has been described as a hybrid of unique to them. 
Colonial-era legal framework and traditional 
According to the Pashtu Descriptive Dictionary 
customs and norms to which executive direction 
(1978: 1272), Jirga is an original Pashtu word 59
has been added.
which in its common usage refers to the 
Because of its repressive set of rules that violate gathering of a few or a large number of people; it 
basic human rights such as freedom from also means consultation according to this 
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collective punishment, the FCR is regarded as a source.   However, in its operation, Jirga refers 
'Black Law' or 'Draconian Law' when judged by to a tribal/local institution of decision-making 
present-day international human rights and dispute settlement that incorporates the 
standards and principles. Nevertheless, it is prevalent local customary law, institutional 
basically the system of justice in place today, rituals, and a body of village elders whose 
which will be elaborated in detail in the coming collective decision about the resolution of a 
chapters. The FATA's Jirga system has become dispute (or local problem) is binding (socially and 
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morally) on the parties involved.  According to institutionalised in the present Constitution of 
James W. Spain:Pakistan under FCR. In order to implement the 
FCR, the British Colonial rule included a system of 
A Jirga in its simplest form is merely an 
administration, that is, a system by which the 
assembly….. Practically all community 
Governor-General of India, through the Chief 
business, both public and private, is 
Commissioner for the Punjab, engaged the local 
subject to its jurisdiction. In its operation, 
Pakhtun leaders through a 'Political Officer' who 
it is probably the closest thing to 
dealt with the Maliks and Lungi holders of the 
Athenian democracy that has existed 
tribes. Because the British Colonial structure was 
since original. It exercises executive, 
so similar to the present Constitutional 
judicial and legislative functions, and yet 
structure, the parallel details will be described 
frequently acts as an instrument for 
below. 63
arbitration and conciliation.
Defining Jirga
Mumtaz A Bangash, a professor at the Area Study 
Historically, individuals, social groups and Center, University of Peshawar, and a resident of 
societies have disputed and competed against Kurram Agency of FATA, describes Jirga in this 
one another over scarce commodities and way:
resources - land, money, political power, and 
The Jirga system ensures maximum 60
ideology.  In many parts of the world, traditional 
part ic ipat ion  of  the  people  in  
way of justice or locally integrated conflict 
administering justice and makes sure 
transformation or resolution institutions are 
that justice is manifestly done. It also 
being approached to resolve conflicts, and to 
provides the umbrella of safety and 
ensure peace and stability within local societies 
security to the weaker sections of the 
or tribes. Such institutions are often suitable in 64
tribal people from the mighty one.
circumstances in which they operate, as they 
satisfy the local cultural and religious Jirga or community-based traditional victim-
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offender mediation usually leads to a deep sense Types of Jirga
of satisfaction, fairness, and ability to move on 
Sarkari or FCR Jirga
with both the parties' lives. Pakhtun as well as 
JirgaPakhtun The FCR  is elaborated in detail in the non- s in Afghanistan have preferred 
Jirga subsequent section (Concept and legal  to formal justice according to recent 
framework of Jirga under FCR 1901); however, it research because it is conducted by respected 
is briefly described below. elders with established social status and the 
reputation for piety and fairness; and because it 
Sarkari or FCR Jirga refers to a Jirga sponsored by 
emphasises on the compensation of victims and 
the government, more specifically by the 
the reintegration of offenders back into the 
political administration led by political agent or 65 
community. Also, Jirga dispenses speedy justice 
his subordinates. The FCR Jirga deals with all 
and is more transparent, trusted and accessible 
criminal and civil cases in the administered areas 66
compared to the state justice system.  
of any particular Agency or Frontier Region (FR). 
Furthermore, in the process of  Jirga 
The laws are administered by the Political Agent 
proceedings, elders reach decisions in 
acting as a District Magistrate. He institutes Jirga 
accordance with accepted local traditions and 
with the consent of the disputant parties. The 
values (customary practices) that are deeply 
Jirga examines all the evidence within the 
ingrained in the collective conscience of the 
framework of the issues framed and submits its 
village/tribe. They have a profound existence in 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
the collective mind of the village and in the minds 
administration. 67
of its individual members.  Often obscured by 
The concerned government authority nominates the quasi-judicial role of the Jirga, its main 
two or more Jirga members depending on the function is to peacefully settle disputes (Teega) 
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complexity and importance of a case. It institutes rather than to adjudicate or pass a sentence.
Jirga with the consent of parties. The Jirga 
In cases of disputes, the people of FATA generally 
examines all the evidence within the framework 
prefer Jirga as a means to resolve criminal and 
of the issues framed, it calls the parties, listens to 
civil disputes and mediate tribal or sectarian 
both points of view, gathers evidence; analyses 
conflicts. However, they do actually have the 
the evidence and announces its verdict. The 
choice to alternatively bring a case before a state 
verdict  is  passed on to the pol it ical  
court and in some areas they can even choose to 
administration for his approval. 
refer to a court of the Taliban organisation or any 
The political administration has the authority to other group. This “forum shopping” really 
enforce such decisions though its Khasadar or indicates that there is a fierce competition 
Levies force. Hassan M. Yousafzai and Ali Gohar between traditional, fundamentalist and state 
elaborated the components of Sarkari or FCR oriented forms of conflict resolution. Only the 
Jirga in their book “Towards Understanding state promises (but not necessarily succeeds) to 
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Pakhtun Jirga'uphold human rights. If one wants to prevent the 
fundamentalist approach from further gaining  A government representative
acceptance in parts of the population, the offer  A case registered by one of the parties or 
of the state justice to the citizens must be cognizance of a situation by the 
carefully evaluated and ways found to improve it. government
 Written referral of the case to the Jirga 
The traditional Jirga deals with varying issues in 
nominated by the government official
the tribal areas including conflicts on land and 
 Recording of statements of the parties 
property, inheritance, alleged violation of 
by the Jirga
'honour' and intra-tribal/inter-tribal killings. 
 Visits to the disputed sites by the Jirga 
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members Olasi Jirga can:
 Recording of further evidence by the  Hold as many sessions as needed
Jirga members  Undertake any issue of interest or 
 Presentation of recommendations to concern to the community
the government agent  Announce any interim decisions
 Consideration, approval, or disapproval  Make new rules for the tribe, like grazing 
of the recommendations rights, water rights, etc
 Reference back to the same Jirga for  Call for other ideas
reconsideration in light of new facts  Invite volunteers as a work force
 Announcement of the verdict  Raise taxes for community work
 Right of parties to appeal  Go as a delegation, send delegation to 
 Implementation of the verdict parties 
 Send delegation to the neighbouring 
In all cases, the decision of Jirga members is 
tribe
unanimous. However, in case a party is not 
satisfied with the verdict, it can approach the Decisions made by Olasi Jirga are rarely 
appellate tribunal of the Commissioner and challenged, as it is perceived to be more 
revision proceedings can be initiated in the court credible and has legitimacy within the 
of the Home and Tribal Affairs Secretary (or communities. This statement can be 
Secretary FATA). supported by perception survey results 
elaborated in Part II of this report. 
Olasi or informal local representative Jirga
Loya or Grand Jirga
Olas means people. Thus, Olasi Jirga is an 
assembly of the elders comprising each Although Loya Jirga has not taken place in the 
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household of a certain village or community.  context of FATA, Afghanistan has convened this 
Olasi Jirga convenes to discuss various criminal form Jirga for centuries. In the Afghan political 
and civil disputes and resolve them consensually culture, Loya Jirga means a 'grand assembly' of 
so that all parties receive  compensation tribal and political leaders, religious scholar, 
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accordingly.  elders and others who assemble periodically in 
order to discuss important national issues and to 
When a dispute arises, elders approach both 
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reach collective decisions.  The issues that a 
parties and set up a Teega to prevent further 
Loya Jirga focuses on are usually of vital national 
aggravation of the situation. The monetary value 
interest such as the selection of a new ruler, a 
of Teega could be either money or weapon. 
declaration of war, the adoption of peace treaties 
Teega is usually maintained for a certain time 
or a new constitution, and decisions of vital 
period and then followed by a proper 
regional and international issues affecting 
constitution of a Jirga. The Jirga then takes time 
Afghanistan. The most well known of this form of 
to collect evidence, analyse the evidence, talk to 
Jirga in the history of Afghanistan is the 1747 72
both parties and villagers, and takes Waak  from 
Loya Jirga in Kandahar which crowned Ahmad 73
parties involved.  
Shah Durrani as the first king of modern 
76
The Jirga members may take time or hold as Afghanistan.  More recently, examples of Loya 
many sessions with parties as they deem Jirgas include the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga and 
necessary to take a decision. Again, Hassan M. the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003. The latter 
Yousafzai and Ali Gohar elaborated the decided upon the Post-Taliban Constitution of 
77
components of Olasi Jirga in their book “Towards Afghanistan.
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conceptions of the rule of law, which looks to the The legality and legitimacy of Jirga
outcome of laws against criteria such as justness 
At present, justice-related services in FATA or fairness.  
operate through two modalities: the official FCR 
The present assessment report supports the Jirga and community-based dispute resolution 
proposition that legality is an attribute of the FCR through the Olasi Jirga.  Throughout this report, 
Jirga, while its legitimacy amid FATA residents is the descriptions and analysis of the two 
quite limited as evidenced by their negative disparate forms of Jirga operative in FATA are 
perceptions of its ability to deliver just outcomes. based upon a conceptual division between 
By way of contrast, the Olasi Jirga is not formally legality and legitimacy.  The principle of legality is 
recognised by law, but is perceived as more easier to define and comprises the ideal that all 
legitimate by the population of FATA. While the laws should be clear, knowable, non-arbitrary 
FCR Jirga is convened under a system of rules and non-retrospective. Thus, its focus is on the 
inherited from the British colonial period, its written rules that comprise a state's system of 
processes, i.e. decision-making by a political statutory law, and the application by decision 
agent, and its sanctions, i.e. collective makers of those rules  which have been 
punishment, are generally known to FATA established beforehand - in a manner that does 
residents.  Moreover, it is backed by the force of not entail discretionary departures from 
law and coercive enforcement tools.  Thus, by established law.  In other words, the principle of 
and large, it possesses legality. On the other legality is closely related to the formalist 
hand, few respondents would identify FCR Jirga approach to rule of law, which tends to focus on 
as capable of delivering justice.  Alternatively, purely formal characteristics that a legal system 
community-based dispute resolution processes must possess, and shies away from assessments 
are not subject to state rules.  Also, their of the fairness of specific laws or legal decisions.
decisions cannot be legally enforced, and instead 
On the other hand, the principle of legitimacy is rely on the commitment of community members 
linked to the ability of a legal system to deliver to a shared set of cultural values.  However, this 
justice in a form that is acceptable to the people lack of legality for Olasi Jirga has not undermined 
it governs.  Indeed, it is the notion of justice that its legitimacy.  Indeed, what sets the Olasi Jirga 
makes laws meaningful to ordinary people in apart from FCR Jirga are its timely decisions, 
their day-to-day lives. But the idea of justice is limited costs, consistency with local notions of 
different for each society, informed by its equity derived from customary laws, as well as 
particular assessment of right versus wrong; in promotion of community harmony and stability. 
other words, its values and norms, and also its 
In the end, the present study lays bare that while expectations of the legal system. As one would 
FATA residents are able to access state and expect, in each society the notion of justice is not 
community-based dispute resolution processes static, but rather subject to change in response to 
to seek relief, it is due to compulsion in the evolving social, political and economic 
former case, while in the latter it is the result of conditions. In the end, for a particular legal 
the greater legitimacy of the forum and its system to be considered just, the present 
processes in the eyes of its adherents.normative values, sensibilities and expectations 
of a society must be reflected in the legal system. 
In other words, social definitions of justice 
should coincide with the institutions, laws, and 
procedures of a state's justice system. In this 
respect, legitimacy conforms with substantive 
Concept and legal framework of Jirga under FCR 
1901
The reader of FCR cannot find the word Jirga in it; 
instead, the FCR  metaphorically uses the term 
'council of elders' for Jirga. The FCR defined the 
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council of elders as “a council of three or more 
p e rs o n s  c o nve n e d  a c c o rd i n g  to  t h e  
Pathan.....usage as the Deputy Commissioner 
78
may direct”.  However, the 1973's Constitution 
of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in article 247(6) 
has formally used the 'tribal Jirga' in the context 
79
of changing the status of FATA.  
In protected areas of FATA, civil and criminal 
cases are decided by the political administration 
vested with both judicial and executive powers. 
One of the ways of seeking redressal of 
grievances against a person or group of persons 
is to approach the Political Agents' courts in the 
80
concerned tribal agency.  An application in the 
court of Political Agent or Assistant Political 
Agent may be filed in order  to initiate a case after 
fulfilling necessary inquiries and investigations, 
cognizance of the case is taken and a Jirga is 
constituted both for civil or criminal cases under 
the Frontier Crimes Regulation section 8 and 
81
section 11 respectively.  
A modified form of Jirga (Sarkari) was adopted 
for use by the PAs as a formal mechanism for 
dispensing justice and resolving conflicts in the 
FATA under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). 
The State plays a very distinct role in this case: 
either the aggrieved person goes to the PA, or the 
PA charges a person if he suspects a crime. In 
protected areas of FATA, political officers, vested 
with judicial powers, deal with civil and criminal 
cases. One of the ways of seeking 
84
own wishes in the form of a Jirga decision.  
The party that influences the political 
administration will easily get a favourable 
85
decision.  Under the FCR, the Political Agent or 
his assistant can refer and constitute the Jirga but 
in practice, these powers are mostly exercised by 
the Political Tehsildar (PT) and Naib Tehsildar 
86
(NT).  Implementation of the decisions of FCR 
Jirga is the responsibility of the political 
administration.
In non-protected areas, disputes are resolved 
through a traditional or Olasi Jirga at the agency 
level. The concept or format of the Olasi Jirga 
goes back to centuries-old traditions. Basically, 
the Olasi Jirga is convoked by a Jirgamaar after 
the disputing parties agree that a Jirga be held to 
resolve their conflict. Usually, the weaker of the 
two disputing parties goes to the Jirgamaar, who 
is an elder and a wise person, to explain the 
complaint. The Jirgamaar then goes to the other 
party to gain their agreement to be a party to a 
Jirga. If there is agreement, both parties agree to 
submit to the consensus of the elders who will 
listen to the dispute and then decide the 
resolution. Note that the cultural goal is to 
resolve the dispute or conflict so that the parties, 
families, tribes etc. will return to a harmonious 
relationship. Conflict is as dysfunctional to tribal 
life as it is in non-tribal societies.  Hence, 
culturally, the traditional 'Olasi Jirga' is still a 
redressal of the preferred form of justice/dispute resolution 
grievances against a person or group of persons mechanism in many Pakhtun-dominated areas of 
87
is to approach the administrative courts in the Pakistan.
82
concerned tribal agency.  The disputant parties 
Local mediators first intervene to achieve a truce 
under the FCR have the right to raise objections 
(Teega) between parties in a criminal case, or to 
relating to the nominated Jirga members, but 
obtain a guarantee (Muchalga) in cash or kind for 
the political administration rarely considers any 
civil disputes. Thereafter, parties must arrive at a 83
such objection in practice.   The case is then 
consensus concerning the mode of settlement 
referred to the FCR Jirga for Rai (opinion) and 
arbitration, Riwaj (customary law) or Sharia' 
verdict. Mostly, the Jirga opinion and verdict is 
(Islamic law). Once the mode of settlement is 
reached as decision of the political officer. It is 
agreed upon, mediators arrange for the selection 
alleged that in most cases, Jirga members sign a 
of a Jirga with the consent of the parties to the 
blank paper and afterwards an opinion is written 
dispute. Implementation of Jirga decisions in 
by the political administration according to their 
non-protected areas is the responsibility of the 
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tribe.  The Jirga may mete out punishment to an Limitations of FCR Jirga
offender, imposing a heavy fine. Occasionally, 
This section discusses areas of concerns of Jirga 
more serious measures may be taken such as 
under FCR. These concerns pertain to FCR 
expelling an individual or a family from the area, 
regulations, fundamental guarantees in the 
and confiscating, destroying or setting fire to 
context of Pakistani Constitution of 1973 and 
homes and property. In such cases, the entire 
Islamic law, equal protection guaranteed to the 
tribe bands together as a Lakhkar (army) to 
people of Pakistan, due process of law, absolute 
enforce the decision. If the political authorities 
powers of the political agent, and finally 
are a party to the truce, the violation may result 
international law and FCR. 
in addition to their displeasure, as it entitles the 
administration to suspend or repeal any of the Regulation of Criminal Justice under FCR 1901
economic benefits enjoyed by the offending 
In a 1991 judgement, Justice Amir-ul-Mulk 89
party.
Mengal of the Balochistan High Court described 
92
Pakhtun tribes in FATA generally support the the original purpose of the FCR:
Jirga as an efficient source of dispensing justice. 
“As known to us all, the legal system imposed by 
At the same time, they are of the opinion that the 
the British […..] was mainly intended […] to rule 
involvement of political administration has put 
the general masses through a class of loyal 
its status and future at stake because the political 
notables from amongst the area thus ostensibly 90
administration hand picks the Jirga members.  
depicting a policy of non-interference in their 
Decisions under the FCR Jirga often favour those 
centuries-old system of Riwaj; although in fact 
with political or economic clout at the expense of 
the object was to keep them away from a 
the vulnerable and weak party. Due to this 
universally recognised judicial system and 
situation, FCR Jirga has lost public credibility. 93
instead give them a sugar-coated legal device. ” 
On the other hand, the survey results and views 
Pakistan inherited FCR from the British Raj as an 
of the key informants support Olasi Jirga as the 
instrument of administration of criminal justice 
credible and most trusted institution providing 
in FATA, and has retained it until this day. With the 
cheep and speady justice to the local peole in 
passage of time, it became a 'black law' or 
FATA. The respondents of the focus-group 
'Draconian law' for the people of FATA due to its 
discussions, views of the key informants and 
harsh provisions. The FCR is not actually designed 
results of the survey admit the fact that money 
to institutionalise the traditional Jirga system, 91
and power have also influenced the Olasi Jirga. 94
nor to make adjudication its focus.  Article 11 of 
The dynamics of tribal society have undergone the FCR empowers the Political Agent to select, 
tremendous changes over the last few decades; convene and announce the final verdict, and 
money has become the status symbol and the sentence those found guilty, making him virtually 
tribal elders could not save themselves from its absolute powerful to administer criminal justice 
influence. However, they still prefer the Jirga in FATA. The concentration of powers in the 
system over the formal judicial system in tribal hands of Deputy Commissioner (Political Agent) 
areas (and in other parts of the country) since the reflects the importance given to local 
latter has drastically failed to deliver justice. administrators. Thus, while the FCR provides for 
Moreover, common people in tribal areas are overall maximum punishment of fourteen years 
economically disadvantaged, and cannot afford imprisonment and individual limits under several 
the litigation expenses incurred during the measures, it leaves the door open to arbitrary 
95
action and abuse.  Imposing collective penalties formal judicial processes.   
on communities accessory to crimes, imposing 
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collective fines on communities where murder or years at a time, seize their property, and impose 
culpable homicide is committed or attempted, fines, all without any requirement of ordinary 
99
criminal trial.recovering fines in default and direct forfeiture of 
public emoluments are the powers the political 
The US State Department's Human Rights Report 
agent uses to regulate the life of the people in 
confirms that in96
FATA and control them.  Importantly, a political 
agent who has acted without regard to local 
justice and also without due process undermines 
the credibility of justice system in FATA.  In sum, 
the FCR is fundamentally not designed to deliver 
justice it is essentially about controlling the 
people of FATA.
FCR and Constitutional guarantees 
The FCR, which does not provide legal 
The 
guarantees for human rights in FATA and indeed 
governance system established by the FCR also 
effectively codifies authority for a range of 
violates Pakistan's international obligations 
human rights violations, is part of a tapestry of an 
assumed under ratified human rights treaties 
antiquated and draconian system of limited 
and under customary international human rights 
government with little or no recognition of or 
law. The judicial system provided by FCR is thus 
respect for human rights, the rule of law, due 
severely f lawed from a human rights 
process, political representation, or democratic 102
perspective.97
institutions.  Nevertheless, based on the FCR, 
the Political Agent is a judge in addition to his 
other executive functions. The FCR also provides s
for a system of collective territorial responsibility 
and collective punishment. Though Part II of the In 
Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 lists a range of the FATA region, ensuring social justice is quite a 
“fundamental rights”, Part XII explicitly excludes daunting task. The Jirga is a purely (but Nanawati 
most or all of FATA from the legal, judicial and includes at least one woman) male institution 
parliamentary system of Pakistan: Article 247(3) and neither sanctions women as member, nor as 
of the Constitution explicitly excludes FATA from a witness or a complainant. Women may access 
all acts of the Pakistani parliament and the Jirga only through a male relative. In case of 
98  
grievances against her male relatives, no Supreme Court,  respectively. A particularly 
recourse whatsoever is available. If a woman problematic aspect of the FCR is its explicit 
approaches (which is rarely the case) a Jirga, it authorisation for the PA to mete out collective 
brushes her off, saying that, 'domestic issues penalties against an entire community for 
need to be resolved within the family'. (In alleged infractions by any of its members. 
Afghanistan, women prefer Jirga over the state Chapter IV of the FCR allows the PA to “blockade 
courts; See: Smith, D. (2009) Community-based … hostile or unfriendly tribe[s]”; and to assess a 
dispute resolution Processes in Nangarhar fine on “communities accessory to crime”. In 
Province, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation exercise of his judicial powers under Chapter IV 
Unit: Kabul: AREU.)and V of the FCR, the PA can order the arrest 
without warrant in cases under Section 498, 
Furthermore, under international Human Rights 
Indian Penal Code and can detain individuals or 
Law, Pakistan is obligated to ensure the 
entire communities be detained without trial for 
 FATA and the less-governed 
areas of the Provincially Administered Tribal 
Areas (PATA), security forces may, under the FCR, 
restrict the activities of terrorism suspects, seize 
their assets for up to 48 hours, and detain them 
100
for as long as one year without charges.  The 
report further states that in many cases these 
prisoners were held incommunicado and were 
not allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their 
choice; oftentimes, family members were barred 
101
from prompt access to detainees.  
Informal justice systems that lack the legal 
protections of institutionali ed justice systems 
have continued, especially in rural areas, and 
sometimes resulted in human rights violations. 
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enjoyment of rights to everyone living in its official Jirgas, the immense power of the PA, lack 
jurisdiction. The FCR Jirga in the FATA infringes of political will and the supremacy of vested 
these rights. In order to fulfill its obligations to all interest have viciously influenced the human 
its citizens, the Government of Pakistan must rights question in tribal areas that may take even 
ensure that if FCR Jirga system is allowed to years to be remedied . 
function as they do today, it must 'play by the 
It will be interesting to mention some of the 
game', i.e. comply with the human rights 
observations of the committees' formed by the 
standards enshrined in the Constitution of 
government to examine the systems under the 
Pakistan and international human rights treaties 
FCR.
which Pakistan has ratified. 
Women rights concerns
Human and women rights concerns 
The reliance on Jirgas under the FCR in practice 
Many voices in FATA, particularly among the 
discriminates against women by providing them 
“common” people, do not accept this system. 
no access to the tribal councils that in the case of 
For example, Section 8 and 11 of FCR authorising 
many disputes may decide their fate and whose 
the political administration to refer cases to the 
procedures include few or no rights or 
council of elders (i.e. a non representative hand 104
protections for those affected.  Although 
picked Jirga) were challenged before the higher 
decisions are considered objective (as the 
judiciary in Toti Khan Vs District Magistrate Ziarat 
decision maker is nominated by both sides) and 
and Sibi. The chief justice A. Rehman accepting 
are based on tradition and religion, critics believe 
the petition declared these two articles to be  
that what is acceptable to society sometimes 
discriminatory. 
violates women's and minorities' human 
105
In another similar case, Khan Abdul Akbar Khan rights.   
Vs Deputy Commissioner Peshawar, the FCR's 
A Pakhtun woman does have an identity: a name, 
provisions were challenged on the principles of 
is someone's daughter, mother and wife; and 
article 5 of the then Constitution of 1956 and 
some young tribal women are doctors, teachers, 
justice Kiyani ruled them out as “discrimination 
etc. Moreover, a woman is  seen as the guardian 
between a Negro and a Whiteman.” These 
of tribal/familial honour among most Pakhtuns. 
efforts would have brought about  positive  
Thus, as a woman can easily 
results, but the 1958 martial law abrogated the 
Constitution, which brought an end to the law 
reforms process and enabled the FCR to reign 
103
supreme.
Sharia't courts were established in 1979; the FCR 
was challenged before the Sharia't bench of the 
Baluchistan High Court under Maulvi  
Mohammad Ishaq Khosti Vs government of 
Baluchistan case. The bench declared that the 
FCR runs afoul of  the basic principles of Islam. 
However, the decision was applicable to PATA 
only. Despite these categorical judgments by the 
superior judiciary against the FCR, it still remains 
a decisive law in the administration of justice for 
a population of approximately 7 million. The net 
result of this whole discussion is that the FCR, the 
bring shame to the 
male-dominated extended family/tribe, she 
does exercise a significant degree of hidden 
control over them. However, both the 
government and the civil society have been 
consistently ignoring women's voices in the 
106
ongoing debate on reform in FATA.  Various 
reform committees, for instance, the FATA 
Reform Committee, convened by Prof. Mumtaz 
Bangash in 2000, and the Committee for 
Amendment in FCR, constituted by the federal 
government, in 2005, did not include a single 
female member. Representatives from FATA in 
the National Assembly and Senate have always 
been men; no woman has ever contested or 
107
been elected to these seats.
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Notions,  inst i tut ions and customs of  into the mainstream of the country. They reject 
Pakhtunwali have been interpreted and the notion that Jirga has been delivering quick 
practiced to exercise, justify and reinforce and cost effective justice. Jirga makes a decision 
patriarchal authority. Pakhtunwali, with an after several meetings and both parties have to 
admixture of Islam, has throughout the ages arrange grand feasts, at times, gifts are offered to 
been used to establish superiority of men over the Jirga members also, costing much, to get a 
women in the Pakhtun-dominated areas judgment. 
1 0 8
general ly  and in  FATA part icular ly.  
FCR Jirga seems to deliver very little justice 
Nang/Ghairat (Individual and family honour), 
specifically in women-related issues. Victims of 
the most fundamental notions of Pakhtunwali, 
domestic violence find no recourse. There is 109
revolve around women and land.  Man claims 
nothing to protect these women. The traditional 
to have the right to control a woman's body, 
village elders do not intervene because violence 110
thoughts and emotions.  Any real or imagined 
by husbands or in-laws against women is 
violation of the boundaries, drawn by man, 
considered to be a family affair. There is no court 
grants him the right to even kill her with impunity 
or traditional forum where they can lodge a 
111
in the name of honour.
complaint or seek assistance. There is no inbuilt 
mechanism in tribal society or customary law to Divorces are also very rare if not non-existent in 
redress such grievances. Tribal women prefer the FATA. Women are told at the time of wedding to 
extension of Pakistani Courts to replace Jirga; bear everything in silence, as there exists no 
 
however, they are concerned that men will never recourse for anybody not even the parents, to 
accept Pakistani law and courts, since, if a woman turn to in case of dispute with the husband or in-
commits a crime, or brings a bad name, men laws. If there is dislike and conflict between wife 
prefer to kill her inside the four walls. They will and husband, the husband will marry another 
112
never let her go to prison. In tribal culture, it is girl if he is rich and keep his first wife as well.
not even thinkable. In proposed reforms, no 
In addition to blood feuds, honour related 
where has there been a proposal to include 
disputes are also settled giving/taking Swara. A 
women in Jirga. Throughout the reform process, 
woman given as Swara is treated very badly by 
involvement of women members has never been 
113
her in-laws;  however, male members of the 
taken into account. 
society deny this fact and argue that Swara may 
114 There seems a dire need to articulate issues prevent bloodshed and enmity.  However, the 
concerning tribal women such as lack of health, fact remains that an innocent girl has to pay the 
education and employment opportunities, price for the sins of her male relatives. 
restrictions on mobility, bride price, domestic 
Women activists severely criticised the custom of 
violence, denial of share in inheritance, 
Ghag or Jagh (declaring claim by a man over a 
representation in parliament and Jirga as well as 
1 1 5
woman) for marriage.  Where males 
consent marriage.
 
(particularly paternal cousins) have a birth right 
The Right to Judicial Autonomy / to marry female cousins, even far better 
Independence proposals for girls cannot be accepted regardless 
of any mental or physical disability of males. This 
Judicial autonomy and judicial independence - 
 
implies that if somebody has an advanced claim 
terms that are used interchangeably is a slippery 
(Ghag) over a girl and if anyone else is wishing to 
concept difficult to define let alone to measure, 
 marry her, he will have to deal with the claim. 
and lies at the crossroads of different 
116Women rights activists struggle to end the 
perspectives.  For the sake of clarity, judicial 
special status of FATA and suggest to bring FATA 
autonomy here means separation of judiciary 
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from the other powers of the state. Judicial purpose of the discussion. 
independence is the concept that decisions of 
The Convention states in article 1 that “Members 
the judiciary should be impartial and not subject 
of tribal or semi-tribal populations in 
to influence from the other branches of 
independent countries whose social and 
government or from private or political interests. 
economic conditions are at less advanced stage 
In a broader sense, the concept of independence 
than the stage reached by other sections of the 
of the judiciary is not limited to the extent of 
national community, and whose status is 
disposal of cases by the judges and discharge of 
regulated wholly or partially by their own  
judicial functions; instead, it emphasises  
customs or traditions or by special laws or 
institutional independence  administrative and 122
regulations”.  Furthermore, article 8 of the 
financial autonomy and the right to a fair and 
Convention states that:
expeditious trial.
To the extent consistent with the interests of the 
Pakistan's Constitutional fabric has promised the 
national community and with the national legal 
independence of the judiciary since its 
system:
establishment, something that is evident from 
(a) The methods  of social control practiced the resolution (popularly known as the 
by the populations concerned shall be used as far Objectives Resolution) moved by the then Prime 
as possible for dealing with crimes or offences Minister Liaquat Ali Khan before the National 
committed by members of these populations;Assembly. The resolution laid down the "Aims 
and Objects of the new Proposed Constitution" 
(b) Where use of such methods of social  
and guaranteed that "the independence of the 
control is not feasible, the customs of these 117
judiciary shall be fully secured".  Therefore, the 
populations in regard to penal matters shall be 
Constitution explicitly laid down that the 
born in mind by the authorities and courts 
judiciary should be separated from the 123
dealing with such cases.  118
executive.  The Pakistani judiciary also 
The ordinary meaning, context and rationale of underlined that if the judiciary of a country is 
citing these articles is that Pakistan is under stripped of its powers, the country would cease 
119 
to exist as a democratic nation. obligation to give judicial autonomy to tribal 
judicial institutions to a certain degree. However 
Pakistan has committed itself  to the 
this concept of judicial autonomy and/or 
international community for independence of 
independence is under transition process in 
the judiciary and respect for the rule of law 
other parts of Pakistan but is denied to the 
through the ratification of international treaties. 
people of FATA. As under the FCR both executive 
For example, the ILO Convention No. 107 
and judicial powers are delegated to a single 
adopted in 1957 was the first comprehensive 
authority i.e. the political administration. This 
international instrument relating to the 
statutory legal cover gave licence to the 
protection and integration of Indigenous and 
executive to procure the intended results from 
Other Tribes and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
the Jirga, which resulted in making the Jirga 
Independent Countries and was ratified by 
system corrupt, leading to a sense of alienation 
Pakistan in 1960. The Convention No. 107 used 
of the FATA people from the rest of the country. 
patronising language, referring in its Article 1 to 
some populations as “less advanced” and FCR Jirga and due process of Law
promoting an assimilationist approach. Although 
A deeply rooted principle in legal jurisprudence is 
this convention remained under serious 
the concept of the due process of law, 120  121
criticism  and was considered ineffective,  it 
traditionally divided into the two categories of 
offers some safeguards relevant here for the 
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substantive due process and procedural due law which hears before it condemns; which 
process. In general, substantive due process proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment 
prohibits the government from infringing  only after trial. The meaning is, that every citizen 
fundamental Constitutional liberties. By shall hold his life, liberty, property, and 
contrast, procedural due process refers to the immunities, under the protection of the general 
procedural limitations placed on the manner in rules which govern society. Everything which 
which a law is administered, applied, or may pass under the form of an enactment, is not, 
128
therefore, to be considered as law.enforced. Thus, procedural due process prohibits 
the government from arbitrarily depriving 
So should the mechanism offered by FCR to 
individuals of legally protected interests without 
decide the cases/disputes be regarded as 'law'? 
first giving them notice and the opportunity to be 
This question was first considered by the then 
heard. Hence, due process of the law is the right 
Justice Cornelius in the administrative case of 
to be treated fairly and have a defending chance 
Samundar Vs. The Crown even before the 
when facing legal action. 
introduction of the fundamental rights concept 
 
in Pakistan. Since then, whenever the issue of The concept of due process of law has been
due process arises, the interpretation of expressly, albeit recently incorporated into the 
th
Constitution of Pakistan by way of the 18  Cornelius is cited, given its very detailed 
Amendment introducing article 10A: 'a person reasoning. Outlining the controversial aspects of 
124
shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process”.  the Regulations (FCR), Cornelius J laid down that 
 
However, the protection of life and liberty was if Article 11 is regarded as a mode of 'justice', the 
guaranteed by virtue of articles 4 and 9 of the mechanism it creates is not in accordance with 
 129 
Constitution before the incorporation of article the law of procedure and of evidence.
10A. These articles enunciate what the Supreme 
“In the case of Jirgas, no procedure of 
Court of Pakistan describes as being “as 
any kind is laid down. The [only] 
comprehensive as the American 'due process of 
requirement is there should be such 125
law' clause in a new garb.”  Article 4 states that:
inquiry 'as may be necessary' and that 
(1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be the accused person should be heard. 
treated in accordance with law is the inalienable [....] [It] seems clear enough that the 
right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of intention of the Regulation also is that 
every other person for the time being within none of the recognised rules of evidence 
Pakistan. should be binding upon the Jirga. The 
main principles which underlie the law of 
(2) In particular: 
evidence are exclusion of irrelevant 
no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, matter and of hearsay, coupled with 
reputation or property of any person shall be insistence upon the production of the 
126
best evidence, and upon a strict taken except in accordance with law.
application of these rules depends the 
Though Article 9 is narrow in scope, it 
safe administration of justice. [...] Jirgas 
strengthens Article 4:
sometimes declare that they have held 
'open and secret inquiries', which 9. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty 
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suggests investigations of a nature save in accordance with law.
entirely different from those which are 
In the case of Manzoor Elahi, the word 'Law' was 
permissible in a Court of Law. [....]
interpreted by Anwar ul Haq  as:
It is likely that some, and it may be a 
By law is most clearly intended the general law; a 
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considerable portion, of the evidence more clearly analysed the mechanism of Jirga by 
which is satisfied the Jirga received ex- remarking in the person of  Justice Salahuddin 
parte ,  and thus without cross- that, “as there were no rules of procedure or 
examination. [...] Moreover, information evidence, no possibility of being represented by 
gathered by putting questions in open counsel and denial of any right of appeal to the 
assembly can never have the quality of superior judiciary, the FCR constituted 'a denial 
judicial evidence, nor can information of fundamental fairness shocking to universal 
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sense of justice'”.  Anwar ul Haq opined that “a obtained by secret investigation be so 
Jirgas trial under the Frontier Crimes Regulation cannot regarded.  may also take 'official 
be regarded as a trial in accordance with law, the notice' of certain matters [....]. For an 
term “law” being understood in the sense of a administrative agency, the taking of 
valid law in terms of the Constitution as well as 'official notice' may be perfectly in order, 
accepted forms of legal process prevailing in but it is highly prejudicial to the 
132
dispensation of justice. Pakistan.”
The process of decision provided under The FCR was also weighed against 'Sharia't in the 
the Regulation is also foreign to justice as case of Muhammad Ishaque Vs. Government of 
administered by the Courts. The hearing Balochistan, where it was declared contrary to 
is before a Jirga but the power of the spirit of due process as emphasised by Islam:
decision is vested in the Deputy 
“Under Islamic laws every case is to be 
Commissioner, who does not see or hear 
tried and decided by the same Court; so 
the accused or any of the witnesses, and 
that the Court should see for itself 
is not empowered by law to do so, even if 
whether or not the evidence adduced by 
he should  so  des ire.  In  these 
the parties inspired confidence if so, to 
circumstances, the Jirga is merely an 
what extent. Again for testing the 
advisory body, and since the Deputy 
veracity of statements of the witnesses 
Commissioner, does not have the case 
examined by him, the Presiding Officer 
presented before him through counsel, 
was bound to follow glaring and 
it is obvious that his decision is wholly 
undisputed principles of Islamic Law, 
vicarious. Decisions of this nature are 
such as cross-examination of a witness, 
common enough on the administrative 
Court questions watching of witness 
side, but they are obnoxious to all 
demeanour and application of any other 
recognised modern principles governing 
proper method to test witness's 
the dispensation of justice. [....] The 
credibility […] There is also no rule of 
mere fact that a revision is permitted 
corroboration of the statements of 
does not remedy the situation in this 
witnesses upon which Islam lays much 
respect.
stress […]. [The] Holy Qur'an has also 
[Finally,] to allow an appeal would be expressly barred use of hearsay evidence 
plainly contrary to the intention of the [….]. In the light of above it is apparent 
authority which enacted the Frontier that the manner in which trial is held 
Crimes Regulation, 1901 which was to under FCR and in particular so much of it 
leave the Deputy Commissioner and the which relates to the collection of 
Commissioner practically unfettered in evidence and its use is patently against 
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relation to their decisions.  the tenets of Islam”.  
The Supreme Court in the case of Manzoor Elahi 
47Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Earlier reforms of FCR the trial of offences, the session judge should 
preside the tribunal and if s/he needs help (for in-
North-West Frontier Committee
depth understanding of the traditions of 
In 1921, a six-member-committee of legislatures tribals!), s/he should be assisted by jurors from a 
was set up to examine the civil and judicial carefully selected list prepared by the 
working of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in government rather than by a council of elders. 
NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The The parties should be allowed representation 
committee included five non-official Indians through legal practitioners. The committee also 
legislature and three English civilian members of recommended that only a limited and specified 
Punjab commission. The five Indians came from nature of cases should be referred to the tribunal 
Utter Pradesh, Madras, Bombay,  Punjab and the and the rest of the cases should be processed 
NWFP respectively. through the ordinary courts system. However, 
the government did not show any willingness to 
In the discussion, the judicial system of NWFP 
accept  the  recommendat ions  o f  the  
system was criticised due to the excessive use of 135  
committee.    
certain provisions of FCR (as opposed to the 
judicial system of other parts of the country). But Sheikh Abdul Hamid Commission
the committee, instead of recommending some 
In 1958, the government of the newly 
appropriate amendments in the context of the 
independent country of Pakistan nominated a 
legal system, recognised the value of FCR by 
commission under the supervision of Mr. Justice 
saying: 
Sheikh Abdul Hamid of the West Pakistan High 
Court. The commission was tasked to examine “To repeal its civil sections would be to inflict 
the judicial set up under the then FCR in the grave hardship on the Pathans, who rely on them 
Quetta and Kalat divisions and to suggest for a cheap and expeditious settlement of their 
Jirga appropriate changes in order to bring it into disputes by a …. To repeal the criminal 
conformity with the Constitution and the rest of sections would be to undermine the forces of law 
the parts of the country without failing the local and order and to deprive the Hindus, in 
requirements. The commission recommended particular, of one of their greater safeguards, in a 
“the withdrawal of the Frontier Crimes land where passions are hot, blood feuds are 
Regulation, 1901, in the two divisions, and the endemic, legal evidence is exceedingly difficult 
abolition of special areas (now Tribal Areas) but if to obtain, and refuge from the arm of the law is 
for any reason, it was found necessary to retain close to hand across the border. To repeal the 
these special areas, then the jurisdiction of the trans-frontier sections would be to paralyze our 
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whole system of trans-frontier control.” High Court and the Supreme Court should be 
extended to these areas”. But like the 
Justice Naimatullah Committee
recommendations of earlier committees formed 
A nine member committee headed by Mr. Justice by the British rulers, the government did not pay 
Naimatullah of the Allahabad High Court heed.
examined the FCR again in 1931. The committee 
The Law Reform Commission administered by 
called for the elimination of the dual justice 
Mr. Justice S.A. Rahman
system that was being practiced in the then 
NWFP. The committee had serious concerns The Law Reform Commission administered by 
about the Deputy Commissioner's powers to Mr. Justice S.A. Rahman of the Supreme Court of 
exclude the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Pakistan in 1958 was formed to judge the 
However, the committee recommended that if possibility of replacing the special laws (of FCR) 
the retention of the tribunal was necessary for with a different formal legal system. The 
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FCR.  The subcommittee's report has not committee suggested the abolition of special 
been made public yet. laws, but due to the existing peculiar 
conditions of certain parts of the province, 
2) The then Governor of KP also constituted a 
these laws continued to exist. Some 
review committee under the Chairmanship 
amendments were proposed in the Jirga 
of former Justice Supreme Court, Mian 136
System but remained without effect.  
Mohammad Ajmal, which submitted its 
Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission report in 2006. The committee was tasked to 
recommend necessary amendments and 
Under the leadership of Mr. Justice Hamood-
modifications in certain clauses of the law. In 
ur-Rehman, Judge of Supreme Court and the 
a workshop organised by CAMP in 2009, 
then chief justice of Pakistan (1967-70), 
Retired Mian Ajmal said that the Committee 
another commission was formed to examine 
has proposed many changes including a 
the judicial process under this special law of 
change of the law's name. Besides a decrease 
FCR; it gave the following observation:
in the powers of the Political Agent proposed 
“They have neither expedited the trial of by the committee, it was suggested that 
criminal cases nor have they proved a judicial powers should be “divided between 
deterrent in the matter of serious crime. the Jirga and FATA Tribunal” that will follow 
They have not inspired public confidence and the pattern of Sessions Courts and will be 
it can hardly be said that they have advanced formed of members eligible to preside  High 
the cause of substantial justice. On the Courts or Sharia't Courts. 
contrary, they are open to serious objections, th
On 8 April 2010, the passing of the 18  
on principle, as being in violation of the 
Constitutional Amendment was made public, 
doctrine of equality before law, and 
but the legislators did not amend Article 247 
constituting the usurpation of the judicial 
which would have allowed parliamentarians 
power by the executive at all levels. Apart 
to legislate and the Courts of Pakistan to 
from this, there are strong feeling and 
exercise justice for the people of FATA.
intrinsic hatred towards the FCR, 1901, which 
had been applied to these areas, with 
ambivalent intentions of taming the tribal 
137
people.  They had the effect of supplanting 
the regular procedures of ordinary court and 
138
thus violation the basic human rights. ”
FCR Reforms Committees (2005-2009)
In 2005, two committees were constituted 
relating to  the FCR:
1) The Senate of Pakistan's Standing 
Committee on Human Rights constituted a 
sub-committee on the FCR which was 
comprised of Senator Farhatullah Baber, 
Senator Hamidullah and Senator Dr. Saad. In 
August 2005, the sub-committee  submitted 
t h e i r  f i n a l  r e p o r t  a l o n g  w i t h  
recommendations to the main committee in 
which amendments were proposed in the 
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Chapter 4
Research Findings
and Analysis
Age groupIntroduction
The survey aimed to interview respondents The following section gives demographic details 
between 18 years of age and above. The data of the 1,500 male and female respondents from 
FATA, aged 18 and above. 
TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender of the respondents
The survey was planned to incorporate men and 
women's perceptions on different aspects of 
Jirga affecting the life of the people of FATA. The 
following statistics show that the survey 
interviews included 49.87% men and 50.13% 
women. 
shows that the survey mostly interviewed over-
50-year-old respondents, compared with the 
youth and middle-aged respondents. 
32.80% of the respondents belonged to the age 
group 18-29-year-olds, while 12.87% were from 
Chapter 4
Research Findings and
Analysis
Frequency
Percent
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Figure 02. Gender of respondents
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Figure 03. Age group of respondents
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the age group of 30-49 years. Age group 50 and shows that only 11.00% of the respondents 
above made up the majority of the interviewees, received Middle level schooling, while 13.60% of 
as this age group is the most involved in Jirga the respondents have Secondary Certificate level 
proceedings. The intention was to interview education. 8.87% of the respondents received 
older people from the tribal society, under Kish religious education. There are other categories 
Grid method, in order to understand their explained in the figure 04.
perception on the Jirga process. Another reason 
If we analyse the entire data sets, we can 
could be the timing of the survey, which occurred 
conclude that 55.20% of the sample is literate, 
when a majority of elders were present their 
even if we exclude the 'religious education only'-
houses/Hujras. In tribal Pakhtun society, the 
category. This is higher than the Census Report 
elders are respected and obeyed the most; they 
data of 1998 for FATA, where only 17.42% in FATA 
also run the family affairs and control the purse 
were literate, including 29.15% male and 3.00% 
strings. The survey also interviewed 2.00% of 
female. This could be because the respondents 
respondents belonging to the 65-and-above-
gave incorrect information, and because the Kish 
years bracket. 
Grid method for selection of the respondents 
Education was used without checking or verifying the 
authenticity of the responses with other 
The following figure 04 shows statistics for the 
methods or tools. 
educational level of the respondents. The survey 
results show that nearly 36.00% of the Education of the head of the family
respondents had not attended school while only 
If the respondent was not the head of the family 
13.60% have primary level education. The figure 
himself/herself, they were asked about the 
education level of the head of the family. (Note: 
there are hardly any female heads of families in Occupation
FATA). In general, the survey has sampled more 
The occupation of male and female respondents 
educated people than the general population for 
shows that the majority of respondents 
the given age group. 
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Figure 05. Education level of head of the family
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the age group of 30-49 years. Age group 50 and shows that only 11.00% of the respondents 
above made up the majority of the interviewees, received Middle level schooling, while 13.60% of 
as this age group is the most involved in Jirga the respondents have Secondary Certificate level 
proceedings. The intention was to interview education. 8.87% of the respondents received 
older people from the tribal society, under Kish religious education. There are other categories 
Grid method, in order to understand their explained in the figure 04.
perception on the Jirga process. Another reason 
If we analyse the entire data sets, we can 
could be the timing of the survey, which occurred 
conclude that 55.20% of the sample is literate, 
when a majority of elders were present their 
even if we exclude the 'religious education only'-
houses/Hujras. In tribal Pakhtun society, the 
category. This is higher than the Census Report 
elders are respected and obeyed the most; they 
data of 1998 for FATA, where only 17.42% in FATA 
also run the family affairs and control the purse 
were literate, including 29.15% male and 3.00% 
strings. The survey also interviewed 2.00% of 
female. This could be because the respondents 
respondents belonging to the 65-and-above-
gave incorrect information, and because the Kish 
years bracket. 
Grid method for selection of the respondents 
Education was used without checking or verifying the 
authenticity of the responses with other 
The following figure 04 shows statistics for the 
methods or tools. 
educational level of the respondents. The survey 
results show that nearly 36.00% of the Education of the head of the family
respondents had not attended school while only 
If the respondent was not the head of the family 
13.60% have primary level education. The figure 
himself/herself, they were asked about the 
education level of the head of the family. (Note: 
there are hardly any female heads of families in Occupation
FATA). In general, the survey has sampled more 
The occupation of male and female respondents 
educated people than the general population for 
shows that the majority of respondents 
the given age group. 
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identified themselves as 'unemployed' (18.73%), 
followed by 'home based worker' (18.53%) and 
'housewife' at 13.47%. If we compare figure 06 
with the education level of the respondents, it 
shows that most of the respondents were 
educated or otherwise skilled.  
Marital status
Early marriages are common in the tribal areas. 
Over three quarters of respondents were found 
to be married, as opposed to just 16.33% who 
were single. The practice of divorce is very rare 
How many people live in your 
and considered a sin in FATA society, a fact that 
household/compound?
can also be inferred from the data results. The 
To know the size of female population in each number of widows is also very low.  
household, the respondents were subsequently 
asked this question. Figure 09 shows that 81.67% 
of the respondents replied that they have 1-5 
adult female members in their family, while 
88.53% respondents confirmed that they have 1-
5 adults male in their household. Looking at both 
figures (for male and female), as opposed to the Family size of a household
national men and women ratio, the survey 
Because of the extended family structure in FATA, 
reflects that there are more male members of a 
and the custom of living in compounds, the 
household than women members. 
concept of household in FATA includes the head 
Religionof the family, his sons (married and unmarried) 
and daughters (un-married), daughters in law, 
FATA is a predominantly Muslim society with very 
and grand children. This makes for a very large-
few minorities. In addition to Muslims, there are 
sized household. 
Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs. Although very few 
in number, they may be even fewer as many We have to assume that when asked the size of 
became displaced during the continuing crisis.the family, the respondents referred to the 
number of people in the compound.
Shia-Sunni proportion in FATA 
Respondents' Sources of information
With the help of a multiple response question, 
the survey documented male and female FATA 
respondents' sources of, or access to, 
information. Because of the multiple responses, 
figure 12 shows the popularity of the various 
media. They are not mutually exclusive 
responses.
Generally, more people of FATA have access to 
Pakistan radio, friends and family, neighbours, 
press and TV as compared to foreign and private 
media channels. 
In the survey, some 56.20% respondents have Respondents who identified themselves as 
access to Pakistani radio. Because the people of Muslim were subsequently asked which sect they 
FATA are faced with internal and external belonged to. As per the data sets, the ratio for 
conflicts, the increase in radio listenership could Shia and Sunni is 14.07% and 85.33% 
be explained by the fact that they are keen to respectively. Shia and Sunni populations live in 
know about the ongoing militancy as well as Kurram and Orakzai Agencies, while the rest of 
national and international news on the topic. FATA is Sunni-dominated. Furthermore, CAMP 
Another factor could be that a growing number has been undertaking perception surveys in FATA 
of people in FATA have access to cell phones with for 'Understanding FATA' since 2007 and has seen 
140 built-in radios. a similar ratio of Shia and Sunni respondents.
Friends and family members are another source 
of information for the people of FATA. 52.07% 
respondents, just a little lower than the radio 
listenership, have access to friends and family 
members' information. The main reason could be 
the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of 
people  f rom FATA to  other  adjacent  
districts/areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), 
where some of them were hosted by the local 
communities and relatives, while others took 
shelter in the IDP camps where they developed Sources of information 
closer ties with friends, relatives and neighbours.
The survey tried to explore how the people of 
Pakistani TV is another important source of FATA access and receive information. The survey 
information for the people of FATA and as the examined readership of newspapers, listenership 
survey shows, a large number of respondents of radio, and viewership of television. The survey 
have access to it. The reason for Pakistan TV also assessed which sources of information the 
viewership being so high could be the absence of people of FATA use and rely upon. 
cable operators in FATA. Some well-to-do families 
Figure 12 is an analysis of the survey findings on may have access to satellite TV; however, the 
the sources of information of the respondents. majority still only has access to Pakistani TV 
channels. 
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Figure 07. Marital status of respondents
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'housewife' at 13.47%. If we compare figure 06 
with the education level of the respondents, it 
shows that most of the respondents were 
educated or otherwise skilled.  
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household, the respondents were subsequently 
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adult female members in their family, while 
88.53% respondents confirmed that they have 1-
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the survey documented male and female FATA 
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information. Because of the multiple responses, 
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media. They are not mutually exclusive 
responses.
Generally, more people of FATA have access to 
Pakistan radio, friends and family, neighbours, 
press and TV as compared to foreign and private 
media channels. 
In the survey, some 56.20% respondents have Respondents who identified themselves as 
access to Pakistani radio. Because the people of Muslim were subsequently asked which sect they 
FATA are faced with internal and external belonged to. As per the data sets, the ratio for 
conflicts, the increase in radio listenership could Shia and Sunni is 14.07% and 85.33% 
be explained by the fact that they are keen to respectively. Shia and Sunni populations live in 
know about the ongoing militancy as well as Kurram and Orakzai Agencies, while the rest of 
national and international news on the topic. FATA is Sunni-dominated. Furthermore, CAMP 
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people  f rom FATA to  other  adjacent  
districts/areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), 
where some of them were hosted by the local 
communities and relatives, while others took 
shelter in the IDP camps where they developed Sources of information 
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have access to it. The reason for Pakistan TV also assessed which sources of information the 
viewership being so high could be the absence of people of FATA use and rely upon. 
cable operators in FATA. Some well-to-do families 
Figure 12 is an analysis of the survey findings on may have access to satellite TV; however, the 
the sources of information of the respondents. majority still only has access to Pakistani TV 
channels. 
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'Friday sermons' are another source of Other popular sources of information are 
information for the respondents. Since the communal gatherings (21.80%), interaction with 
people of FATA are very religious and adhere to work colleagues (20.80%), and meetings with 
Islamic rituals, they attend and listen to the tribal leaders (19.67%). 
Friday sermons every week. 
There are several other sources of information 
mentioned in figure 12 that provides a clear valued. 
picture of how people of FATA receive 
Among foreign sources, more respondents 
information from different sources. 
identified BBC radio (as opposed to press or TV) 
Respondents' Most Valued Source of as the most valued source of information. 
Information However, the identification for BBC radio is 
comparatively low against the BBC listenership. 
Through a subsequent single-choice question, 
Low response for British TV is mainly due to the 
the respondents were asked which source of 
absence of any cable network service in FATA. 
information they value the most. Reading from 
Very few people have installed dish satellite 
left to right in figure 13 it is clear that the formal 
antennas in their Hujras and homes. British press 
media is the most valued, with close to three 
readership is also extremely low, which is 
quarters of the respondents choosing this 
understandable due to low literacy and no access 
option. The Pakistani Press, Radio and TV at 
to foreign newspapers. 
35.50%, 24.00% and 8.30% respectively, are the 
other most valued sources. Literacy probably The data also reveals that very few respondents 
plays an important role in the type of media opted for American press, television and radio. 
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'Friends and family' are valued sources, and Newspaper readership
constitute the third most valued source of 
The survey attempted to identify which 
information  (13.40%). Among other sources of 
newspaper is widely read by the FATA 
information, 'Friday sermon' (5.90%) and 
respondents. The figure 14 shows that 'Mashriq' 
'neighbours (5.10%) were chosen by the 
Urdu language daily newspaper was identified by 
respondents as the most valued sources of 
31.67% respondents. 'Mashriq' is followed by the 
information. 
daily 'Aaj', another Urdu newspaper (23.87%). Among other Urdu newspapers, Khabrain, Jang 
and Pakistan were prominent newspapers 
The Urdu Daily Ausaf is the third most popular 
identified by respondents as the most read 
Urdu newspaper identified by 14.13% 
newspapers. The English newspapers readership 
respondents from FATA. The Daily Express 
is low due to low levels of English language 
remained the fourth most read newspaper.
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'Friends and family' are valued sources, and Newspaper readership
constitute the third most valued source of 
The survey attempted to identify which 
information  (13.40%). Among other sources of 
newspaper is widely read by the FATA 
information, 'Friday sermon' (5.90%) and 
respondents. The figure 14 shows that 'Mashriq' 
'neighbours (5.10%) were chosen by the 
Urdu language daily newspaper was identified by 
respondents as the most valued sources of 
31.67% respondents. 'Mashriq' is followed by the 
information. 
daily 'Aaj', another Urdu newspaper (23.87%). Among other Urdu newspapers, Khabrain, Jang 
and Pakistan were prominent newspapers 
The Urdu Daily Ausaf is the third most popular 
identified by respondents as the most read 
Urdu newspaper identified by 14.13% 
newspapers. The English newspapers readership 
respondents from FATA. The Daily Express 
is low due to low levels of English language 
remained the fourth most read newspaper.
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literacy.
46.20% respondents said they 'did not 
know' or did not identify any 
newspaper. One of the reasons could 
be that these respondents were 
illiterate.  
TV viewership
There is no cable network facility 
available to the people in FATA. 
However, all Pakistani public TV 
channels are available to FATA viewers 
through direct transmission. 
The survey asked about the preference 
of TV channels and out of 1500 FATA 
respondents, 39.93% did not know 
what channels they most prefer. This 
may be because they do not have 
access to television. 
Khyber AVT is the only private Pashtu 
channel with coverage inside FATA, and 
was identified as the second most 
watched channel (16.73%) after the 
public PTV channel (46.00%). Another 
public channel, ATV, was identified as 
the third most watched TV channel by 
12.87% of the respondents. 
Respondents also identify Aaj, which 
could be accessed through either cable 
service or dish antenna. Around 9.13% 
respondents identified Aaj as the most 
preferred channel in FATA. 
Respondents identified scores of other 
private and western TV channels from 
satellite dishes and other sources.  respondents were asked to identify radio 
However, those responses are too few to merit channels they preferred. Judging by the 
further analysis.  programming source, Dewa (Voice of America) is 
the most popular Pashtu radio source in FATA, 
Radio listenership
being identified by 36.40% of the respondents. 
According to various statistics mentioned in Dewa radio channel is followed by BBC Pashtu 
figure 16, the radio is more popular than the TV service as the second most preferred radio 
and press as a source of information. channel identified by 29.27% respondents. 
Through a multiple-choice question, FATA Until recently, BBC Pashtu service was the most 
General Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, preferred radio channel for the people of FATA in 
District & Sessions Courts, Provincial High several other perception surveys conducted by 
Courts, Supreme Court of Pakistan)CAMP since 2007; however, within recent times, 
Dewa has received a tremendous response from 
The British created the general criminal courts in 
the local population in FATA. 
the sub-continent under the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1898. When asked about courts in 26.27% respondents identified Radio Pakistan, a 
Pakistan, a distinction was made between public transmission radio channel, as the fourth 
general courts  which have jurisdiction over a most preferred radio source in FATA. Other 
broad range of civil and criminal matters  and popular radio sources are BBC Urdu (17.60%), FM 
specialised courts that address specific 104 Buraq (15.53%) and FM 101 (7.07%). 
substantive areas of law such as anti-terrorism or 
25.93% respondents either 'did not know' or had 
narcotics offences. The respondents' awareness 
no access to radio sources. 
of general courts is discussed here, and their 
awareness of specialised courts is addressed The other radio stations mentioned are, for the 
later.most part, local stations serving specific market 
areas or Agencies. One would not expect them to 
More than half of the respondents, 53.47%, 
register high in a sample extending beyond their 
claimed that they are aware of various levels of 
reach.
courts. However, the survey could not judge the 
level and extent of awareness of the Questions related to the 'sources of information' 
respondents, as we did not have any parameter reveal that the most common and valued sources 
to verify whether the respondents really had of information among the respondents are 
knowledge of general courts. Pakistani radio, television, family and friends, and 
neighbours. Among radio, perhaps the most 
Close to half of the respondents, 46.53%, did not 
commonly used media, the most popular 
know anything about general courts of Pakistan.
channels are Dewa (Voice of America) and the 
Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics CourtsBBC. 
Specialised Anti-Terrorism courts were created Awareness of institutions and actors
by the 1997 Anti-Terrorist Act, amended on 24 
The survey intended to understand the level of 
O cto b er  1998  by  th e  Ant i - Ter ro r i s m 
awareness of the respondents about various 
[Amendment] Ordinance. Special Courts (Control 
institutions and actors involved in dispensing 
of Narcotics Substances) were constituted under 
justice and ensuring the rule of law in Pakistan. 
the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. 
Most of these institutions do not necessarily exist 
Specialized ATCs deal with offences punishable 
in FATA; however, it was necessary to document 
under the Anti-Terrorism Act and specialised 
the perception of the respondents about these 
Narcotics Courts deal with offences punishable 
institutions. 
under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 
1997. 
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Figure 16. Radio listenership
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
General Courts in Pakistan (Judicial 
Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts, 
Provincial High Courts, Supreme Court of 
Pakistan) 
53.47 46.53 100.00  
Table 07: Awareness of General Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate,
District & Sessions Courts, Provincial High Courts, Supreme Court of Pakistan)
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literacy.
46.20% respondents said they 'did not 
know' or did not identify any 
newspaper. One of the reasons could 
be that these respondents were 
illiterate.  
TV viewership
There is no cable network facility 
available to the people in FATA. 
However, all Pakistani public TV 
channels are available to FATA viewers 
through direct transmission. 
The survey asked about the preference 
of TV channels and out of 1500 FATA 
respondents, 39.93% did not know 
what channels they most prefer. This 
may be because they do not have 
access to television. 
Khyber AVT is the only private Pashtu 
channel with coverage inside FATA, and 
was identified as the second most 
watched channel (16.73%) after the 
public PTV channel (46.00%). Another 
public channel, ATV, was identified as 
the third most watched TV channel by 
12.87% of the respondents. 
Respondents also identify Aaj, which 
could be accessed through either cable 
service or dish antenna. Around 9.13% 
respondents identified Aaj as the most 
preferred channel in FATA. 
Respondents identified scores of other 
private and western TV channels from 
satellite dishes and other sources.  respondents were asked to identify radio 
However, those responses are too few to merit channels they preferred. Judging by the 
further analysis.  programming source, Dewa (Voice of America) is 
the most popular Pashtu radio source in FATA, 
Radio listenership
being identified by 36.40% of the respondents. 
According to various statistics mentioned in Dewa radio channel is followed by BBC Pashtu 
figure 16, the radio is more popular than the TV service as the second most preferred radio 
and press as a source of information. channel identified by 29.27% respondents. 
Through a multiple-choice question, FATA Until recently, BBC Pashtu service was the most 
General Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court of preferred radio channel for the people of FATA in 
Pakistan, High Courts, Court of Session, Court several other perception surveys conducted by 
of Magistrate, Court of District Judge, Court of CAMP since 2007; however, within recent times, 
Civil Judge)Dewa has received a tremendous response from 
the local population in FATA. 
When asked about courts in Pakistan, a 
distinction was made between general criminal 26.27% respondents identified Radio Pakistan, a 
or civil courts, and specialized courts that address public transmission radio channel, as the fourth 
specific substantive areas of law such as anti-most preferred radio source in FATA. Other 
terrorism or narcotics offences. High Courts and popular radio sources are BBC Urdu (17.60%), FM 
the Supreme Court of Pakistan were constituted 104 Buraq (15.53%) and FM 101 (7.07%). 
under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.  They 
25.93% respondents either 'did not know' or had 
serve as appellate Courts, and are also 
no access to radio sources. 
empowered to enforce Fundamental Rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution. Criminal The other radio stations mentioned are, for the 
courts in Pakistan  i.e. Court of Session & Court of most part, local stations serving specific market 
Magistrate  were created under the Criminal areas or Agencies. One would not expect them to 
Procedure Code of 1898; whereas civil courts  i.e. register high in a sample extending beyond their 
Court of District Judge & Court of Civil Judge - reach.
were created under the West Pakistan Civil 
Questions related to the 'sources of information' 
Courts Ordinance, 1962.
reveal that the most common and valued sources 
More than half of the respondents, 53.47%, of information among the respondents are 
claimed that they are aware of various levels of Pakistani radio, television, family and friends, and 
courts. However, the survey could not judge the neighbours. Among radio, perhaps the most 
level and extent of awareness of the commonly used media, the most popular 
respondents, as we did not have any parameter channels are Dewa (Voice of America) and the 
to verify whether the respondents really had BBC. 
knowledge of general courts. 
Awareness of institutions and actors
Close to half of the respondents, 46.53%, did not 
The survey intended to understand the level of 
know anything about general courts of Pakistan.
awareness of the respondents about various 
Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courtsinstitutions and actors involved in dispensing 
justice and ensuring the rule of law in Pakistan. 
Specialised Anti-Terrorism courts were created 
Most of these institutions do not necessarily exist 
by the Anti-Terrorist Act, 1997 to deal with 
in FATA; however, it was necessary to document 
terrorism offences under the said Act; and 
the perception of the respondents about these 
'Special Courts' were constituted under the 
institutions. 
Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 to 
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Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
 
53.47 46.53 100.00  
Table 07: Awareness of General Courts in Pakistan General Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court of
Pakistan, High Courts, Court of Session, Court of Magistrate, Court of District Judge,
Court of Civil Judge)
General Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court 
of Pakistan, High Courts, Court of Session, 
Court of Magistrate, Court of District Judge, 
Court of Civil Judge)
29.60% of the respondents confirmed that they address narcotics offences under the Act.  
were aware about Federal Sharia't Court, while 
The respondents were asked whether they were 
70.40% of the respondents did not know about 
aware of, or had heard about specialised anti-
these courts. 
terrorism or narcotics courts in Pakistan. Over a 
After cross-tabulation, it is clear that men are quarter of the respondents, 26.47%, confirmed 
nearly two times more aware of the Federal that they were aware of specialised Anti-
Sharia't Court than women. Out of the 271 who Terrorism or Narcotics courts, whereas three 
did not respond to the question, 231 were quarters of FATA respondents did not have any 
women. idea about these institutions. 
After cross-tabulating the data with the Federal Sharia't Court
educational level of the respondents, it was 
found that of the 444 respondents who were not 
aware of the Federal Sharia't Court, 351 never 
attended school. 
The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established 
by the President's Order No.1 of 1980 as 
incorporated into the Constitution of Pakistan of 
1973 under chapter 3A. The FSC has the power to 
Islamic Seminary Federationsreview any law or provision of law in order to 
determine whether it is repugnant to the 
Federations of Islamic seminaries which are 
'Injunctions of Islam' as laid down in the Holy 
operative in Pakistan oversee and manage 
individual Islamic seminaries (Madrassah) Qur'an & Sunnah. Either Pakistani citizens, the 
registered under them.  Religious clerics Federal or Provincial Government may bring a 
affiliated with these Federations or registered petition to the FSC to review suspect laws, or it 
madaris often provide opinions on family law may exercise its suo moto powers. It also has 
issues based on Islamic law precepts. The revisional jurisdiction with respect to any case 
'Madrassah Certificate' they issue can be brought tried by a criminal court under the Hudood laws. 
to a general court to support one's claim. Some of An appeal of the ruling of the FSC lies to the 
the most well-established Federations in Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, and the schools of thought they Pakistan.
represent, include: Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia 
(Deobandi), Tanzeem-ul-Madaris (Barelvi), 
Rabat-ul-Madaris (Jamaat-i-Islami), Wafaq-ul-
Madaris Al-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith), and Wafaq-ul-
Madaris Ashia (Shiia). 
Federations.
The FATA respondents were asked whether they 
are aware of Islamic Seminary Federations. Out 
of 1,500 respondents, half (50.60%), were aware 
of the Islamic Seminary Federations, while the 
other half did not know about them. 
injustice due to 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Human rights activists founded the HRCP in 1987. 
The HRCP is an independent, non-profit 
organisation not associated or affiliated with the 
 
government or any political party. It is mandated 
to spread awareness of human rights among the There are thousands of Madrassa schools 
people, mobilise public opinion, collect operating in FATA, most of them under the 
information and disseminate knowledge about management of  the above-mentioned 
human rights abuses, and to monitor and defend 
human rights in Pakistan. HRCP also operates a 
Complaint Cell where individuals can call to lodge 
a complaint. HRCP also has branches in some 
FATA Agencies and frontier regions.
Only 23.93% confirmed that they were aware of 
the HRCP's existence in Pakistan as well as in 
During the focus-group discussions and 
FATA. More than three quarters of the 
consultations, there was an overwhelming 
respondents (76.10%) were not aware. 
support for the religious madrassa system in 
Cross-tabulation with gender showed that more FATA. 
than twice as many women did not know about 
Federal Ombudsman
HRCP compared to men. 
In 1983, the office of the Federal Ombudsman 
FCR Jirga system or other informal dispute 
was established under the Wafaqi Mohtasib 
resolution mechanisms (e.g. Olasi Jirga, shura)
(Ombudsman) Order, 1983. The Ombudsman is 
The Jirga and other dispute resolution an independent institution, established under 
mechanisms have been discussed in detail in the law, to provide speedy relief to the general public 
first as well as in subsequent chapters. The survey in case somebody has suffered  
attempted to confirm whether the respondents 'maladministration' at the hands of a Federal 
were aware of the informal dispute resolution Government Agency.
institutions. 
21.50% of the respondents confirmed that they 
Nearly three quarters (74.40%) confirmed that knew about the office of the Federal 
they were aware of the Jirga and other dispute Ombudsman, while over three quarters of the 
resolution mechanisms. The high level of respondents responded that they did not.
awareness is due to the fact that the Jirga is the 
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Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  
No 
(%age)  
Total  
Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts  26.47 73.50 100.00  
Table 08: Awareness of Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
Name of Institution / Actor 
Yes
(%age)
 
No 
(%age)  
Total  
Federal Sharia't Court 29.60 70.40 100.00  
Table 09: Awareness of the Federal Sharia't Court
Table 10: Awareness of  Islamic Seminary Federation
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
Islamic Seminary Federation
  
50.60 49.40 100.00 
Table 11: Awareness of the Federal Ombudsman
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
Federal Ombudsman 21.50 78.50 100.00  
Table 12: Awareness of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Name of Institution / Actor 
Yes 
(%age) 
No 
(%age)  
Total  
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 23.90 76.10 100.00 
29.60% of the respondents confirmed that they address narcotics offences under the Act.  
were aware about Federal Sharia't Court, while 
The respondents were asked whether they were 
70.40% of the respondents did not know about 
aware of, or had heard about specialised anti-
these courts. 
terrorism or narcotics courts in Pakistan. Over a 
After cross-tabulation, it is clear that men are quarter of the respondents, 26.47%, confirmed 
nearly two times more aware of the Federal that they were aware of specialised Anti-
Sharia't Court than women. Out of the 271 who Terrorism or Narcotics courts, whereas three 
did not respond to the question, 231 were quarters of FATA respondents did not have any 
women. idea about these institutions. 
After cross-tabulating the data with the Federal Sharia't Court
educational level of the respondents, it was 
found that of the 444 respondents who were not 
aware of the Federal Sharia't Court, 351 never 
attended school. 
The Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established 
by the President's Order No.1 of 1980 as 
incorporated into the Constitution of Pakistan of 
1973 under chapter 3A. The FSC has the power to 
Islamic Seminary Federationsreview any law or provision of law in order to 
determine whether it is repugnant to the 
Federations of Islamic seminaries which are 
'Injunctions of Islam' as laid down in the Holy 
operative in Pakistan oversee and manage 
individual Islamic seminaries (Madrassah) Qur'an & Sunnah. Either Pakistani citizens, the 
registered under them.  Religious clerics Federal or Provincial Government may bring a 
affiliated with these Federations or registered petition to the FSC to review suspect laws, or it 
madaris often provide opinions on family law may exercise its suo moto powers. It also has 
issues based on Islamic law precepts. The revisional jurisdiction with respect to any case 
'Madrassah Certificate' they issue can be brought tried by a criminal court under the Hudood laws. 
to a general court to support one's claim. Some of An appeal of the ruling of the FSC lies to the 
the most well-established Federations in Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, and the schools of thought they Pakistan.
represent, include: Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia 
(Deobandi), Tanzeem-ul-Madaris (Barelvi), 
Rabat-ul-Madaris (Jamaat-i-Islami), Wafaq-ul-
Madaris Al-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith), and Wafaq-ul-
Madaris Ashia (Shiia). 
Federations.
The FATA respondents were asked whether they 
are aware of Islamic Seminary Federations. Out 
of 1,500 respondents, half (50.60%), were aware 
of the Islamic Seminary Federations, while the 
other half did not know about them. 
injustice due to 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Human rights activists founded the HRCP in 1987. 
The HRCP is an independent, non-profit 
organisation not associated or affiliated with the 
 
government or any political party. It is mandated 
to spread awareness of human rights among the There are thousands of Madrassa schools 
people, mobilise public opinion, collect operating in FATA, most of them under the 
information and disseminate knowledge about management of  the above-mentioned 
human rights abuses, and to monitor and defend 
human rights in Pakistan. HRCP also operates a 
Complaint Cell where individuals can call to lodge 
a complaint. HRCP also has branches in some 
FATA Agencies and frontier regions.
Only 23.93% confirmed that they were aware of 
the HRCP's existence in Pakistan as well as in 
During the focus-group discussions and 
FATA. More than three quarters of the 
consultations, there was an overwhelming 
respondents (76.10%) were not aware. 
support for the religious madrassa system in 
Cross-tabulation with gender showed that more FATA. 
than twice as many women did not know about 
Federal Ombudsman
HRCP compared to men. 
In 1983, the office of the Federal Ombudsman 
FCR Jirga system or other informal dispute 
was established under the Wafaqi Mohtasib 
resolution mechanisms (e.g. Olasi Jirga, shura)
(Ombudsman) Order, 1983. The Ombudsman is 
The Jirga and other dispute resolution an independent institution, established under 
mechanisms have been discussed in detail in the law, to provide speedy relief to the general public 
first as well as in subsequent chapters. The survey in case somebody has suffered  
attempted to confirm whether the respondents 'maladministration' at the hands of a Federal 
were aware of the informal dispute resolution Government Agency.
institutions. 
21.50% of the respondents confirmed that they 
Nearly three quarters (74.40%) confirmed that knew about the office of the Federal 
they were aware of the Jirga and other dispute Ombudsman, while over three quarters of the 
resolution mechanisms. The high level of respondents responded that they did not.
awareness is due to the fact that the Jirga is the 
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Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  
No 
(%age)  
Total  
Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts  26.47 73.50 100.00  
Table 08: Awareness of Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
Name of Institution / Actor 
Yes
(%age)
 
No 
(%age)  
Total  
Federal Sharia't Court 29.60 70.40 100.00  
Table 09: Awareness of the Federal Sharia't Court
Table 10: Awareness of  Islamic Seminary Federation
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
Islamic Seminary Federation
  
50.60 49.40 100.00  
Table 11: Awareness of the Federal Ombudsman
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
Federal Ombudsman 21.50 78.50 100.00  
Table 12: Awareness of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Name of Institution / Actor 
Yes 
(%age)  
No 
(%age)  
Total  
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 23.90 76.10 100.00 
only justice dispensing mechanism in FATA both 
accessible and trusted by many. 
It is clear that the respondents had very little idea 
about the justice dispensing institutions/actors 
in Pakistan apart from the FCR Jirga which is 
practised in FATA. There is also a huge 
discrepancy between male and female 
respondents; it is unfortunate to note that the 
awareness level among FATA residents relating to 
these institutions is so low, particularly among 
women. 
Opinion/perception of the following 
institutions and actors
The survey attempted to document the 
perception/opinion of the respondents on 
various institutions, actors and their functions. 
The question tries to cover several aspects of 
such institutions' functions. 
Provincial Police Authorities and their local 
representatives
It is a very common perception that the people of 
offenders. The police derive their powers of 
search, investigation, and arrest from the 
Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The police 
administrative structure and functions were laid 
down in the Police Act of 1861. However, it was 
replaced by the Police Order 2002, enacted by 
General Musharraf, which created public 
accountability mechanisms, and means to limit 
political interference in criminal cases. The Police 
Order was resisted by the police establishment 
and Provincial Governments, and therefore not 
properly implemented.  In 2009 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Police Order would have to 
re-adopted by the National Assembly, but this 
was never done.  The Provincial Governments 
are now in the process of drafting provincial 
police legislation to override the Police Order 
altogether.
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the Police 
Act of 1861, and the Police Order of 2002 have 
not been extended to the FATA region, while 
Khasadar and Levies force take care of the 
Police authorities are responsible for maintaining internal security in the protected areas of FATA.
law and order, registering a First Information 
Report [FIR], investigating crimes and arresting 
FATA do not like the police system and would Police Authorities. This view was shared by the 
never welcome it in their area. It is also believed overwhelming majority in the focus-group 
that the locals would consider the system to be discussions and consultations. They believe that 
against their customs. The FATA respondents the police does not suit the FATA environment 
were asked in a qualified manner to share their where people can effectively settle their issues 
perceptions or opinions of provincial police through Jirga.
authorities and their local representatives. 
General Courts in Pakistan 
41.80% opined that provincial police authorities 
take bribes for their services, while 35.30% did 
not know much about the provincial police 
authorities. 7.30% believed that the police 
An introduction to the General Courts of Pakistan 
department is always under immense pressure 
has been provided in the previous question. This 
from its superiors and representative 
section will analyse how the respondents 
governments, thus allowing for most of the cases 
perceived the functions of these courts. 
to go un-settled and criminals or offenders to get 
away. Around 5.50% believed that the police 40.50% replied that they did not know the 
department sometimes violates human rights function of the courts. 
while dealing with cases. 2.20% believed that the 
While 14.40% believed that officials and judges 
police department is unresponsive to criticism. 
take bribes when deciding a case in general 
A mere 3.60% believed that the police courts, 14.00% believed that general courts can 
department is affordable and should be be influenced by the powerful, the weaker party 
extended to FATA. Only 2.60% believed that the thus not receiving due justice. Only 3.20% 
police department is quick in settling cases. believed that general courts are unresponsive to 
1.10% said that the police department is 'class any criticism and 4.50% believed that general 
biased' and always favours the rich and courts ignore human rights when deciding a case.  
influential. 
However, 13.40% still believed that general 
Table 14 shows that the FATA respondents do not courts are affordable, and 7.50% opined in a 
have a very favourable view of the Provincial qualified manner that general courts are quick in 
(Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, High Courts, Court of Session, Court 
of Magistrate, Court of District Judge, Court of 
Civil Judge)
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Table 13: Awareness of FCR Jirga system or other informal dispute resolution mechanisms
(e.g. Olasi Jirga, shura)
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
FCR Jirga system or other informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms (e.g. Olasi Jirga, shura) 
74.4 25.6  100.00 
Table 14: Opinion/perception of Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives
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Table 15: Perception/opinion of General Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court of Pakistan, High
Courts, Court of Session, Court of Magistrate, Court of District Judge, Court of Civil Judge)
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General Courts in Pakistan 
(Supreme Court of Pakistan, 
High Courts, Court of 
Session, Court of 
Magistrate, Court of District 
Judge, Court of Civil Judge)
only justice dispensing mechanism in FATA both 
accessible and trusted by many. 
It is clear that the respondents had very little idea 
about the justice dispensing institutions/actors 
in Pakistan apart from the FCR Jirga which is 
practised in FATA. There is also a huge 
discrepancy between male and female 
respondents; it is unfortunate to note that the 
awareness level among FATA residents relating to 
these institutions is so low, particularly among 
women. 
Opinion/perception of the following 
institutions and actors
The survey attempted to document the 
perception/opinion of the respondents on 
various institutions, actors and their functions. 
The question tries to cover several aspects of 
such institutions' functions. 
Provincial Police Authorities and their local 
representatives
It is a very common perception that the people of 
offenders. The police derive their powers of 
search, investigation, and arrest from the 
Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The police 
administrative structure and functions were laid 
down in the Police Act of 1861. However, it was 
replaced by the Police Order 2002, enacted by 
General Musharraf, which created public 
accountability mechanisms, and means to limit 
political interference in criminal cases. The Police 
Order was resisted by the police establishment 
and Provincial Governments, and therefore not 
properly implemented.  In 2009 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Police Order would have to 
re-adopted by the National Assembly, but this 
was never done.  The Provincial Governments 
are now in the process of drafting provincial 
police legislation to override the Police Order 
altogether.
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the Police 
Act of 1861, and the Police Order of 2002 have 
not been extended to the FATA region, while 
Khasadar and Levies force take care of the 
Police authorities are responsible for maintaining internal security in the protected areas of FATA.
law and order, registering a First Information 
Report [FIR], investigating crimes and arresting 
FATA do not like the police system and would Police Authorities. This view was shared by the 
never welcome it in their area. It is also believed overwhelming majority in the focus-group 
that the locals would consider the system to be discussions and consultations. They believe that 
against their customs. The FATA respondents the police does not suit the FATA environment 
were asked in a qualified manner to share their where people can effectively settle their issues 
perceptions or opinions of provincial police through Jirga.
authorities and their local representatives. 
General Courts in Pakistan 
41.80% opined that provincial police authorities 
take bribes for their services, while 35.30% did 
not know much about the provincial police 
authorities. 7.30% believed that the police 
An introduction to the General Courts of Pakistan 
department is always under immense pressure 
has been provided in the previous question. This 
from its superiors and representative 
section will analyse how the respondents 
governments, thus allowing for most of the cases 
perceived the functions of these courts. 
to go un-settled and criminals or offenders to get 
away. Around 5.50% believed that the police 40.50% replied that they did not know the 
department sometimes violates human rights function of the courts. 
while dealing with cases. 2.20% believed that the 
While 14.40% believed that officials and judges 
police department is unresponsive to criticism. 
take bribes when deciding a case in general 
A mere 3.60% believed that the police courts, 14.00% believed that general courts can 
department is affordable and should be be influenced by the powerful, the weaker party 
extended to FATA. Only 2.60% believed that the thus not receiving due justice. Only 3.20% 
police department is quick in settling cases. believed that general courts are unresponsive to 
1.10% said that the police department is 'class any criticism and 4.50% believed that general 
biased' and always favours the rich and courts ignore human rights when deciding a case.  
influential. 
However, 13.40% still believed that general 
Table 14 shows that the FATA respondents do not courts are affordable, and 7.50% opined in a 
have a very favourable view of the Provincial qualified manner that general courts are quick in 
(Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, High Courts, Court of Session, Court 
of Magistrate, Court of District Judge, Court of 
Civil Judge)
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Table 13: Awareness of FCR Jirga system or other informal dispute resolution mechanisms
(e.g. Olasi Jirga, shura)
Name of Institution / Actor Yes (%age)  No (%age)  Total  
FCR Jirga system or other informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms (e.g. Olasi Jirga, shura)  
74.4  25.6  100.00  
Table 14: Opinion/perception of Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives
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Table 15: Perception/opinion of General Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court of Pakistan, High
Courts, Court of Session, Court of Magistrate, Court of District Judge, Court of Civil Judge)
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General Courts in Pakistan 
(Supreme Court of Pakistan, 
High Courts, Court of 
Session, Court of 
Magistrate, Court of District 
Judge, Court of Civil Judge)
dispensing justice to the people. could not form their opinion, as they did not 
know much about these specialised courts. Only 
Analysing the above results, one can clearly see 
9.30% believed that these courts can be 
that the FATA respondents do not have a very 
influenced by the powerful in order to obtain 
favourable view of the general courts in Pakistan. 
favourable results. Some 6.70% believed that 
This view was also shared by the respondents 
these courts do not consider human rights when 
during the focus-group discussions and 
deciding a case, while 6.10% opined that the 
consultations, while key informants of in-depth 
officials of these courts take bribes and favour 
interviews also pointed out several weaknesses 
cases. Only 5.00% believed that these courts are 
of general courts and suggested that Jirga is best 
unresponsive to any criticism. 
suited to the local tribal environment. 40.50% 
replied that they did not know the function of the 6.30% believed that these courts are affordable 
courts. and 4.60% opined that they are quick in deciding 
cases.  
Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
Overall, the opinion of FATA respondents of these 
A brief introduction of Anti-Terrorism or 
courts is not very favourable. The same 
Narcotics Courts was given in the previous 
sentiments were also reflected in the qualitative 
question. This section will examine how the 
assessment. Very few voices were in favour of 
respondents perceive the functions of this 
these courts and extending them to FATA; and 
institution in Pakistan. 
very few believed that the named courts consider 
More than half of the respondents, 59.60%, all elements of globalisation, international 
human rights standards and gender sensitivities. They argued that Islamic Sharia't law could be 
practiced under the system of Jirga. 
Awareness Federal Sharia't Court
 have been 
introduced in the previous section of this chapter. 
 The Here we will examine how FATA respondents 
respondents' level of understanding was gauged opined on various functions of these 
in the previous section; however, this question . 
aims to document the opinion of the 
Interestingly, 32.10% believed that 
respondents on various functions of the Federal 
 A 
Sharia't Court in Pakistan. 
considerable proportion of FATA people send 
their children to these institutions for education, 
 the majority, 59.10%, did a fact verifiable through the education level of 
not have an opinion. 14.90% believed that respondents.
Federal Sharia't Courts are affordable for poor, 
10.10% believed that these institutions are quick 
and 7.00% believed that these courts are quick in 
and receptive to the needs of the people. Only a 
dispensing justice to the people. 
small proportion, 1.80%, believed that such 
There was also some negative opinion about the institutions are susceptible to bribes, while 
courts; 8.30% believed that powerful people can 2.50% believed that such institutions can be 
influence these courts, while 3.30% believed that influenced by the powerful. 3.30% believed that 
unresponsive to any  are unresponsive, 
criticism. Some 3.10% opined in a qualified while 1.30% opined that they are ignorant of 
manner that officials human rights. Furthermore, there was a large 
receive bribes. number of respondents, 45.70%, who did not 
know the answer or had not formed any opinion.  
Let alone general courts, even an Islamic Sharia't 
court is not welcomed by the FATA respondents During the focus-group discussions and 
who believe that there are several shortcomings consultations, there was overwhelming support 
associated with this system of justice. This was for the religious madrassa system in FATA. 
also echoed during the focus-group discussions 
Awareness Federal Ombudsman
and consultations, with many respondents 
preferring the Jirga to Federal Sharia't Court. Compared to other institutions, nearly two-
Islamic Seminary Federations
Given the Constitution of Pakistan has been 
extended to FATA, this means that the system of Islamic Seminary Federations
courts have also not been established in FATA, 
including the jurisdiction of the FSC.
Federations
Islamic 
Seminary Federations are affordable.
Since Federal Shariat Court does not have 
jurisdiction over FATA, 
Federal Shariat Court was Islamic Seminary Federations
the Federal Shariat Court's 
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Table 16: Perception of Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
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Table 17: Perception of Federal Sharia't Court
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Table 18: Peception/opinion of Islamic Seminary Federations
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32.10 10.10 1.80 2.50 3.30 1.30 2.30 0.90 45.70 100.00 Islamic Seminary Federations
dispensing justice to the people. could not form their opinion, as they did not 
know much about these specialised courts. Only 
Analysing the above results, one can clearly see 
9.30% believed that these courts can be 
that the FATA respondents do not have a very 
influenced by the powerful in order to obtain 
favourable view of the general courts in Pakistan. 
favourable results. Some 6.70% believed that 
This view was also shared by the respondents 
these courts do not consider human rights when 
during the focus-group discussions and 
deciding a case, while 6.10% opined that the 
consultations, while key informants of in-depth 
officials of these courts take bribes and favour 
interviews also pointed out several weaknesses 
cases. Only 5.00% believed that these courts are 
of general courts and suggested that Jirga is best 
unresponsive to any criticism. 
suited to the local tribal environment. 40.50% 
replied that they did not know the function of the 6.30% believed that these courts are affordable 
courts. and 4.60% opined that they are quick in deciding 
cases.  
Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
Overall, the opinion of FATA respondents of these 
A brief introduction of Anti-Terrorism or 
courts is not very favourable. The same 
Narcotics Courts was given in the previous 
sentiments were also reflected in the qualitative 
question. This section will examine how the 
assessment. Very few voices were in favour of 
respondents perceive the functions of this 
these courts and extending them to FATA; and 
institution in Pakistan. 
very few believed that the named courts consider 
More than half of the respondents, 59.60%, all elements of globalisation, international 
human rights standards and gender sensitivities. They argued that Islamic Sharia't law could be 
practiced under the system of Jirga. 
Awareness Federal Sharia't Court
 have been 
introduced in the previous section of this chapter. 
 The Here we will examine how FATA respondents 
respondents' level of understanding was gauged opined on various functions of these 
in the previous section; however, this question . 
aims to document the opinion of the 
Interestingly, 32.10% believed that 
respondents on various functions of the Federal 
 A 
Sharia't Court in Pakistan. 
considerable proportion of FATA people send 
their children to these institutions for education, 
 the majority, 59.10%, did a fact verifiable through the education level of 
not have an opinion. 14.90% believed that respondents.
Federal Sharia't Courts are affordable for poor, 
10.10% believed that these institutions are quick 
and 7.00% believed that these courts are quick in 
and receptive to the needs of the people. Only a 
dispensing justice to the people. 
small proportion, 1.80%, believed that such 
There was also some negative opinion about the institutions are susceptible to bribes, while 
courts; 8.30% believed that powerful people can 2.50% believed that such institutions can be 
influence these courts, while 3.30% believed that influenced by the powerful. 3.30% believed that 
unresponsive to any  are unresponsive, 
criticism. Some 3.10% opined in a qualified while 1.30% opined that they are ignorant of 
manner that officials human rights. Furthermore, there was a large 
receive bribes. number of respondents, 45.70%, who did not 
know the answer or had not formed any opinion.  
Let alone general courts, even an Islamic Sharia't 
court is not welcomed by the FATA respondents During the focus-group discussions and 
who believe that there are several shortcomings consultations, there was overwhelming support 
associated with this system of justice. This was for the religious madrassa system in FATA. 
also echoed during the focus-group discussions 
Awareness Federal Ombudsman
and consultations, with many respondents 
preferring the Jirga to Federal Sharia't Court. Compared to other institutions, nearly two-
Islamic Seminary Federations
Given the Constitution of Pakistan has been 
extended to FATA, this means that the system of Islamic Seminary Federations
courts have also not been established in FATA, 
including the jurisdiction of the FSC.
Federations
Islamic 
Seminary Federations are affordable.
Since Federal Shariat Court does not have 
jurisdiction over FATA, 
Federal Shariat Court was Islamic Seminary Federations
the Federal Shariat Court's 
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Table 16: Perception of Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts
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Specialized Anti-
Terrorism or Narcotics 
Courts 
6.30 4.60 6.10 9.30 5.00 6.70  0.80  1.60  59.60  100.00  
Table 17: Perception of Federal Sharia't Court
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Table 18: Peception/opinion of Islamic Seminary Federations
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32.10 10.10 1.80 2.50 3.30 1.30 2.30 0.90 45.70 100.00 Islamic Seminary Federations
thirds of the respondents, 65.90%, were not respondents, 62.90%, did not know about the 
aware of the Federal Ombudsman and his HRCP's existence or of its functions. 
function. Of the remaining respondents, 6.90% 
Most of the respondents in the focus-group 
believed that this institution is affordable, while 
discussions, including men and women, young 
5.30% opined that services could be obtained 
and old, did not have a clear idea of the HRCP's 
quickly from this institution. However, there 
role in their areas. Very few people, and notably 
were some negative responses as well.
those with higher education and better access to 
Since the office of Federal Ombudsman does not information, knew little about the institution. 
exist in FATA, the majority of the respondents 
Informal dispute resolution mechanisms
either did not know or had a good overall opinion 
of it. The previous chapters covered the respondents' 
opinion of informal dispute resolution 
During the focus-group discussions with various 
mechanisms in Pakistan. This question lies within 
age and gender groups from FATA, it was clear 
a general context and does not only pertain to 
that the majority, especially illiterate and less 
Jirga, but also to other forms of shura, i.e. 
educated respondents, were ignorant of these 
respected elder(s) or other influential person(s) 
offices and therefore could form opinions of their 
within a family or community.
own. 
Comparing the responses favouring informal 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
dispute resolution systems over other 
Due to CAMP's presence in the FATA region, we institutions, we see a very clear difference. 
are aware of the presence of HRCP local chapters Around 43.30% of the respondents, much more 
and its representatives; however, the survey than for any other institute mentioned earlier, 
results show that more than half of the believed that informal dispute resolution 
In table 22, over half of the respondents (55.90%) mechanisms are affordable. Since this was a 
mentioned that the services of a religious leader single response question, we see that the second 
in the community could be acquired without priority of FATA respondents was the quick 
much cost, as they are accessible and affordable dispensation of justice, 9.50%. 
for all. This is quite a high number, even higher 
A majority of the respondents who had not 
than for informal dispute resolution systems. 
formed an opinion were women, who do not take 
About the element of bribe the religious leaders part in the informal justice dispensation 
perceived to get, only 1.10% respondents mechanisms.  
believed so; while 3.70% believed that powerful 
Religious leader in the community
players in the society could influence religious 
leaders in their favour. Only 3.10% respondents During the last three decades, religious leaders 
opined that religious leaders are unresponsive to received tremendous respect and prominence 
criticism, while 1.70% believed that they ignore for their major and active role in the Afghan Jihad 
human rights elements when deciding a case. against Soviet Union and, later on, their support 
Only 1.90% believed that religious leaders are for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
not gender sensitive and 2.70% thought that they religious leaders are in close contact with the 
are class biased.community; therefore, the level of trust placed in 
them is unimaginable. 
Respondents of focus-group discussions also 
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Table 19: Perception/opinion of Federal Ombudsman
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Federal Ombudsman 6.90 5.30 5.50 9.00 3.40 1.50 1.60 0.90 65.90 100.00 
Table 20: Perception/opinon of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
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Table 21: Perception/opinion of Informal dispute resolution mechanisms
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Informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
(e.g. Jirga, shura, 
respected elder(s), or 
other influential person(s) 
in your family/community) 
43.30 9.50 7.50 7.30 2.40 3.30 1.10 1.70 23.90 100.00 
Table 22: Perception/opinion of Religious leader in the community
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Actor 
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the community 
55.90 14.20 1.10 3.70 3.10 1.70 1.90 2.70 15.90 100.00 
thirds of the respondents, 65.90%, were not respondents, 62.90%, did not know about the 
aware of the Federal Ombudsman and his HRCP's existence or of its functions. 
function. Of the remaining respondents, 6.90% 
Most of the respondents in the focus-group 
believed that this institution is affordable, while 
discussions, including men and women, young 
5.30% opined that services could be obtained 
and old, did not have a clear idea of the HRCP's 
quickly from this institution. However, there 
role in their areas. Very few people, and notably 
were some negative responses as well.
those with higher education and better access to 
Since the office of Federal Ombudsman does not information, knew little about the institution. 
exist in FATA, the majority of the respondents 
Informal dispute resolution mechanisms
either did not know or had a good overall opinion 
of it. The previous chapters covered the respondents' 
opinion of informal dispute resolution 
During the focus-group discussions with various 
mechanisms in Pakistan. This question lies within 
age and gender groups from FATA, it was clear 
a general context and does not only pertain to 
that the majority, especially illiterate and less 
Jirga, but also to other forms of shura, i.e. 
educated respondents, were ignorant of these 
respected elder(s) or other influential person(s) 
offices and therefore could form opinions of their 
within a family or community.
own. 
Comparing the responses favouring informal 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
dispute resolution systems over other 
Due to CAMP's presence in the FATA region, we institutions, we see a very clear difference. 
are aware of the presence of HRCP local chapters Around 43.30% of the respondents, much more 
and its representatives; however, the survey than for any other institute mentioned earlier, 
results show that more than half of the believed that informal dispute resolution 
In table 22, over half of the respondents (55.90%) mechanisms are affordable. Since this was a 
mentioned that the services of a religious leader single response question, we see that the second 
in the community could be acquired without priority of FATA respondents was the quick 
much cost, as they are accessible and affordable dispensation of justice, 9.50%. 
for all. This is quite a high number, even higher 
A majority of the respondents who had not 
than for informal dispute resolution systems. 
formed an opinion were women, who do not take 
About the element of bribe the religious leaders part in the informal justice dispensation 
perceived to get, only 1.10% respondents mechanisms.  
believed so; while 3.70% believed that powerful 
Religious leader in the community
players in the society could influence religious 
leaders in their favour. Only 3.10% respondents During the last three decades, religious leaders 
opined that religious leaders are unresponsive to received tremendous respect and prominence 
criticism, while 1.70% believed that they ignore for their major and active role in the Afghan Jihad 
human rights elements when deciding a case. against Soviet Union and, later on, their support 
Only 1.90% believed that religious leaders are for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
not gender sensitive and 2.70% thought that they religious leaders are in close contact with the 
are class biased.community; therefore, the level of trust placed in 
them is unimaginable. 
Respondents of focus-group discussions also 
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Table 19: Perception/opinion of Federal Ombudsman
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Federal Ombudsman 6.90 5.30 5.50 9.00 3.40 1.50 1.60 0.90 65.90 100.00 
Table 20: Perception/opinon of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
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Table 21: Perception/opinion of Informal dispute resolution mechanisms
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Informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
(e.g. Jirga, shura, 
respected elder(s), or 
other influential person(s) 
in your family/community) 
43.30 9.50 7.50 7.30 2.40 3.30 1.10 1.70 23.90 100.00 
Table 22: Perception/opinion of Religious leader in the community
Name of Institution / 
Actor 
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Religious leader in 
the community 
55.90 14.20 1.10 3.70 3.10 1.70 1.90 2.70 15.90 100.00 
Victim of theft or fraudplaced their trust in religious leaders. 
12.80 % out of 1,500 respondents is a worrisome Since the last section showed a low level of 
figure. The Contract Act has not been extended awareness of justice-dispensing institutions and 
to FATA, where people do business through a c t o r s ,  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  
verbal commitments, thus providing a greater actors/institutions were also not very clear. As 
chance for such litigations to happen. expected, the highest number of responses 
related to questions on the informal dispute 
Victim of assault
resolution mechanism and its actors, majority of 
The respondents were then asked whether they the respondents believe it to be both affordable 
or any other member of their household had and speedy. 
been victims of assault. Out of 1,500 respondents 
Experience with litigation
only 43 (3.30%) confirmed that they had been 
victims of assault, while 1,336 (89.10%) did not With Jirga being the prevalent and only system of 
experience assault. 90 respondents (6.00%) did justice dispensation in FATA, a vast majority does 
not know whether any member of their not get involved in the formal justice mechanism, 
household experienced this. 25 people (1.70%) and prefers to resolve disputes at the community 
did not reply. level. In order to get a better idea of the nature of 
cases that respondents and/or their family 
The absence of any internal security apparatus 
members have faced, and what their experiences 
makes FATA seem like a wild place where no one 
have been like, the survey asked detailed 
is safe. However, since every family is responsible 
questions which are presented in this section 
for its own security, every individual in FATA 
with analysis. 
knows the consequences of offences and the 
burden of responsibility as a result of such acts. The FATA respondents, males and females, were 
Therefore, it is not surprising that only 3.30 % had asked whether they or one of their household 
been assaulted once.  members had experienced any crime or issue 
during the last ten years. Respondents were 
Victims of domestic abuse
provided with a list of issues so that they could 
It is generally perceived that the tribal men are share their experience on each, one by one. 
violent towards women at home, especially Following is a brief analysis for each issue/crime 
towards their wives. However, the data shows a based on the responses we received.
different picture, with only 3.70% informing this had experienced forced marriages, 17 were 
survey that they had experienced domestic women and 11 were men. 
abuse, and 1,341 respondents (89.40%) saying 
Family member gone missing or disappeared
that they had not. 
Due to the ongoing militancy and in response to 
The small percentage could originate from the 
the Pakistan military operation in most parts of 
fact that many respondents gave incorrect 
FATA, over a million people have had to leave 
information to the enumerators, not wanting to 
FATA. Maliks were kidnapped and later on killed 
share their domestic problems with outsiders.
by militants. Some innocent people were 
When cross-tabulated, of the 56 respondents kidnapped for ransom by militant groups, while 
who experienced domestic abuse, 42 were others went missing and were later found dead. 
women. On the other hand, the military also picked up 
locals for investigation while their family 
Victims of forced marriage
members did not have any idea of where they 
In the rural part of Pakthun areas, especially in were. There are a number of stories where 
FATA, it is believed that elders of a family families have lost their loved ones due to the 
generally arrange marriages and that in some insurgency in FATA. 
cases, marriages are forced. However, the survey 
Arrested without warrant by the political 
results are contrary. 
administration under FCR
Only 28 of 1,500 respondents experienced forced 
According to Article 10 (1) of the Constitution of 
marriage. These results show that respondents 
Pakistan,
were shy of sharing personal issues, while only 
few had the courage to share their experiences.  No person who is arrested shall be 
detained in custody without being 
After cross-tabulation of the 28 respondents who 
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Table 23: Victims of theft or fraud
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know 
No Response  Total  
Victim of theft 
or fraud 
192 1,155 117 36 1,500 
Percentage  12.80 77.00 7.80 2.40 100.00 
Table 25: Victims of domestic abuse
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know 
No 
Response  
Total  
Victim of 
domestic abuse 
56 1,341 92 11  1,500 
Percentage 3.7 89.40 6.1 0.70  100.00 
Table 26: Victims of forced marriage
Crime/issue Experienced  
Not 
Experienced  
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Victim of forced 
marriage 
28  1,367  90  15  1,500  
Table 27: Family member has gone missing or disappeared
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know 
No 
Response 
Total  
Family member 
has gone missing 
or disappeared 
35 1,360 88 17 1,500 
Table 24: Victims of assault
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No Response  Total  
Victim of assault 49 1,336 90  25  1,500  
Percentage 3.30 89.10 6.00 1.70 100.00  
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Victims of domestic abuse
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who experienced domestic abuse, 42 were others went missing and were later found dead. 
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locals for investigation while their family 
Victims of forced marriage
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cases, marriages are forced. However, the survey 
Arrested without warrant by the political 
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administration under FCR
Only 28 of 1,500 respondents experienced forced 
According to Article 10 (1) of the Constitution of 
marriage. These results show that respondents 
Pakistan,
were shy of sharing personal issues, while only 
few had the courage to share their experiences.  No person who is arrested shall be 
detained in custody without being 
After cross-tabulation of the 28 respondents who 
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Total  
Victim of forced 
marriage 
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Table 27: Family member has gone missing or disappeared
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know 
No 
Response 
Total  
Family member 
has gone missing 
or disappeared 
35 1,360 88 17 1,500 
informed, as soon as may be of the 85 respondents confirmed that they or their 
grounds for such arrest, nor  shall he be family members were arrested by the political 
denied the right to consult and be administration without warrant. 
defended by a legal practitioner of his 
The FCR gives immense powers to the political 142
choice. 
administration, who can sometimes put 
The people of FATA are provided with all rights someone behind bars for years without 
enshrined in the Constitution; however, there are presenting him/her to any court of law. 
some ambiguities as to how one can claim such 
Accused of an offence under the Anti-
rights in the absence of a superior judiciary in 
Terrorism Act
FATA. Article 38 (Powers of arrest) of the FCR 
1901, Chapter V, says; The Anti-Terrorism Act is extended to the 
protected areas of FATA only. The political 
In any place in which all or any of the 
administration can arrest a person accused of an 
provisions of this Regulation are for the time 
offence under this Act by virtue of the FCR 
being in force
dispositions. 
i) Any private person may, without an 
When 1,500 FATA respondents were asked 
order from a Magistrate and without a 
whether they or their household member 
warrant, arrest or cause to be arrested, and 
remained accused of an offence under Anti-
make over or cause to be made over to a 
Terrorism Act, 19 respondents confirmed that 
police officer or take or cause to be taken to 
they experienced this. The ratio of accused is 
the nearest police station, any Person who 
quite low given that the ongoing militancy and 
has been concerned in any cognizable 
the 'war on terror' may have caused a huge 
offence or against whom a reasonable 
number of such arrests. One reason for such a 
complaint has been made or credible 
low response could be the reluctance of 
information has been received, or a 
respondents to share this information. 
reasonable suspicion exists of his having 
been so concerned; […]. Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault 
(under the Hudood Ordinance or the Pakistan 
When the survey asked the respondents whether 
Penal Code)
they or their family members were arrested by 
the political administration without any warrant, The Hudood Ordinance is applicable in the FATA 
region; therefore, the political administration committing any other crime and only 13 
can make use of the FCR when enforcing this respondents confirmed that this had been the 
ordinance. case. Again, this is quite a low ratio compared 
with the given law and order situation. 
The survey attempted to record whether the 
respondents or their household members were Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the 
accused of committing sexual abuse/assault. political administration
Only 5 respondents confirmed that they were 
The number of 48 respondents is not very big 
accused of committing sexual abuse/assault. 
given the law and order situation. TV channels 
Cases of honour killing are very rare in Pakhtun and national newspapers regularly report 
society and especially in FATA; however, if terrorists being arrested by the military during 
someone commits sexual abuse there is a high search operations in FATA. However, such arrests 
probability of him/her being killed in the name of are effectuated by the military or other law 
honour. Even the comparably small number of enforcement agencies and not by the political 
five respondents is already extremely surprising. administration. Therefore, respondents might 
have only referred to the political administration 
when responding to the question. 90 respondents did not have any information 
about their household members or were not 
Bribery by Khasadar or Levies force
interested in sharing this information. 
In settled areas, the police is very notorious for 
Accused of committing any other crime
taking bribes from people, while in FATA, 
Khasadar or Levies force are blamed for such Respondents were also asked whether they or 
acts. For instance, when transporting goods from their household members had been accused of 
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Table 28: Arrests without warrant
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Arrested without 
warrant by the 
political administration 
under FCR 
85 1,313 91  11  1,500  
Table 29: Offences under Anti-Terrorism Act 
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Accused of an 
offence under the 
Anti-Terrorism Act 
19 1,377 90  14  1,500  
Table: 30. Accused of committing sexual abuse under Hudood Laws Ordinance of Pakistan
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Accused of committing 
sexual abuse/assault 
(under the Hudood 
Ordinance or the 
Pakistan Penal Code) 
5 1,392 90  13  1,500  
Table 31: Accused of committing other crime
Crime/issue Experienced  
Not 
Experienced  
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Accused of committing 
any other crime 
13  1,384  85  18  1,500  
Table 32: Unlawful detention, search or arrest by political administration
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Unlawful detention, 
search or arrest by the 
political administration 
48 1,351 86  15  1,500  
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Total  
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Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Unlawful detention, 
search or arrest by the 
political administration 
48 1,351 86  15  1,500  
settled areas to FATA or from FATA to settled military or FC, this gives a very gloomy and 
areas, there are several illegal taxes or bribes that worrisome picture of the human rights situation 
one has to pay when crossing over checkpoints in in FATA, as such cases are extremely rare in 
FATA. settled districts of Pakistan. 
Although not many people in FATA are involved Money recovery, or debt/obligation 
with transportation or smuggling business, the settlement
number of affirmative answers is still quite low. 
Since the Pakistan Stamp Act has not been 
Taking or giving bribes is considered a great sin in 
extended to FATA, all agreements/commitments 
Islam and perhaps that is why many respondents 
are concluded verbally. In case of violation, local 
found that they did not want to share their 
Jirgas settle money recovery or debt/obligation 
experiences. 
cases. The political administration may also 
Assault or torture by Frontier Corps (FC) or Army intervene to avoid any situation susceptible of 
causing violence. 
The military operation in FATA has caused 
numerous issues of concerns, including assault or Contract enforcement in business dealings
torture by FC or Army. Out of 1,500 FATA 
As stated above, neither the Contract Act nor the 
respondents, 89 confirmed that they or their 
Stamp Act have been extended to FATA; however, 
household members experienced assault or 
there are cases where parties sign contracts in 
torture by FC or Army, which makes around 
the settled districts of Pakistan. Such contracts 
5.90% of the total respondents. 
Previous surveys by CAMP revealed that around a fall under the FCR, and when one of the parties 
quarter of FATA residents had experienced forced approaches the political administration with a 
migration. However, if 5- 6 people out of 100 complaint, the political administration has the 
143
powers to react and enforce business dealings.have experienced assault or torture from the 
When 1,500 respondents from FATA were asked to the question.  
whether they or their family members 
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child 
experienced contract enforcement in business 
custody, guardianship, inheritance
dealings, only 13 confirmed that they did. The 
number of cases under this category is quite low As mentioned before, cases of divorce, child 
for the above stated reasons. custody, inheritance or guardianship, and 
maintenance are very rare in the tribal society. 
Purchase or sale of movable property
Such issues are dealt with within the four walls of 
Of 1,500 FATA respondents, 81 confirmed that a household and are considered very much 
they experienced litigation of purchase or sale of against the family honour if discussed with 
moveable property. strangers. In response to such situations, family 
members resolve such issues through a family 
While a significant number of respondents (89) 
Jirga. 
did not know whether their household members 
had experienced such cases, 14 respondents did There is a high probability that the 20 
not reply to the question. Some 40 respondents respondents who responded in the affirmative 
confirmed that they faced such litigations while had resolved these issues through their family 
1,358 replied that they did not. 90 respondents Jirga. 
did not know, while 12 respondents did not reply 
Dispute with employer over unpaid wages
to the question.
Tribal society consists of many characteristics 
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc
that provide a sense of unity and cohesion. It is 
1,500 respondents were asked through a single based on inter-family linkages that unite sub-
choice question whether they had experienced clans, clans and tribes and families in a web of 
any issues related to lease and rental, which led kinship. The family structure is the most complex 
to disrepair or eviction. Some 40 respondents feature of tribal society that shares family 
confirmed that they faced such litigations while honour, property and intra-familial hate and love 
1,358 replied that they did not. 90 respondents relationships.
did not know, while 12 respondents did not reply 
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Table 33: Bribery related to Khasadar or Levies
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced  
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response
Total  
Bribery by Khasadar 
or Levies force 
54 1,343 87  16  1,500  
Crime/issue Experienced Not Experienced 
Don’t 
Know 
No 
Response  
Total  
Assault or torture 
by FC or Army 
89 1,306 86 19  1,500 
Percentage 5.9 87.10 5.7 1.3  100.00 
Table 34: Assault or torture by FC or Army
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Contract enforcement 
in business dealings 
13 1,385 87  15  1,500  
Table 36: Contract enforcement in business dealing
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response 
Total  
Purchase or sale of 
movable property 
81 1,316 89 14 1,500 
Table 37: Purchase or sale of movable property
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Lease and rental issues: 
disrepair, eviction etc. 
40 1,358 90  12  1,500  
Table 38: Lease and rental issues
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Money recovery, or 
debt/obligation settlement 
36 1,362 88 14  1,500 
Percentage  2.40 90.80 5.90 0.90 100.00 
Table 35: Recovery of money or debt settlement
settled areas to FATA or from FATA to settled military or FC, this gives a very gloomy and 
areas, there are several illegal taxes or bribes that worrisome picture of the human rights situation 
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number of affirmative answers is still quite low. 
Since the Pakistan Stamp Act has not been 
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extended to FATA, all agreements/commitments 
Islam and perhaps that is why many respondents 
are concluded verbally. In case of violation, local 
found that they did not want to share their 
Jirgas settle money recovery or debt/obligation 
experiences. 
cases. The political administration may also 
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The military operation in FATA has caused 
numerous issues of concerns, including assault or Contract enforcement in business dealings
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Generally, businesses in FATA are owned by Involvement in sectarian violence
families and not by individuals. Employees are 
Orakzai and Kurram Agencies in FATA are two 
generally from within a family, at different 
tribal areas where Shiite and Sunni communities 
hierarchies, depending mostly on their individual 
live together. Shiite population is estimated to be 
status within the family or household. First-borns 
between 12-14% of the total FATA population; 
usually run the show, while youngsters follow. 
however, there are areas where local tribes are 
This way, most of the workers/employees are 
predominantly Shiite, such as in Parachinar tehsil 
from within that particular family and there are 
of Kurram Agency . The last few years of sectarian 
less chances of any such litigation. 
Thus, the response from FATA respondents is not violence in Kurram Agency have disrupted life in 
a surprise, as only 14 respondents shared that the area, and led to forced migration of 
they had a dispute with their employer over thousands of families of both sects. The sectarian 
unpaid wages. violence in Kurram also spilled over into the 
adjacent Orakzai Agency. Those who are actively 
Debt bondage
involved in violent acts are arrested by the 
Very few Pakistani banks have branches in FATA. political administration, but the majority is still at 
Since the Recovery Act has not been extended to large. 
FATA, banks do not give loans to the locals of 
The question aimed to know whether any of the 
FATA. In the absence of such services, the people 
respondents had been guilty of or involved in 
of FATA are left with no other choice but to take 
loans from local private companies who run sectarian violence. 10 respondents confirmed 
currency business and provide loans on a very that during the last ten years, they or their family 
high credit. It is believed that the interest rate members had been charged with sectarian 
could be between 30% to 70%, higher than with violence. 
banks. 
This number is fairly small compared to the 
magnitude of  the problem; however,  family feuds information as they are proud of 
respondents might not have honestly disclosed these feuds. However, the number is still fairly 
this information. Furthermore, both sects blame low, as it is perceived that almost every family in 
the intelligence agencies or a 'foreign hand' for FATA has a feud. This could also be taken 
this violence. Therefore, there is a certain positively and as an indication that the people of 
reluctance to share information on sectarian FATA are now realising the impact of the feuds 
violence. which have contribued to the underdevelopment 
of their areas. 
Found involved in tribal/family clashes
Injured in an accident (motor vehicle)
It is a known fact that Pakhtuns, especially in 
tribal areas, have family and tribal feuds over In FATA, as stated in the first chapter, the terrain is 
land, honour, water or other issues related to harsh and road communication is extremely 
shared property. The media always report on poor. The highways are in better condition, but 
such incidents within the family which leads to access roads are, for the most part, not 
violence, injuries and death. The political asphalted, making driving extremely difficult and 
administration's intervention leads to the arrest dangerous. 
of people from both sides after the ceasefire 
Have you been involved in a dispute during the 
(teega). 
past two years?
The survey aimed to know whether any of the 
If a Pakhtun family member is involved in any 
respondents were found guilty or involved in 
tribal/family clashes and as many as 84 litigation, the whole family gets involved, 
confirmed that they or their family members had including women and children. Therefore, 
faced such litigations. This number may not women respondents who confirmed that they 
include those cases of family/tribal clashes which experienced such situation did not necessarily 
were resolved internally by local Jirgas. mean to say that they were personally involved, 
but that their families were part of such a 
Tribal Pakhtuns do not shy away from sharing 
dispute. 
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Crime/issue  Experienced 
Not 
Experienced  
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Family law issues: divorce, 
maintenance, child custody, 
guardianship, inheritance 
20 1,378 85  17  1,500  
Table 39: Family law issues
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Dispute with 
employer over unpaid 
wages 
14 1,384 89  13  1,500  
Table 40: Dispute with employer over unpaid wages
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Debt bondage 42 1,355 87  16  1,500 
Table 41: Debt bondage
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Found involvement 
in sectarian violence 
10 1,388 86  16  1,500  
Table 42: Involvement in sectarian violence 
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know  
No 
Response  
Total  
Found involved in 
tribal/family clashes 
84 1,314 88  14  1,500  
Table 43: Involvement in tribal/family clashes
Crime/issue Experienced 
Not 
Experienced 
Don’t 
Know 
No 
Response  
Total  
Injured in an accident 
(motor vehicle) 
129 1268 87 16  1500  
Table 44: Injuries in accident
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(motor vehicle) 
129 1268 87 16  1500  
Table 44: Injuries in accident
faced civil disputes, while 34.50% respondents 
said that they had experienced criminal disputes. 
All 8.06% respondents who did not know the 
answer were women.
In the previous section, around 38.70% of the 
respondents had experienced litigation of 
numerous forms, from 'victim of theft or fraud' 
(12.80%), to 'injured in an accident' (8.60%), 
'arrest or torture by FC or Army' (5.90%) to 
'arrested without warrant under the FCR' 
(5.70%). 
Following these results, the survey attempted to 
find out whether the respondents had faced any 
dispute during the last two years and some Whom did you take the dispute to first?
38.07% respondents confirmed that they had 
The 571 respondents who had experienced indeed experienced litigation of one or the other 
disputes were then asked whom they had first form. This reflects a staggering reality of tribal 
taken their dispute to for resolution. Out of 571 life; it also shows that in the absence of any 
respondents, 43.08% said that they had taken security apparatus, people turn against each 
their disputes to a Jirga. 30.82% respondents said other easily and raise decades-old issues. Many 
that they had taken their disputes to the local have disputes of varying nature, leading to 
leaders (Khans or Maliks) first, while 10.33% violence and bloodshed.  
respondents said that they had taken their 
Out of the 571 respondents who had disputes to Mullah/Imam of their areas. 
experienced litigation, 290 were women, 9 
6.30% respondents said that they had taken their respondents more than men. However, as stated 
disputes to courts in adjoining districts of Khyber above, this does not preclude that in reality, the 
Pakhtunkhwa first. In such cases, a disputant can women's male family members had been the one 
file an appeal in the court of commissioner of the to experience the dispute.  
adjoining district against the verdict of FCR Jirgas. 
It has been observed that women, as disputants, 
4.98% respondents of the sample had also are not allowed to become part of the Jirga 
accessed Taliban courts. When cross-tabulated, process, their male members generally represent 
the data by Agency/FR shows that out of 28 them. 
respondents who had accessed Taliban courts, 18 
If yes, what was the dispute about? were from South Waziristan Agency, 6 from FR 
Tank and 2 from FR D.I.Khan, while only one came 571 respondents who shared this information 
from FR Peshawar. Taliban presence is mostly said that they had experienced varying levels of 
concentrated in South Waziristan, North disputes. They were subsequently asked what 
Waziristan, FR Tank, FR Bannu and FR D.I. Khan. type of dispute they had experienced. Out of 571 
respondents, 46.58% answered that they had 
level of satisfaction with various forms of justice 
systems in Pakistan. Jirga  receives an 
overwhelming response from the respondents in 
terms of satisfactory delivery of justice in a 
manner communities in FATA aspire for. Out of 
249 respondents, 227 respondents have shown 
their satisfaction, including 152 'very satisfied' 
and 75 'satisfied'. Only 22 respondents were not 
satisfied with the Jirga decisions they received in 
response to their disputes, including 20 'some 
what unsatisfied' and 2 'not satisfied'. 
The results show that the people in FATA are also 
very satisfied with the involvement of local 
leaders (Khans or Maliks) or Mullahs/imams in 
resolving their disputes. 
In the conservative tribal society of FATA, Mullas 
and Imams are considered very important people 
and an integral part of the society. During the last 
three decades Mullahs and Imams have received  
tremendous amount of prominence and respect 
How satisfied were you with the involvement of 
because of their role to gather support for Afghan 
the following? 
jihad against Soviet Forces. Since they are 
The 571 respondents who had experienced perceived to be well versed in the Sharia't law 
litigations of various nature were then asked therefore, it has been observed that sometime 
whether they were satisfied with the institution people take their disputes to these Mullahs and 
once they had approached them. Imams to be processed under Sharia'a law. 
Table 45 conveys a very clear picture of people's Some 36 respondents took their disputes to the 
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Table 45. Satisfaction with justice-dispensing mechanism/actor
Response 
Very 
Satisfied 
Somewhat 
Satisfied  
Somewhat 
Unsatisfied  
Not 
Satisfied  
Total  
State Court 1 20 10  5  36  
Jirga 152 75 20  2  249  
Local leaders (Khans or Maliks) 79 83 12  2  176  
Mullah (s) Imam (s) 35 14 8  2  59  
Taliban 13 3 7  5  28  
Other 2 3 0  1  6  
Don’t Know     17  
Total 282 198 57  17  571  
faced civil disputes, while 34.50% respondents 
said that they had experienced criminal disputes. 
All 8.06% respondents who did not know the 
answer were women.
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'arrest or torture by FC or Army' (5.90%) to 
'arrested without warrant under the FCR' 
(5.70%). 
Following these results, the survey attempted to 
find out whether the respondents had faced any 
dispute during the last two years and some Whom did you take the dispute to first?
38.07% respondents confirmed that they had 
The 571 respondents who had experienced indeed experienced litigation of one or the other 
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taken their dispute to for resolution. Out of 571 life; it also shows that in the absence of any 
respondents, 43.08% said that they had taken security apparatus, people turn against each 
their disputes to a Jirga. 30.82% respondents said other easily and raise decades-old issues. Many 
that they had taken their disputes to the local have disputes of varying nature, leading to 
leaders (Khans or Maliks) first, while 10.33% violence and bloodshed.  
respondents said that they had taken their 
Out of the 571 respondents who had disputes to Mullah/Imam of their areas. 
experienced litigation, 290 were women, 9 
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Pakhtunkhwa first. In such cases, a disputant can women's male family members had been the one 
file an appeal in the court of commissioner of the to experience the dispute.  
adjoining district against the verdict of FCR Jirgas. 
It has been observed that women, as disputants, 
4.98% respondents of the sample had also are not allowed to become part of the Jirga 
accessed Taliban courts. When cross-tabulated, process, their male members generally represent 
the data by Agency/FR shows that out of 28 them. 
respondents who had accessed Taliban courts, 18 
If yes, what was the dispute about? were from South Waziristan Agency, 6 from FR 
Tank and 2 from FR D.I.Khan, while only one came 571 respondents who shared this information 
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overwhelming response from the respondents in 
terms of satisfactory delivery of justice in a 
manner communities in FATA aspire for. Out of 
249 respondents, 227 respondents have shown 
their satisfaction, including 152 'very satisfied' 
and 75 'satisfied'. Only 22 respondents were not 
satisfied with the Jirga decisions they received in 
response to their disputes, including 20 'some 
what unsatisfied' and 2 'not satisfied'. 
The results show that the people in FATA are also 
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Table 45. Satisfaction with justice-dispensing mechanism/actor
Response 
Very 
Satisfied 
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Satisfied  
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Not 
Satisfied  
Total  
State Court 1 20 10  5  36  
Jirga 152 75 20  2  249  
Local leaders (Khans or Maliks) 79 83 12  2  176  
Mullah (s) Imam (s) 35 14 8  2  59  
Taliban 13 3 7  5  28  
Other 2 3 0  1  6  
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Total 282 198 57  17  571  
state courts. Since FCR regulates the entire life in Furthermore, since the Pakistan army and other 
FATA, it is generally believed that cases of all security forces are hunting Taliban, it is not 
nature should go to either the FCR Jirga or Olasi possible for them to organise their courts, etc. 
Jirga. Therefore, it is a little surprising that the  36 Therefore, the results show that a few 
respondents accessed the state's court system. respondents took their cases to Taliban. Out of 28 
However, legal experts reported that although respondents, 16 showed their satisfaction, 
state courts are very expensive and time- including 13 'very satisfied' and three 'somewhat 
consuming, the people of FATA still have the satisfied', while 12 respondents were not 
option to access them in their adjacent districts. satisfied with the judgement of Taliban courts, 
Looking at the data, we see that out of 36 litigants including seven 'somewhat unsatisfied' and five 
who had accessed state courts, some 21 'not satisfied'. 
respondents showed their satisfaction, including 
Table 45 shows that the Jirga institution remains 
1 'very satisfied' and 20 'somewhat satisfied'. 
the most trusted system, followed by local 
Some 15 respondents showed their lack of 
leaders and Mullahs. All three have been very 
satisfaction, including 10 'somewhat unsatisfied' 
important institutions within tribal society for a 
and five 'not satisfied'. 
long time. 
Taliban courts were quite active in the beginning 
What were the reasons you chose the 
of the Taliban evolution in FATA after the 9/11-
institution/individual to deal with the dispute? 
incident and subsequent attacks of American and 
NATO forces on Afghanistan; Afghan Taliban took Through a multiple-choice question, 571 were 
refuge in FATA and started their activities of a s k e d  w h y  t h e y  c h o s e  t h o s e  
gathering support, using land for training, and institutions/individuals to deal with their 
recruiting new local Taliban. Since FCR Jirga is not disputes. The reasons that respondents shared 
very trusted and the people were not satisfied are shown in table 46. 
with the justice dispensation, they started 
The data is very straight forward and tells how 
looking towards Taliban for social justice. At that 
the respondents perceived them to be 'fair and 
point in time, the Taliban resolved some very 
trusted' (16.93%), 'less expensive' (11.73%), 
complex disputes and received a tremendous 
'efficient and effective' (10.47%), 'follows 
amount of appreciation and trust from the local 
accepted local norms and values' (8.60%), 'close 
tribes. However, the justice meted out according 
to where I live' (8.27%) and 'less corrupt' (5.47%). 
to Taliban interpretation of Islam became 
unacceptable to the local people and hence, the This response shows that more people look for 
Taliban's charm quickly started to fade. institutions that are fair and trusted, followed by 
its economic dimensions. The absence of 
corruption was their last priority, as it is believed 
that almost all institutions are corrupt. 
Trust placed in the types and functions of the 
Jirga systems
This section documents the respondents' 
perception on various dimensions of Jirga  such 
as perception of respondents on different types 
of Jirga  institutions, including Taliban 
Shura/Jirga, the level of trust the respondents 
have on various types of Jirgas, and their views 
on whether reforms can be brought in to the Jirga 
mechanism, etc. 
In your opinion, what type of Jirga is most 
trusted for resolving disputes in this area?
The survey attempted to gauge the level of trust 
the respondents have in the type of Jirga they 
have access to. The respondents were asked 
chose both FCR and Olasi Jirgas, 410 were 
about the types of Jirga they trust the most for 
illiterate, while 664 had primary to intermediate 
resolving disputes. The respondents were given 
level education. This also indicates that the 
options of Taliban, FCR or government and Olasi 
majority who chose FCR Jirga are either illiterate 
Jirgas. Well over two-third of the respondents 
or less educated and do not know much about 
(70.47%) identified Olasi Jirga as the most 
the legal and human rights consequences 
trusted one followed by FCR Jirga with just 
associated with both Jirga institutions.  
12.07%. However, keeping in view the ongoing 
security situation and wide spread perception During the focus-group discussions, we found 
that FATA is under full influence of Talibanisation, that most of the respondents preferred Olasi 
the survey results for Taliban Jirga are quite Jirga system to FCR Jirga. Regardless of gender 
astounding with only 0.67% support. and age, the participants of all focus-group 
discussions supported Jirga, especially Olasi Jirga 
The overwhelming support for the Olasi Jirga 
and opined that Olasi Jirga is less corrupt and 
conveys a clear message that the FATA 
more transparent and accountable, less 
respondents are quite satisfied with this system 
expensive, and acceptable to all parties. 
and not so much with other forms of Jirga. 
Lawyers and retired civil servants also revealed 
After cross tabulation by age group for both Olasi 
that the Olasi Jirga mechanism, as a tool to 
and FCR Jirga, it was found that out of 1,238 
dispense justice, is the most trusted institution in 
respondents who chose both Jirga systems, 640 
144
FATA.  They believed that the Jirga mechanism is 
are between the age group 50-64 years and 419 
a more effective and efficient tool to dispense 
between the age group of 18-29 years. This also 
justice within the tribal environment, as it 
indicates that both young and old prefer Jirgas to 
satisfies the religious and cultural sentiments of 
other forms of justice mechanisms. 
the people.
When further cross-tabulated with education 
level, we see that out of 1,238 respondents who 
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Response Frequency Percent 
Other (Specify) 8 0.53 
Less corrupt 82 5.47 
Close to where I live 124 8.27 
Follows accepted local norms and values 129 8.60 
Efficient and effective at resolving the dispute 157 10.47 
Less expensive 176 11.73 
Fair and trusted 254 16.93 
Table 46: Reasons for choosing the institution/individual to deal with the dispute
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Figure 20. Type of Jirga most trusted for resolving
disputes in the area
state courts. Since FCR regulates the entire life in Furthermore, since the Pakistan army and other 
FATA, it is generally believed that cases of all security forces are hunting Taliban, it is not 
nature should go to either the FCR Jirga or Olasi possible for them to organise their courts, etc. 
Jirga. Therefore, it is a little surprising that the  36 Therefore, the results show that a few 
respondents accessed the state's court system. respondents took their cases to Taliban. Out of 28 
However, legal experts reported that although respondents, 16 showed their satisfaction, 
state courts are very expensive and time- including 13 'very satisfied' and three 'somewhat 
consuming, the people of FATA still have the satisfied', while 12 respondents were not 
option to access them in their adjacent districts. satisfied with the judgement of Taliban courts, 
Looking at the data, we see that out of 36 litigants including seven 'somewhat unsatisfied' and five 
who had accessed state courts, some 21 'not satisfied'. 
respondents showed their satisfaction, including 
Table 45 shows that the Jirga institution remains 
1 'very satisfied' and 20 'somewhat satisfied'. 
the most trusted system, followed by local 
Some 15 respondents showed their lack of 
leaders and Mullahs. All three have been very 
satisfaction, including 10 'somewhat unsatisfied' 
important institutions within tribal society for a 
and five 'not satisfied'. 
long time. 
Taliban courts were quite active in the beginning 
What were the reasons you chose the 
of the Taliban evolution in FATA after the 9/11-
institution/individual to deal with the dispute? 
incident and subsequent attacks of American and 
NATO forces on Afghanistan; Afghan Taliban took Through a multiple-choice question, 571 were 
refuge in FATA and started their activities of a s k e d  w h y  t h e y  c h o s e  t h o s e  
gathering support, using land for training, and institutions/individuals to deal with their 
recruiting new local Taliban. Since FCR Jirga is not disputes. The reasons that respondents shared 
very trusted and the people were not satisfied are shown in table 46. 
with the justice dispensation, they started 
The data is very straight forward and tells how 
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the respondents perceived them to be 'fair and 
point in time, the Taliban resolved some very 
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'efficient and effective' (10.47%), 'follows 
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tribes. However, the justice meted out according 
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trusted for resolving disputes in this area?
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dispense justice, is the most trusted institution in 
respondents who chose both Jirga systems, 640 
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FATA.  They believed that the Jirga mechanism is 
are between the age group 50-64 years and 419 
a more effective and efficient tool to dispense 
between the age group of 18-29 years. This also 
justice within the tribal environment, as it 
indicates that both young and old prefer Jirgas to 
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other forms of justice mechanisms. 
the people.
When further cross-tabulated with education 
level, we see that out of 1,238 respondents who 
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Response Frequency Percent 
Other (Specify) 8 0.53 
Less corrupt 82 5.47 
Close to where I live 124 8.27 
Follows accepted local norms and values 129 8.60 
Efficient and effective at resolving the dispute 157 10.47 
Less expensive 176 11.73 
Fair and trusted 254 16.93 
Table 46: Reasons for choosing the institution/individual to deal with the dispute
10
32
105
115
181
1057
0.67
2.13
7.00
7.67
12.07
70.47
Taliban Jirga
Other (Specify)
No response
Don't know
FCR Jirga
Olasi Jirga or 
Qaomi Jirga
Frequency
Percent
Figure 20. Type of Jirga most trusted for resolving
disputes in the area
Effectiveness of FCR Jirga mechanism. 
FATA respondents were subsequently asked to This notion is supported by the results of most of 
share their perception of the effectiveness of the  the focus-group discussions in which the 
FCR Jirga system in resolving criminal and civil 
cases. The results indicate that respondents were 
more in favour of the FCR Jirga settling criminal 
cases as compared to civil cases. In various focus-
group discussions, the respondents revealed that 
civil cases settlement under FCR Jirga takes more 
time and creates frustration for both disputant 
parties. 
participants specifically narrated how Olasi Jirga 
is more effective in resolving civil disputes. To 
avoid more bloodshed or maintain law and order 
situation in the respective Agency, the local 
political administration is keener to deal with 
criminal rather than civil issues. However, if a civil 
case leads to bloodshed or violence, the political 
When we cross-tabulated the data by gender, we administration intervenes and resolves it before it 
found that out of 643 respondents who did not gets worse.  
know the answer or who did not have any 
Effectiveness of other forms of Jirgas (Taliban 
opinion, 503 were women. We further cross-
Shura)
tabulated the data by education of the 
respondents and found that 340 of them had Taliban Jirgas or Shuras are confined to a few 
never gone to school. parts of FATA. The presence of military operation 
in South Waziristan, Bajaur and some parts of 
Effectiveness of Olasi Jirga
Mohmand, Orakzai and Khyber Agencies and FR 
Contrary to FCR Jirga, Olasi Jirga is more effective Kohat indicate the presence of Taliban and other 
145
in resolving civil than criminal cases.  More than religiously oriented groups. Besides, there are 
half of the respondents, 53.00%, believed that other areas such as North Waziristan, FR D.I. 
Olasi Jirga is more effective in resolving civil cases 
as opposed to only 23.73% who believed that 
Olasi Jirga is best suited for resolving criminal 
cases. 23.27% is still quite a high number and 
when we cross-tabulated this figure, we found 
that out of 349 respondents, 185 had never gone 
to school, while 38 had only received religious 
education, and 51 had primary level education. 
Further cross-tabulation showed that out of 349 
respondents, 315 were women. This reflects lack 
of awareness among women about the Jirga 
Khan, and FR Kohat where there has not been any the other hand, the table 47 also shows that most 
military operation against militant groups, but respondents from Bajaur, Khyber and Kurram 
where it is widely believed that the areas are agencies did not have any opinion or did not 
Talibanised. know the answer. We have seen a weak presence 
of Taliban groups in Khyber and Kurram agencies 
The presence of Taliban in these areas leads us to 
in the past; however, the Taliban were in full 
believe that Taliban and other militant groups 
control of Bajaur before the military operation 
deal with local matters through their own 
there and they had organised such Jirgas where 
interpretation of Islam. However, the data 
alleged criminals were persecuted. 
provides a striking revelation. 72.93% 
respondents shared that they did not know or Fairness of FCR Jirga
they did not have any opinion on the Taliban 
We asked the respondents different questions 
Jirga, while only 14.93% respondents said that 
with regard to the fairness of the FCR and Olasi 
Taliban Jirga is effective in resolving civil cases. 
Jirga mechanisms. First, we will deal with the FCR 
12.13% believed that Taliban Jirga is effective in Jirga mechanism. Compared to other results of 
resolving criminal cases. This shows that Taliban the subsequent questions, figure 24 shows some 
are unable to conduct their Jirgas regularly encouraging results for FCR Jirga. Nevertheless, 
because of their engagement with the military in the rest of the survey results in the subsequent 
FATA. sections provide a very clear indication that FCR 
Jirga has little credibility and acceptance within 
When cross-tabulating the data by Agency/FR, 
the tribal society in FATA. 
those who believed that Taliban Jirga is effective 
in resolving criminal and civil cases were mostly During the focus-group discussions with 
from South and North Waziristan agencies where disputant parties of Jirgas, an overwhelming 
we have seen Taliban presence and support. On majority showed their lack of trust in the FCR 
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Figure 21: Effectiveness of FCR Jirga
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Figure 23: Effectiveness of other forms
of Jirga (Taliban Shura)
Table 47: Cross-tabulation by Agency/FR for views on Taliban Jirga
Response  
 
Total
 
Criminal cases
 
Civil cases
 
Don’t 
Know 
Bajaur Agency 16 10 217 243 
FR Bannu 0 1 49 50 
FR D.I.Khan 2 34 14 50 
FR Kohat 0 0 50 50 
FR Lakki 4 0 46 50 
FR Peshawar 2 2 46 50 
FR Tank 0 43 7 50 
Khyber Agency 6 6 211 223 
Kurram Agency 3 4 176 183 
Mohmand Agency 32 16 87 135 
North Waziristan Agency 60 40 48 148 
Orakzai Agency 1 0 91 92 
South Waziristan Agency 56
 
68
 
52
 
176
 
Total   182 224 1,094 1,500 
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because of their engagement with the military in the rest of the survey results in the subsequent 
FATA. sections provide a very clear indication that FCR 
Jirga has little credibility and acceptance within 
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the tribal society in FATA. 
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FR Kohat 0 0 50 50 
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52
 
176
 
Total   182 224 1,094 1,500 
Jirga and shared that cases had been influenced 
by the political administration and at times by the 
Jirga members who were hand-picked by the 
administration. Fairness of Sharia' (under Taliban) 
The lawyers and civil servants who were Figure 26 shows opposing results to the focus-
interviewed for this study were also of the view group discussions and consultations. Figure 26 
that FCR Jirga was not a fair institution for shows that only 13.66% respondents believed 
providing justice to the aggrieved. that Taliban style of Sharia' is fair, including 5.53% 
'very fair' and 8.13% 'somewhat fair'. In all focus-Fairness of Olasi Jirga
group d iscuss ions  and  consu l tat ions ,  
1,500 male and female respondents from FATA respondents expressed their full belief in the 
were asked in a qualified manner to share their fairness of trial under Sharia' laws; however, in 
views on the fairness of Olasi Jirga system. In face-to-face perception surveys, one-third of the 
response to this question, the data reveals that respondents, 34.53%, believed that Taliban style 
only 18.07% of the respondents believed that Sharia' is unfair, including 23.60% who thought it 
Olasi Jirga was unfair, including 1.67% 'very to be 'very unfair' and 13.93% who said 
unfair' and 16.40% 'somewhat unfair'. An 'somewhat unfair'. This shows the lack of trust 
overwhelming majority of respondents, 70.13%, the respondents have in the fairness of trials 
believed in the fairness of the Olasi Jirga, under Taliban style Sharia'. 
including 38.53% 'very fair' and 31.60% 
A larger group of respondents, 29.40%, did not 'somewhat fair'. 
form any opinion, while some 19.40% did not 
An overwhelming majority of the respondents in reply. When we cross-tabulated these two 
the focus-group discussion were also of the view options, we found that more women opted for 
that Olasi Jirga is fairer than FCR Jirga. As stated these options than men. If we combine both 
above, key informants from the legal profession options, this amounts to half of the respondents 
also viewed Olasi Jirga as more reliable and fairer (48.80%). 
than FCR or any other form of dispute resolution 
Interviews with female leaders from FATA also mechanism in FATA. 
show their lack of trust in the fairness of any of the 
Respondents of focus-group discussions and 
consultations supported this notion. An 
overwhelming majority believed that in response 
to fears of conflicts getting bloody, Jirga 
intervenes and prevents bloodshed in most 
cases. It is also believed that the role of Jirga is 
restorative and not retributive and that it 
therefore brings harmony to the community.
FCR Jirga decisions are influenced by the more 
powerful party to a dispute
The respondents were then asked whether they 
would support the notion that the powerful 
party can easily influence FCR Jirgas. Some 
28.00% respondents disagreed with the notion, 
above mechanisms including Olasi, FCR and 
Sharia', and believed that all such tools have 
violated women's rights and have kept them 
146
away from the decision-making process.
Jirga plays a proactive role in preventing 
conflicts
It is perceived that in tribal areas bordering 
Afghanistan, Jirga (in the context of both FCR and 
Olasi) plays a vital role in dispensing justice, 
preventing bloodshed and resolving decade-old 
conflicts. This question intended to learn the 
respondents' opinion on the proactive role of 
Jirga in preventing conflicts. 
including 9.27% 'strongly disagree' and 19.07% 
'somewhat disagree'. On the other hand, 
majority of the respondents, 41.60%, agreed 
with this notion, including 18.60% 'strongly 
agree' and 23.00% 'somewhat agree'. Almost 
quarter of the respondents did not form an 
opinion or did not know the answer. Some 7.40% 
did not respond to the question.
When we cross-tabulated the results with 
income, we found 223 respondents from the 
higher income group [PKR 15,000 and above] 
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Figure 27. Is it true that Jirga plays proactive
role in preventing conflicts?
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Figure 28: FCR Jirga decisions are influenced by
the more powerful party to a dispute
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cases. It is also believed that the role of Jirga is 
restorative and not retributive and that it 
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The respondents were then asked whether they 
would support the notion that the powerful 
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Sharia', and believed that all such tools have 
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Jirga in preventing conflicts. 
including 9.27% 'strongly disagree' and 19.07% 
'somewhat disagree'. On the other hand, 
majority of the respondents, 41.60%, agreed 
with this notion, including 18.60% 'strongly 
agree' and 23.00% 'somewhat agree'. Almost 
quarter of the respondents did not form an 
opinion or did not know the answer. Some 7.40% 
did not respond to the question.
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Figure 28: FCR Jirga decisions are influenced by
the more powerful party to a dispute
out of 298 who did not know the answer or did Around 31.20% respondents disagreed with the 
not reply were women. notion, including 10.53% 'strongly disagree' and 
20.67% 'somewhat disagree'. While 34.87% During focus-group discussions with various 
respondents agreed with the notion, including groups, the participants showed mistrust on the 
14.20 'strongly agree' and 20.67% 'somewhat Jirga members' integrity. They added that the 
agree'. political administration could influence the Jirga 
decision through their hand-picked members. After cross-tabulation, we found that out of 438 
This view was overwhelmingly shared by respondents who did not have an answer, 360 
participants of various consultations and key were women. 
informants from FATA.
During the focus-group discussions, majority of 
Jirga members remain impartialthe respondents said that possibilities of Jirga 
members being intimidated by the more This question is linked to the previous one. Jirga 
powerful party exist. members who are susceptible to influence by the 
political administration are unlikely to remain Jirga members are influenced by Political 
impartial. However, the figure 32 shows a Administration
different picture. Around 47.00% respondents 
As Jirga members are selected by the political believed that Jirga members remain impartial 
administration, there are more chances of and cannot be easily influenced to manipulate 
members being influenced by the political the Jirga process and decisions including 22.80% 
administration. This perception is reflected in the 'strongly agree' and 24.20% 'somewhat agree'. 
survey results. As Jirga members are selected by While 30.53% respondents disagreed that Jirga 
the political administration, there are more members could remain impartial, including 
chances of members being influenced by the 10.40% 'strongly disagree' and 20.13% 
political administration. This perception is 'somewhat disagree'. 
reflected in figure 31.
The focus-group discussions with various groups 
Cross-tabulation showed that 239 respondents 
who agreed with the notion. This shows that this 
perception is stronger within the higher income 
groups.
During focus-group discussions with disputants, 
very few voices disapproved of this notion, while 
the overwhelming majority was against the FCR 
Jirga, which, the respondents believed, has the 
tendency to be influenced by the powerful party 
to the dispute. They believed that once the 
decision is made by the political administration, 
it is hard to challenge it in any court of law. 
During the in-depth interviews, Maliks and 
religious leaders from FATA shared the 
perception that FCR Jirga decisions are 
influenced by the powerful who have 
connections inside the political administration of 
however, at the same time, respondents also 
their respective agencies. 
suspected that losing parties usually direct such 
allegations against Jirga members. The above information leads us to believe that 
power can play a role in influencing Jirga 
During the in-depth interviews with key 
decisions. The huge vacuum that the lack of 
informants, it was shared that Jirga members  
proper justice in FATA has created has been filled 
receive a reasonable fee for their services; 
by criminal elements which, by design, give more 
however, the informants did not deny fact that 
power to the already powerful. this creates in 
some members are corrupt and often receive 
balance in the equation of the society and leads 
bribes. They also added that such members do 
to unrest and chaos, a situation that is widely 
not have respect within their communities and 
prevalent in FATA and other poorly governed 
subsequently lose credibility. Furthermore, the 
region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa like Malakand 
losing party in the court of polit ical  
Division.
administration can always challenge such biased 
Jirga decisions. Besides, the community is always Jirga elders/members take bribes
witness to such proceedings and can react 
Through a single-choice question, the 
against one-sided decisions. 
respondents were asked whether they agreed or 
A large group (19.40%) did not know the answer disagreed with the notion that Jirga members 
and 5.27% did not respond; cross-tabulation take bribes. The response is mixed and shows 
showed the majority of them were female that there is a possibility of members being 
respondents. bribed by disputant parties. Some 31.27%, 
agreed with the notion, including 14.07% 
Jirga members are intimidated by the more 
'strongly agree' and 17.20% 'somewhat agree'. A 
powerful party to a dispute
total of 44.07% disagreed with the notion, 
The survey intended to know whether the including 25.07% 'strongly disagree' and 19.00% 
respondents would agree or disagree with the 'somewhat disagree'.
notion that the more powerful party to a dispute 
During the focus-group discussions, majority of 
intimidates Jirga members in their favour. The 
the respondents revealed that Jirga members 
answers received shows mixed responses. 
receive bribes from the disputant parties; 
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modes of settlement during their Jirga 
proceedings. 
These results reflect the double standards of the 
local people in FATA. Parties choose whatever 
mode of settlement suits them. When it comes to 
Badal or Qasas (revenge), they will opt for 
Sharia'; however, when it comes to giving rights 
to women, they will prefer to follow traditions 
and customs. 
Government officials involvement in Jirga 
Proceedings
The fact that people do not like the involvement 
of government officials during the Jirga 
proceedings was tested during the focus-group 
discussions, consultations and through the 
perception survey. The results are very similar; 
figure 36 shows that majority of the respondents, 
59.53%, opposed the notion, including 34.53% notion, including 27.80% 'strongly support' and 
'strongly oppose' and 25.00% 'somewhat 29.60% 'somewhat support'. More than a 
oppose'. While 23.60% respondents supported quarter of the respondents, 26.20%, opposed 
the notion, including 11.20% 'strongly support' the notion, including 7.67% 'strongly oppose' 
and 12.40% 'somewhat support'.and 18.53% 'somewhat oppose' the notion. 
The involvement of government or local FCR Jirga should be conducted under a mixture 
administration is not welcomed by the local of both Sharia' Law and local Riwaj
people who do not support the idea of members 
Figure 35 shows a very authentic picture of the 
being selected by the local administration. They 
psyche of the tribal society in FATA. The local 
people usually practice both Riwaj and Sharia' as 
dispute resolution. 
When asked this question during the perception 
survey, a total of 23.86% respondents opposed 
this notion, including 5.13% 'strongly oppose' 
and 18.73% 'somewhat oppose'. On the other 
hand, majority, 59.13%, supported the notion, 
including 33.60% 'strongly support' and 25.53% 
'somewhat support'.
On the other hand, it was observed and shared 
by the key informants that if things are not in the 
revealed different opinions than the survey 
findings. However, it is also important to mention 
here that majority of the respondents showed 
their concerns over the impartiality of FCR Jirga 
during focus-group discussions. It is interesting 
to note that very few voices were raised relating 
to the impartiality of the Olasi Jirga members. 
The key legal informants hailing from FATA 
supported the Jirga as an efficient source of 
dispensing justice; however, they were of the 
opinion that the government involvement 
through the political administration has put its favour of tribesmen under the Sharia' law, they 
status and future at stake. switch to their old customs. For instance, women 
are provided with inheritance rights under 
FCR Jirga should be conducted under Sharia' 
Sharia' as opposed to under the local customs of 
Law
the tribal society. There are other bad practices 
In FATA, disputing parties to the Jirga must arrive such as Swara etc. which are discouraged under 
at a consensus concerning the mode of the Sharia' law but remain local customs that are 
settlement  arbitration, Riwaj (customary laws) strongly rooted in the tribal society and preferred 
147
or Sharia' (Islamic law).  During the focus-group over Sharia' laws. 
discussions, a majority including women and 
FCR Jirga should be conducted under local Riwaj
youth identified Sharia' law [under Jirga process] 
as a mode of settlement for any of their Contrary to the above, more than half of the 
problems, including disputes. There were very responses received were in favour of Riwaj. 
few voices that supported Riwaj as the mode of Around 57.40% respondents supported the 
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modes of settlement during their Jirga 
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being selected by the local administration. They 
psyche of the tribal society in FATA. The local 
people usually practice both Riwaj and Sharia' as 
dispute resolution. 
When asked this question during the perception 
survey, a total of 23.86% respondents opposed 
this notion, including 5.13% 'strongly oppose' 
and 18.73% 'somewhat oppose'. On the other 
hand, majority, 59.13%, supported the notion, 
including 33.60% 'strongly support' and 25.53% 
'somewhat support'.
On the other hand, it was observed and shared 
by the key informants that if things are not in the 
revealed different opinions than the survey 
findings. However, it is also important to mention 
here that majority of the respondents showed 
their concerns over the impartiality of FCR Jirga 
during focus-group discussions. It is interesting 
to note that very few voices were raised relating 
to the impartiality of the Olasi Jirga members. 
The key legal informants hailing from FATA 
supported the Jirga as an efficient source of 
dispensing justice; however, they were of the 
opinion that the government involvement 
through the political administration has put its favour of tribesmen under the Sharia' law, they 
status and future at stake. switch to their old customs. For instance, women 
are provided with inheritance rights under 
FCR Jirga should be conducted under Sharia' 
Sharia' as opposed to under the local customs of 
Law
the tribal society. There are other bad practices 
In FATA, disputing parties to the Jirga must arrive such as Swara etc. which are discouraged under 
at a consensus concerning the mode of the Sharia' law but remain local customs that are 
settlement  arbitration, Riwaj (customary laws) strongly rooted in the tribal society and preferred 
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or Sharia' (Islamic law).  During the focus-group over Sharia' laws. 
discussions, a majority including women and 
FCR Jirga should be conducted under local Riwaj
youth identified Sharia' law [under Jirga process] 
as a mode of settlement for any of their Contrary to the above, more than half of the 
problems, including disputes. There were very responses received were in favour of Riwaj. 
few voices that supported Riwaj as the mode of Around 57.40% respondents supported the 
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respondents also supported the men's 
argument. This shows the extreme lack of 
awareness among women of FATA on basic rights 
and issues they are faced with, as well as their 
dependency on male family members. 
During the focus-group discussions and 
consultations, the topic was very carefully 
discussed. Some subsequent questions aiming to 
probe the respondents were asked. The overall 
results of the qualitative data shows that tribal 
society is not ready to accept this reality; 
however, some voices supported the inclusion of 
women in the Jirga process, which, they 
believed, would help reduce chances of violation 
of women's rights. 
Jirga violates minorities' rights
During the focus-group discussions and 
The survey intended to know the respondents 
consultations, the respondents were unable to 
support for the notion whether 'Jirga violates 
come up with a strong argument, while some 
minorities' rights'. Figure 39 provides a very clear 
young voices were heard supporting the notion 
picture of the perception of the tribal society on 
and blaming the Jirga institution for not 
this account. Majority, 63.60%, disagreed with 
providing any platform for the minorities. 
the notion, including 49.20% 'strongly disagree' 
and 14.40% 'somewhat disagree'. While 13.07% Jirga violates basic Human Rights
agreed with the notion, including 5.87% 'strongly 
It is argued that Jirga institution is not in 
agree' and 7.20% 'somewhat agree'. 
conformity with the international human rights 
Again, cross-tabulation showed that the standards and with the Constitution of 
1 5 1overwhelming majority of those who gave no Pakistan.  However, the respondents' 
answer were female. perception seems to be quite different and does 
not support the notion that Jirga violates basic 
believe that the Jirga process should be admixture of Islam, has throughout the ages 
transparent and accountable to the people been used to establish the superiority of men 
involved, not to the government. over women in the Pakhtun-dominated areas 
149
generally, and in FATA particularly.  Notions, 
Jirga fails to resolve disputes effectively
institutions and customs of Pakhtunwali have 
Jirga been interpreted and practiced in men's favour in With regard to the notion that '  fails to 
order to exercise, justify and reinforce patriarchal resolve disputes effectively', the respondents did 
authority. Jirga, as an institution of Pakhtun not seem very convinced and a majority, 65.20%, 
150
disagreed with the notion, including 40.33% who society, violates women's rights.
'strongly disagreed' and 24.87% who 'somewhat 
However, keeping in view the above-mentioned 
disagreed'. Only 17.60% supported the notion, 
negative perception, figure 38 depicts a very 
including 5.20% who did so 'strongly' and 12.40% 
different picture, given that a two-third majority, 
who 'somewhat supported' it.
71.73%, disagreed with the notion, including 
The results show the true picture of the 43.40% who 'strongly disagreed' and 18.33% 
who 'somewhat disagreed'. 
Since half of the respondents were women, 
cross-tabulation showed very interesting results; 
women of Pakhtun society, especially the rural 
and tribal women, supported the male members 
of the family. Nearly half of the respondents who 
disagreed with the notion are women. Data in 
table 48 by gender is self-explanatory.  
During the focus-group discussions and 
consultations, the respondents were not ready 
to believe in a violation of women's rights and 
blamed the media for propagating against Jirga 
and tribal way of life. Surprisingly, women 
sentiments of the tribal society; however, some 
respondents blamed Jirga for their under-
148
development and lack of proper justice.  
Jirga violates women's rights
Human and women's rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International ,  Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, Aurat Foundation, etc. 
have some very negative and strong views about 
the Jirga institution and argue that Jirga has the 
tendency to violate women rights. Women 
activists also believe that Pakhtunwali, with an 
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Table 48: Cross-tabulation data of tribal women supporting their males
Response Male  Female  
Strongly agree 75  36  
Somewhat agree 86  71  
Somewhat disagree 174  101  
Strongly disagree 344  307  
Don't know 59  161  
No response 10  76  
Total 748  752  
respondents also supported the men's 
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and issues they are faced with, as well as their 
dependency on male family members. 
During the focus-group discussions and 
consultations, the topic was very carefully 
discussed. Some subsequent questions aiming to 
probe the respondents were asked. The overall 
results of the qualitative data shows that tribal 
society is not ready to accept this reality; 
however, some voices supported the inclusion of 
women in the Jirga process, which, they 
believed, would help reduce chances of violation 
of women's rights. 
Jirga violates minorities' rights
During the focus-group discussions and 
The survey intended to know the respondents 
consultations, the respondents were unable to 
support for the notion whether 'Jirga violates 
come up with a strong argument, while some 
minorities' rights'. Figure 39 provides a very clear 
young voices were heard supporting the notion 
picture of the perception of the tribal society on 
and blaming the Jirga institution for not 
this account. Majority, 63.60%, disagreed with 
providing any platform for the minorities. 
the notion, including 49.20% 'strongly disagree' 
and 14.40% 'somewhat disagree'. While 13.07% Jirga violates basic Human Rights
agreed with the notion, including 5.87% 'strongly 
It is argued that Jirga institution is not in 
agree' and 7.20% 'somewhat agree'. 
conformity with the international human rights 
Again, cross-tabulation showed that the standards and with the Constitution of 
1 5 1overwhelming majority of those who gave no Pakistan.  However, the respondents' 
answer were female. perception seems to be quite different and does 
not support the notion that Jirga violates basic 
believe that the Jirga process should be admixture of Islam, has throughout the ages 
transparent and accountable to the people been used to establish the superiority of men 
involved, not to the government. over women in the Pakhtun-dominated areas 
149
generally, and in FATA particularly.  Notions, 
Jirga fails to resolve disputes effectively
institutions and customs of Pakhtunwali have 
Jirga been interpreted and practiced in men's favour in With regard to the notion that '  fails to 
order to exercise, justify and reinforce patriarchal resolve disputes effectively', the respondents did 
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However, keeping in view the above-mentioned 
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different picture, given that a two-third majority, 
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The results show the true picture of the 43.40% who 'strongly disagreed' and 18.33% 
who 'somewhat disagreed'. 
Since half of the respondents were women, 
cross-tabulation showed very interesting results; 
women of Pakhtun society, especially the rural 
and tribal women, supported the male members 
of the family. Nearly half of the respondents who 
disagreed with the notion are women. Data in 
table 48 by gender is self-explanatory.  
During the focus-group discussions and 
consultations, the respondents were not ready 
to believe in a violation of women's rights and 
blamed the media for propagating against Jirga 
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sentiments of the tribal society; however, some 
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development and lack of proper justice.  
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Human and women's rights organisations such as 
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the Jirga institution and argue that Jirga has the 
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Table 48: Cross-tabulation data of tribal women supporting their males
Response Male  Female  
Strongly agree 75  36  
Somewhat agree 86  71  
Somewhat disagree 174  101  
Strongly disagree 344  307  
Don't know 59  161  
No response 10  76  
Total 748  752  
Interviews with lawyers, women activists and 
Jirga mediates and restores peace and order, and 
other groups raised the concern that Jirga does 
could harmonise the tribal society by preventing 
not have any mechanism to prevent women's 
conflicts that have caused enormous bloodshed. 
and minorities' rights violations, making it an 
They provided some historical instances in 
unacceptable form of justice dispensation tool 
support of the notion. They said that it took a few 
for those who are against this institution. 
days in resolving several decades long conflict  
Jirga maintains social order and restores over land ownership, which prevented 
152
harmony in the community unnecessary bloodshed.
Mediating and restoring peace and harmony to Jirga is well placed to resolve civil disputes 
the tribal society, Jirga is perceived to be best only
suited to the tribal areas' conservative 
To know the effectiveness of Jirga in resolving the 
environment. However, recent security and 
civil disputes only, we asked the respondents 
political developments in FATA have raised 
whether they would support or oppose the 
several questions as to the role of Jirga. The 
notion. F
Taliban as well as the Pakistan army by-passed 
the Jirga institution, which has undermined its 
credibility, leaving doubts on the very existence 
of Jirga in FATA in recent days. 
However, survey results show that respondents 
trust the Jirga as a tool to maintain social order 
This question was also discussed during the 
and harmony in FATA. 
focus-group discussions and received some 
During the focus-group discussions, middle-aged overwhelming responses favouring Jirga as a 
respondents and litigants particularly raised well-placed institution to resolve both criminal 
their concerns and said that the Pakistan army and civil disputes. The number of cases can be 
should not have bypassed the role of local varied for Olasi and FCR Jirga, as FCR Jirga is more 
administration and Jirga. They believed that involved in resolving criminal cases while the 
igure 44 shows that half of the 
respondents, 50%, disagreed with the notion, 
including 29.00% ‘strongly disagree’ and 21.00% 
‘somewhat disagree’. On the other hand 30.07% 
agreed with the notion, including 10.67% 
‘strongly agree’ and 19.40% ‘somewhat agree’. 
human rights of the people living in FATA, 
including women and minorities. Majority, Jirga, as an open process, can easily be observed 
60.27%, disagreed with the notion, including by outsiders. They argued strongly that anyone 
46.27% 'strongly disagree' and 14.00% observing the Jirga process could raise concerns 
'somewhat disagree'. 17.60% respondents over proceedings if he was not satisfied. Jirga 
supported the notion, including 6.80% 'strongly members can be replaced if found to be 
agree' and 10.80% 'somewhat agree'. unsatisfactory by any party to the dispute. 
Furthermore, those respondents who disagreed 
Respondents in the focus-group discussions and 
with the notion argued that Jirga fails to provide 
consultations argued that Jirga provided equal 
a fair chance to women and minorities.
opportunities to all and does not violate any 
fundamental rights of the individual. They Jirga has the potential to prevent violation of 
blamed the Western media for highlighting the women and minorities' rights
negative aspects of Jirga.  
In response to the notion that 'Jirga has the 
Jirga provides a fair and public hearing potential to prevent violation of women and 
opportunity to key parties involved in the minorities' rights', the results are slightly 
dispute different to results in figures 38 and 39 where 
majority disagreed with the notion that Jirga 
Most of the Jirga proceedings take place in an 
violates women and minorities rights.
open place and can be attended by anyone 
except women. Over one-third of the sample, 37.67%, disagreed 
with the notion, including 15.20% 'strongly 
Respondents agreed with the notion that 'Jirga 
disagree' and 22.47% 'somewhat disagree', while 
provides a fair and public hearing opportunity to 
40.47% respondents agreed with the notion, 
the parties involved in the dispute'. Majority of 
including 19.67% 'strongly agree' and 20.80% 
respondents, 58.06%, agreed with the notion, 
'somewhat agree'. 
including 20.13% 'strongly agree' and 27.93% 
'somewhat agree'. Since this question was a subsequent one, some 
respondents may have changed their views 
During the focus-group discussions, the 
slightly as the survey proceeded. 
respondents were very clear about the fact that 
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Figure 43. Jirga maintains social order and
restores harmony in the community
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Figure 43. Jirga maintains social order and
restores harmony in the community
know the answer (16.47%) or did not reply disagree'. 15.80% of the respondents did not 
(10.00%). know the answer while 8.00% did not reply.
As stated earlier, both Jirga forms are effective in An overwhelming majority of respondents 
their respective realms. Olasi is more effective in during the focus-group discussions agreed with 
resolving civil disputes while FCR Jirga is the notion and believed that Jirga can contribute 
approached for criminal cases keeping in view considerably to ensuring the rule of law. 
the role of political administration's role. For 
Key informants from FATA, including lawyers, 
criminal cases the people do not have much 
retired civil servants, members of Jirga, etc., also 
choice, as the political administration has to 
were of the opinion that a 'free and fair Jirga 
intervene concerning criminal cases to maintain 
mechanism can contribute to maintaining law 
law and order in the area, leaving little choice for 
and order and providing justice to all, [thus] 
the public to approach Olasi Jirga. 153 
ensuring the rule of law in FATA'.
Jirga contributes to Rule of Law
Jirga resolves serious crimes
It is generally perceived within tribal society that 
On the ability of Jirga resolving some serious 
in FATA, Jirga plays a vital role in ensuring rule of 
crimes, half of the respondents, 50.33%, agreed 
law. In the absence of any other state's 
with the notion, including 25.73% 'strongly 
mechanism to ensure rule of law, Jirga remains 
agree' and 24.60% 'somewhat agree'. 27.73% 
the sole institution, which provides security and 
opposed the notion, including 7.73% 'strongly 
justice to the people and prevents conflicts.  
disagree' and 20.00% 'somewhat disagree'.
The figure 47 shows that nearly half of the 
Cross-tabulation showed that out of 165 in the 
respondents 49.60% supported the notion, 
including 22.47% 'strongly agree' and 27.13% 
'somewhat agree'. Only a quarter of the sample, 
26.60%, disagreed with the notion, including 
6.60% 'strongly disagree' and 20.00% 'somewhat 
'don't know' category, 142 were women, while 
those who did not respond included 149 women 
and 15 men. 
Information gathered through qualitative tools 
However, the survey results are slightly 
confusing. As per the figure 45, 39.14% 
respondents agreed with the notion, including 
17.07% 'strongly agree' and 22.07% 'somewhat 
agree' while one-third of the respondents, 
33.46% disagreed, including 13.73% 'strongly 
disagree' and 19.73% 'somewhat disagree'.
Taliban fighters are mainly from within the local 
communities who have killed and injured 
thousands of innocent people. During this time 
of 'Taliban militancy', it is very difficult for the 
local people to give amnesty and reintegrate 
Taliban fighters because of the concept of Badal 
under Pakhtunwali. 
Jirga is well placed to resolve both civil and 
criminal disputes
majority of litigants approaching an Olasi Jirga 
The survey intended to gauge opinion on 
wish to resolve civil disputes. 
whether the 'Jirga is well placed to resolve both 
Jirga reintegrates offenders into the civil and criminal disputes'. The figure 46 shows 
community that a large group of respondents, 44.40%, 
agreed with the notion, including 23.13% 
As stated before, Jirga is restorative rather than 
'strongly agree' and 21.27% 'somewhat agree', 
retributive in nature. The aim of a Jirga is to 
while 29.13% respondents disagreed, including 
restore communal harmony, reintegrate both 
8.33% 'strongly disagree' and 20.80% 'somewhat 
parties to the dispute in society and restore 
disagree'.
normalcy. 
Quite a large group of respondents either did not 
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Figure 47. Jirga contributes to Rule of Law
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Figure 47. Jirga contributes to Rule of Law
education at all supported the FCR clause of clause. Table 49 is meant to illustrate the issue.
collective responsibility for imposing Jirga 
D u r i n g  t h e  fo c u s - g ro u p  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  
decisions, while those who opposed it form the 
consultations with local leaders and interviews 
second largest group within the 'not schooled' 
with key informants, it was revealed that a 
group. Literate respondents mainly opposed the 
section of the tribal society supports the status 
collective responsibility clause of the FCR. This 
quo in FATA, while educated and well-informed 
also reflects the lack of awareness of the local 
people argued that the current status under FCR 
people in regards to some  archaic clauses of the 
with its inhuman clauses have kept the people 
FCR, including the collective responsibility 
and the area far behind in terms of human 
development. 
During Olasi Jirga proceedings, every member 
of the Jirga has the right to express his views in a 
democratic way.
such as focus-group discussions, consultations 
and in-depth interviews with key informants tell 
us that Jirga cannot resolve serious or complex 
issues. However, it can be improved and can form 
a written jurisprudence with the passage of 
154
time.
Jirga is an organised, well-established, 
transparent and efficient institution
Cross-tabulation of the 'don't know' and 'no 
response' categories by gender showed that of 
142 respondents in the 'don't know' category, 
131 were female, while 80 of the 88 'no 
response' respondents were females. Again, this 
reflects the lack of knowledge of women 
regarding the Jirga process. 
Do you support/oppose the punishment of 
collective responsibility [under the FCR] for the 
implementation of Jirga decision?
Cross-tabulation of the data with education level 
showed that more respondents having no 
Jirga makes lasting peace among disputants
Cross-tabulation by gender showed that of the 
98 'don't know' respondents, 93 were women, 
and 82 women were part of the 'no response' 
category. 
Men were also very vocal compared to women 
during the focus-group discussions. 
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Figure 50. Jirga makes lasting peace
among disputants Response Frequency  Percent  
No response 112  7.47  
Strongly support 179  11.93  
Don't know 180  12.00  
Somewhat oppose 197  13.13  
Somewhat support 262  17.47  
Strongly oppose 570  38.00  
Total 1,500 100.00  
Table 49: Perception on punishment of collective responsibility [under the FCR] for the implementation
of Jirga decision.
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Figure 51. Do you support/oppose the punishment
of collective responsibility (under FCR)
for the implementation of Jirga decisions?
275
358
374
210
213
70
18.33
23.87
24.93
14.00
14.20
4.67
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don't know
No response
Frequency
Percent
Figure 52. During FCR Jirga proceedings,
every member of the Jirga has the right to
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Figure 53. During Olasi Jirga proceedings, every
member of the Jirga has the right to express his
views in a democratic way
During FCR Jirga proceedings, every member of 
the Jirga has the right to express his views in a 
democratic way.
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During FCR Jirga proceedings, every member of 
the Jirga has the right to express his views in a 
democratic way.
Code, international norms and practices related 
to human rights, and knowledge of the 
Constitution of Pakistan and other basics related 
to her judicial system. This will help the Jirga 
reach a decision which complies with the 
standards of justice; however, they argued, the 
present Jirga members only know the dictates of 
157
their society (Pakhtunwali).  They added that 
modern education will further strengthen Jirga 
158 
to face the challenges of today's world.
Respondents of consultations and focus-group 
discussions argued that conventional wisdom, 
respect within the tribal society as well as family 
status are the main pre-requisites that a Jirga 
159
member should bring to the Jirga.  They 
believed that members of Jirga know their code 
of conduct and take guidance from past cases.   
Figure 54 indicates that people see the 
importance of education for a Jirga member, but 
not as the sole qualification. A Jirga member 
must also be knowledgeable of the local Riwaj 
and Sharia'. 
Jirga is a speedy and less expensive mechanism 
of dispute resolution
It is generally perceived that the state's formal 
justice system is very expensive, corrupt and 
time-consuming. People have to wait several 
years for a decision while paying huge amounts 
of money to their lawyers and officials of lower 
cadre. In comparison to this, Jirga is cheap and 
quick in dispensing justice. However, experts 
have shown their concerns and admitted that 
identified 'good family reputation and respect' 
160
money has influenced the Jirga process.  Since 
within their society. Some 12.13% respondents 
the dynamics of Pakhtun society have changed 
identified 'good level of education', which is 
during the last few decades and money has 
obviously necessary as they have to be 
become a status symbol, the tribal elders have 
conversant with Sharia' laws. Those who 
1 6 1
also become inf luenced by money.  
identified 'good level of formal education' were 
Nonetheless, a majority still supports the Jirga 
only 11.67%. Some 11.60% identified 'piety' as a 
system as compared to the formal judicial system 
condition for becoming a Jirga member.  
in FATA, as the formal legal system has failed to 
Lawyers from FATA were of the view that it would deliver justice to the common man in Pakistan. 
be an ideal situation to see educated members of Furthermore, nearly 60% of people in FATA live 
a Jirga who have sufficient knowledge of below the poverty line and are economically 
customary laws, Sharia' laws, the Pakistan Penal disadvantaged; therefore, they cannot afford the 
The outcome of various consultations with become a member of the Pakhtun Jirga council, 
Maliks, youth, and other members of the society education is not the pre-requisite in either FATA 
in FATA reinforced these results. The survey or any other Pakhtun-dominated area of 
results can also be supported by the outcome of Pakistan. A member should come from a noble 
various focus-group discussions where men family; he should be rich and powerful, and 
especially supported this notion. respected for his wisdom and past experience. 
Education is not a condition but can be added to 
Almost all key informants of the in-depth 
his credit. In Afghanistan, members of a local 
interviews except for women agreed with this, 
Jirga/Shura usually have these qualities:  piety, 
and argued that Olasi Jirga remains the only 
religiosity, a proven record and reputation of 
viable institution in FATA which can provide an 
Milmastiya (hospitality), of a good family, Nang 
opportunity to the people to express their voices 
or Ghairt (honour), a large number of men in the 
democratically and without any fear. 
family, verbal eloquence and a proven record of 
155Credibility, victim's compensation and selection sound judgments in past Jirgas.
criteria of Jirga members
Furthermore, it has been observed that the 
This section deals with respondents' perceptions people of FATA prefer Jirga to the formal justice 
on various issues concerning victim's system of the country. They argue that Jirga is 
compensation, Jirga members' qualifications, cheap, accessible, speedy, and that they have the 
156their credibility, their selection criteria, and the choice of either Sharia' or Riwaj. 
enforcement of Jirga decisions, etc.  
Criteria for becoming a Jirga elder/member
A level of, and relevant educational background 
Male and female respondents from FATA were and experience could be the prerequisites for 
asked about what the criteria to become a Jirga becoming a lawyer or a judge in the formal 
member should be. Out of 1,500 respondents, judicial system of a modern nation state. 
32.27% identified 'conventional wisdom and Without these conditions it is rather impossible 
expertise' as the main pre-requisite for becoming to hold such a position. On the contrary, to 
a Jirga member, followed by 12.80% who 
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member should be. Out of 1,500 respondents, judicial system of a modern nation state. 
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becoming a Jirga elder/member?
That nearly one-third of the respondents, 
32.00%, did not agree with the statement and 
shared their concerns shows that people have 
reservations over the outcome of Jirga process 
and believe that at times, Jirga does not provide 
a proper compensation to the victim party. In 
certain cases, we see a violation of human rights, 
especially women's rights, at the end of a Jirga. 
Therefore, the results are very similar to the 
response we saw in the focus-group discussions 
where respondents shared similar concerns. 
The women activists' groups, legal professionals, 
and other government officials also agreed with 
the fact that sometimes, Jirga does not reach a 
good decision and that the victims thus do not 
receive a proper compensation.  
Cross-tabulation by education showed that 
more men (232) than women (67) have respondents with higher education do not 
confirmed that members of Sarkari Jirga do not support the statement, as out of 57 highly 
receive fee. A large number of respondents were educated respondents, only 22 supported the 
undecided, which also indicates the ambiguity of statement.
the situation. Out of 521 respondents who did 
Fee charged by a Sarkari (FCR) Jirga for resolving 
not have an opinion, there were 390 women, 
disputes
while 118 of the 161 'no response' respondents 
were women.The survey aimed to confirm whether the Jirga 
elders receive a fee from the litigants, or if this is 
Fee charged by the Olasi Jirga for resolving 
merely hearsay. The respondents were hence 
disputes
asked whether disputants of FCR Jirga pay a fee 
Over half of respondents, 59.53%, confirmed to the Jirga elders. There were mixed responses 
that disputants of Olasi Jirga pay fee to the Jirga from the respondents.
members, while only 14.73% said 'no'. This 
Cross-tabulation showed that more male than 
question received a clearer response in 
female respondents (342 to 177) confirmed that 
comparison to the one for Sarkari Jirga.
members of a Sarkari Jirga receive a fee from the 
Since FCR Jirga members receive allowances disputant parties. However, we also see that 
from the political administration for their 
When we analysed the focus-group discussions, 
we saw an overwhelming support from the 
respondents despite all other shortcomings of 
Jirga. However, they were open to reforming the 
Jirga system. 
Experts from the legal profession, Maliks, and 
other stakeholders also underlined the 
importance of Jirga on the basis of its ability to 
163
provide speedy justice at a very cheap rate.
One of the main outcomes of Jirga decision is 
fair compensation to victims
The Jirga process usually aims to reach a 
c o n c l u s i o n  w h e re  a  v i c t i m  re c e i v e s  
compensation while the burden is placed on the 
offenders. Thus, while the victim is compensated 
(usually in material form), the offenders are 
usually reintegrated into the society/community, 
which restores harmony. Besides, Jirga decisions 
litigation expenses incurred during the formal 
are based on consensus, which means both the 
162
judicial processes.    
parties have to accept the decision of the Jirga. 
Jirga elders usually receive money for their 
service, which is perceived by some as bribe 
while others take it as members' eligible fee. 
Generally, the offending party has to bear the 
cost of all expenses on behalf of all parties 
involved. At the end of the Jirga, the offending 
party has to arrange a feast for a large gathering, 
including the victim party, Jirga elders, and 
community members. This is a big cost for the 
offending party; however, the philosophy behind 
this act is that those who commit a crime must 
face the consequences. This way, the offenders 
learn a lesson and the entire community realises 
the burden of responsibility in case anyone 
commits crime. This may not stop people from 
committing crimes but is a precautionary 
measure. 
Besides other thematic issues of Jirga, the study 
also documents the perception of 1,500 
respondents regarding the Jirga system's ability 
to deliver justice, the element of compensation 
the Jirga system provides to the victim party, and 
financial involved aspects of the Jirga process. 
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Figure 55. How strongly do you agree with the
statement: Jirga is a speedy and less expensive
mechanism of dispute resolution
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“one of the main outcomes of Jirga decision is a
fair compensation to victims”?
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Figure 57. Do disputants pay a fee when their
 disputes are resolved through a Sarkari (FCR) Jirga?
Response  
Gender of respondents 
Total Male Female 
Yes 342 177 519 
No 232 67 299 
Don't know 131 390 521 
No response 43 118 161 
Total   748 752 1,500 
Table 51. Cross-tabulation on payment of fee to FCR Jirga
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32.00%, did not agree with the statement and 
shared their concerns shows that people have 
reservations over the outcome of Jirga process 
and believe that at times, Jirga does not provide 
a proper compensation to the victim party. In 
certain cases, we see a violation of human rights, 
especially women's rights, at the end of a Jirga. 
Therefore, the results are very similar to the 
response we saw in the focus-group discussions 
where respondents shared similar concerns. 
The women activists' groups, legal professionals, 
and other government officials also agreed with 
the fact that sometimes, Jirga does not reach a 
good decision and that the victims thus do not 
receive a proper compensation.  
Cross-tabulation by education showed that 
more men (232) than women (67) have respondents with higher education do not 
confirmed that members of Sarkari Jirga do not support the statement, as out of 57 highly 
receive fee. A large number of respondents were educated respondents, only 22 supported the 
undecided, which also indicates the ambiguity of statement.
the situation. Out of 521 respondents who did 
Fee charged by a Sarkari (FCR) Jirga for resolving 
not have an opinion, there were 390 women, 
disputes
while 118 of the 161 'no response' respondents 
were women.The survey aimed to confirm whether the Jirga 
elders receive a fee from the litigants, or if this is 
Fee charged by the Olasi Jirga for resolving 
merely hearsay. The respondents were hence 
disputes
asked whether disputants of FCR Jirga pay a fee 
Over half of respondents, 59.53%, confirmed to the Jirga elders. There were mixed responses 
that disputants of Olasi Jirga pay fee to the Jirga from the respondents.
members, while only 14.73% said 'no'. This 
Cross-tabulation showed that more male than 
question received a clearer response in 
female respondents (342 to 177) confirmed that 
comparison to the one for Sarkari Jirga.
members of a Sarkari Jirga receive a fee from the 
Since FCR Jirga members receive allowances disputant parties. However, we also see that 
from the political administration for their 
When we analysed the focus-group discussions, 
we saw an overwhelming support from the 
respondents despite all other shortcomings of 
Jirga. However, they were open to reforming the 
Jirga system. 
Experts from the legal profession, Maliks, and 
other stakeholders also underlined the 
importance of Jirga on the basis of its ability to 
163
provide speedy justice at a very cheap rate.
One of the main outcomes of Jirga decision is 
fair compensation to victims
The Jirga process usually aims to reach a 
c o n c l u s i o n  w h e re  a  v i c t i m  re c e i v e s  
compensation while the burden is placed on the 
offenders. Thus, while the victim is compensated 
(usually in material form), the offenders are 
usually reintegrated into the society/community, 
which restores harmony. Besides, Jirga decisions 
litigation expenses incurred during the formal 
are based on consensus, which means both the 
162
judicial processes.    
parties have to accept the decision of the Jirga. 
Jirga elders usually receive money for their 
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Gender of respondents 
Total Male Female 
Yes 342 177 519 
No 232 67 299 
Don't know 131 390 521 
No response 43 118 161 
Total   748 752 1,500 
Table 51. Cross-tabulation on payment of fee to FCR Jirga
believed that it happens 'often'. 
Jirga enforces its decision through
In FATA, Jirga verdicts are reached after 
due process and after getting the 
consent of both parties. However, in a 
situation where one party or both the 
parties do not accept the decision, 
then other ways are adopted to 
enforce the Jirga decision.
Furthermore, figure 61 also shows that it 
depends on the respondents' personal 
experience whether they have experienced or 
seen a situation where a party disobeyed a Jirga 
decision.
Those respondents who said 'yes' to the question 1500 respondents were asked in a qualified 
of disobeying the Jirga decision, were manner to share their opinion about 'how a Jirga 
subsequently asked 'how often does this enforces its decision'. A large group of 
happen?'. Out of 48.00% respondents 31.66% respondents, 28.47%, identified that Jirga 
said that it 'rarely' happens, while some 10.53% decisions are enforced 'through community 
believed that it happened 'very often'. 6.33% lakhkar', followed by 23.67% respondents who 
believed that 'political administration' enforces 
Jirga decisions through Khasadar force. 20.53% 
respondents informed the survey that Jirga 
decisions could be enforced through 'social 
pressure'. 11.40% respondents did not know the 
answer and cross-tabulation by gender showed 
that 71 respondents of 165 were women, which 
reinforces tribal women's lack of knowledge on 
Jirga.
Probing/inquiry mechanism of a Jirga process is 
satisfactory 
The survey results show the level of satisfaction 
that this is a widely accepted and agreed upon 
fee which Jirga members must get from the 
respondents. 
Most of the above-mentioned ways of receiving 
fee against Jirga members' services seem to be 
lawful with the exception of 'bribes' (17.58%). 
This establishes the fact that Jirga members 
receive a fee, which keeps them motivated to 
take part in the Jirga processes. 
Jirga members selection
This question was asked in the context of FCR 
Jirga, as the Political Administration is vested 
with the powers to select a Jirga member. 
However, some lawyers said that members could 
be selected by the parties to the dispute as well 
during the in-depth interview sessions. This 
services, fewer Jirga members may receive a fee means that disputant parties have some say in 
for their services under the FCR Jirga process. In the selection process of Jirga members. 
the case of Olasi Jirga, the members depend on 
The results are very self-explanatory and suggest the disputant parties. Nonetheless, Jirga 
that the Political Administration's role should be members seem to receive fees or contributions 
minimized considerably in selecting the Jirga in different forms. 
members, and that disputants should be given a 
Majority believes that Olasi Jirga members larger role which can develop trust between the 
should receive a fee from the respondents for government and people, leading more people to 
their services. Over one third of the respondents, accept the Jirga verdicts.
38.30%, identified that Olasi Jirga members are 
Party to a dispute can disobey a Jirga decisionpaid for their travel and food, something that 
people happily pay for. Some 39.42% believed It is always hard to accept a decision which does 
not come in your favour; however, Jirga has the 
mechanism to enforce its decision.
When a party is not satisfied with the Jirga 
decision and does not accept the verdict, that 
particular Jirga becomes invalid and another 
Jirga is constituted. If the decision of the second 
Jirga is also not accepted by the party, both the 
parties are given a third chance. However, the 
decision of the third Jirga has to be accepted by 
both the parties; otherwise, the Jirga will have to 
apply other means to enforce its verdict. 
In case of a FCR Jirga, no party can appeal to the 
court of commissioner after receiving a verdict 
from the office of Political Agent or his assistant. 
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Figure 58. Do disputants pay fee to Jirga members,
 when their disputes are resolved through Olasi Jirga?
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Figure 60. Selection of Jirga members 
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Figure 61. Could any party to a dispute
disobey a Jirga decision?
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Figure 62. If yes, how often does this happen
believed that it happens 'often'. 
Jirga enforces its decision through
In FATA, Jirga verdicts are reached after 
due process and after getting the 
consent of both parties. However, in a 
situation where one party or both the 
parties do not accept the decision, 
then other ways are adopted to 
enforce the Jirga decision.
Furthermore, figure 61 also shows that it 
depends on the respondents' personal 
experience whether they have experienced or 
seen a situation where a party disobeyed a Jirga 
decision.
Those respondents who said 'yes' to the question 1500 respondents were asked in a qualified 
of disobeying the Jirga decision, were manner to share their opinion about 'how a Jirga 
subsequently asked 'how often does this enforces its decision'. A large group of 
happen?'. Out of 48.00% respondents 31.66% respondents, 28.47%, identified that Jirga 
said that it 'rarely' happens, while some 10.53% decisions are enforced 'through community 
believed that it happened 'very often'. 6.33% lakhkar', followed by 23.67% respondents who 
believed that 'political administration' enforces 
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respondents informed the survey that Jirga 
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pressure'. 11.40% respondents did not know the 
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satisfactory 
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that this is a widely accepted and agreed upon 
fee which Jirga members must get from the 
respondents. 
Most of the above-mentioned ways of receiving 
fee against Jirga members' services seem to be 
lawful with the exception of 'bribes' (17.58%). 
This establishes the fact that Jirga members 
receive a fee, which keeps them motivated to 
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This question was asked in the context of FCR 
Jirga, as the Political Administration is vested 
with the powers to select a Jirga member. 
However, some lawyers said that members could 
be selected by the parties to the dispute as well 
during the in-depth interview sessions. This 
services, fewer Jirga members may receive a fee means that disputant parties have some say in 
for their services under the FCR Jirga process. In the selection process of Jirga members. 
the case of Olasi Jirga, the members depend on 
The results are very self-explanatory and suggest the disputant parties. Nonetheless, Jirga 
that the Political Administration's role should be members seem to receive fees or contributions 
minimized considerably in selecting the Jirga in different forms. 
members, and that disputants should be given a 
Majority believes that Olasi Jirga members larger role which can develop trust between the 
should receive a fee from the respondents for government and people, leading more people to 
their services. Over one third of the respondents, accept the Jirga verdicts.
38.30%, identified that Olasi Jirga members are 
Party to a dispute can disobey a Jirga decisionpaid for their travel and food, something that 
people happily pay for. Some 39.42% believed It is always hard to accept a decision which does 
not come in your favour; however, Jirga has the 
mechanism to enforce its decision.
When a party is not satisfied with the Jirga 
decision and does not accept the verdict, that 
particular Jirga becomes invalid and another 
Jirga is constituted. If the decision of the second 
Jirga is also not accepted by the party, both the 
parties are given a third chance. However, the 
decision of the third Jirga has to be accepted by 
both the parties; otherwise, the Jirga will have to 
apply other means to enforce its verdict. 
In case of a FCR Jirga, no party can appeal to the 
court of commissioner after receiving a verdict 
from the office of Political Agent or his assistant. 
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Figure 62. If yes, how often does this happen
party or both the parties do not accept the 
decision, other ways are adopted in order to 
enforce the Jirga decision.
Satisfaction over probing/inquiry mechanism 
of Jirga process
Human Rights and Jirga
Although the Jirga is perceived to be affordable 
and speedy, the complete lack of involvement of 
women and minorities in the Jirga mechanism is 
a flaw. The other major drawback is the violation 
of human rights of marginalised groups (women, 
youth, religious and ethnic minorities etc.) due to 
Women should have an equal chance to the decisions made by Jirga, which do not take 
participate in Jirga decision-making processesinto account Pakistan Constitution, the 
universally accepted principles of Human Rights 
After cross-tabulation by education, we see a 
or international instruments relevant to 
mixed response from both literate and illiterate 
Pakistan. 
respondents; however, more educated than 
illiterate respondents agreed with the notion and Jirga takes cognizance of matrimonial disputes 
vice versa.including guardianship/custody of children
We also cross-tabulated the data by gender; In Pakhtun-dominated areas of Pakistan, 
more than twice the number of women (222) especially rural areas, Jirga deals with all sorts of 
compared to men (103) 'strongly agree' with the matters,  including matters related to 
notion, while 295 men 'strongly disagree' with matrimonial disputes of guardianship/custody of 
the notion as compared to 119 women children. Even in the presence of proper formal 
respondents. This also shows that tribal women courts and a police system in settled districts of 
are willing to become a part of the Jirga process. Pa k ht u n - d o m i n ate d  a re a s  o f  K hy b e r  
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, people prefer to 
Looking at figure 66 results, it is quite 
resolve their matters through informal Jirga, 
encouraging to see that a large number of 
including matters concerning divorce, custody of 
respondents realise the importance of female 
children, money matters, etc. 
participation in the Jirga process. We also 
women respondents, which constitute almost 
of the people of FATA on the probing mechanism 
half of the respondents. Out of 130 respondents, 
of Jirga  process. Three-fourth of the 
119 are women who did not know the answer. 
respondents, 76.33%, agreed with the notion, 
including 45.00% who 'strongly agree' and Jirga enforces its decision through
31.33% who 'somewhat agree'. Only 9.27% 
In FATA, Jirga verdicts are reached after due 
respondents voted against the notion, including 
process and after receiving the consent of both 
4.47% 'strongly disagree' and 4.80% 'somewhat 
the parties. However, in a situation where one 
disagree'. 
Those who agreed with the notion included 487 
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Figure 66. Women's participation in Jirga 
decision making process
  
Gender of respondents 
Total  Male Female 
Strongly agree 103 222 325 
Somewhat agree 150 131 281 
Somewhat disagree 139 86 225 
Strongly disagree 295 119 414 
Don’t know 43 111 154 
No response 18 83 101 
  748 752 1,500 
Table 52. Cross-tabulation by gender for participation of women in Jirga
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Figure 63. Enforcement of Jirga decision
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Figure 63. Enforcement of Jirga decision
Cross-tabulation by education shows that those woman and in violation of fundamental rights of 
who opposed the notion included a majority of women; however, this question intends to 
illiterate respondents. More female respondents document how respondents perceive Swara. 
opposed the notion as compared to those 
Cross-tabulation by gender showed that more 
women who supported the notion. 
male than female respondents believed that 
The respondents of the focus-group discussions Swara violates women's rights. Of 192 
also disapproved of this view. The participants of respondents who believed Swara does not 
the consultations and the key informants of the violate women's  rights, the majority are women. 
in-depth interviews admitted that the custom of 
This realisation by both men and women is 
Swara should come to an end, while some 
extremely encouraging. Although many still 
claimed that this custom died ages ago and is no 
favour Swara and believe that it prevents 
longer practiced. 
violence and could save lives, this argument is 
Alternative to Swara dying as more people become aware of the fact 
that the ills of men should not be corrected at the 
During focus-group discussions, respondents 
165
cost of women.  
suggested several alternate options, including 
those mentioned above, and an overwhelming Ethnic minorities should have an equal chance 
majority was of the opinion that the custom of to participate in Jirga decision-making 
Swara should end and be replaced with a processes
different material compensation.
In FATA, ethnic minorities are generally families 
Women activists and social workers severely with carpentry, butchery, shoemaking, and 
criticised the custom of Swara and termed this blacksmith skills, and immigrated a long time 
practice un-Islamic, inhuman and contrary to ago. Local tribes do not have any interest in the 
164
women's rights. above-mentioned trades and consider these 
low-cast jobs. 
Swara and violation of women's rights
Local tribes in FATA seem to be in a state of denial 
It is obvious that Swara is against the will of a 
and do not acknowledge the rights of ethnic 
(271) believed that Swara could resolve complex 
disputes. On the other hand, out of 827 literate 
respondents who marked 'no', including those 
with a religious education, more than half [448] 
believed that Swara could not resolve complex 
disputes.
During the focus-group discussions with men and 
women from all seven agencies, respondents 
said that Swara is outdated and that people don't 
practice this custom any more. However, some of 
the respondents said that this custom was still 
practiced in their areas. 
During in-depth interviews with lawyers, elders, 
and other social workers, we did not receive 
strong arguments in favour of Swara, which is an 
encouraging sign. 
Swara as a way of resolving conflict between 
two families/parties
received positive reaction from the respondents 
during the focus-group discussions. However, 
the participants of consultations attended by key 
informants were not ready to accept this and 
were of the view that Pakhtun tribal culture does 
not allow the participation of women in the Jirga 
process. 
Respondents of in-depth interviews with a legal 
background underlined the importance of 
women's participation so that Jirga complies 
with international human rights and women's 
standards. 
Swara resolves some very complex disputes
After analysing the data by gender and 
education, we found that out of 371 illiterate 
respondents who marked 'yes', the majority 
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Figure 68. Support for Swara as a way for 
resolving conflicts between two families/parties
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Figure 69. Do you think that Swara
violates women's rights
Response Frequency Percent 
It should be continued 108 7.20 
It should be replaced with money 691 46.07 
It should be replaced with cattle/land 243 16.20 
Don’t know 290 19.33 
No response 168 11.20 
Total 1,500 100.00 
Table 53. Alternatives to Swara
Response Frequency Percent 
No response 89 5.93 
No 192 12.80 
Don't know 218 14.53 
Yes 1001 66.73 
Total 1,500 100.00 
Table 54. Perception about Swara and women's rights
  Gender of respondents  
Total  Male Female  
No response 17 72  89  
No 57 135  192  
Don't know 63 155  218  
Yes 611 390  1,001  
  
748 752  1,500  
Table 55. Cross-tabulation about Swara and women's rights
Cross-tabulation by education shows that those woman and in violation of fundamental rights of 
who opposed the notion included a majority of women; however, this question intends to 
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(271) believed that Swara could resolve complex 
disputes. On the other hand, out of 827 literate 
respondents who marked 'no', including those 
with a religious education, more than half [448] 
believed that Swara could not resolve complex 
disputes.
During the focus-group discussions with men and 
women from all seven agencies, respondents 
said that Swara is outdated and that people don't 
practice this custom any more. However, some of 
the respondents said that this custom was still 
practiced in their areas. 
During in-depth interviews with lawyers, elders, 
and other social workers, we did not receive 
strong arguments in favour of Swara, which is an 
encouraging sign. 
Swara as a way of resolving conflict between 
two families/parties
received positive reaction from the respondents 
during the focus-group discussions. However, 
the participants of consultations attended by key 
informants were not ready to accept this and 
were of the view that Pakhtun tribal culture does 
not allow the participation of women in the Jirga 
process. 
Respondents of in-depth interviews with a legal 
background underlined the importance of 
women's participation so that Jirga complies 
with international human rights and women's 
standards. 
Swara resolves some very complex disputes
After analysing the data by gender and 
education, we found that out of 371 illiterate 
respondents who marked 'yes', the majority 
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Sikhs in Waziristan, Khyber and Orakzai Agencies, Pakistan is not extended to FATA therefore the 
while the Christian community mainly lives in local communities/tribes take the law into their 
Khyber and Kurram Agencies. There is also a own hands. In some cases, if an individual or a 
small Hindu population in Waziristan Agency. As family does not obey the decision of a Jirga, the 
per the local perception, Sikh and Hindus have community will have to take action against them 
lived in these areas for the last few centuries and in the form of either setting fire to their houses 
they haven't encountered any trouble from the and property or expelling that family from the 
local tribes when practicing their own religious community, etc., depending on the magnitude of 
rituals and resolving their civil disputes. the crime. 
Nonetheless, their criminal offences are dealt 
Majority, 61.56%, of the respondents opposed 
with under the local Jirga system  both FCR and 
the idea of burning houses if a decision of a Jirga 166 
Olasi, depending on the gravity of the crime.
was not obeyed by a party to the dispute, 
Again, the results are quite encouraging, which including 47.53% 'strongly oppose' and 14.00% 
indicates that the tribes in FATA may allow the 'somewhat oppose'. Less than a quarter of the 
involvement of religious minorities in Jirga respondents, 21.87% supported the idea, 
process. There is, however, a lack of including 9.40% 'strongly support' and 12.47% 
understanding of globalisation, international 'somewhat support'.
human rights standards, the Constitution of 
The results show that people oppose the idea of 
Pakistan, democracy etc., which proves that 
burning houses, which was also reflected during 
there is a need for education on these issues. 
the focus-group discussions where a majority of 
Houses of those people who disobey Jirga respondents opposed this tradition. 
decision should be burnt
The participants of regional consultations and 
Since the police system of settled areas of key informants during in-depth interviews also 
opposed the idea and termed it as “against all 
human rights norms”. 
FATA should be given the right to judicial 
autonomy
Judicial autonomy and judicial independence are 
used interchangeably, as they denote a slippery 
concept that is difficult to define let alone to 
measure and that lies at the crossroads of 
167
different perspectives.  
For the sake of clarity, judicial autonomy here 
means the separation of the judiciary from other 
powers of the state. Judicial independence is the 
concept that decisions of the judiciary should be 
impartial and not subject to influence from other 
branches of government or from private or 
political interests. Hence, independence of the 
judic iary  emphasises  on inst i tut ional  
independence, administrative and financial 
autonomy  and the right to a fair and expeditious 
trial.
minorities who migrated to FATA many decades 
ago and became full citizens of FATA, as per the 
international standards. However, the local 
tribes do not accept this and consider them as 
second grade citizens in FATA.  
The outdated system in FATA also supports the 
local tribes by giving ethnic minorities second-
grade citizenship. The system always prefers 
local tribes to ethnic minorities on reserved 
vacancies and quota seats in educational 
institutions in Pakistan. These marginalised 
groups can hardly take part in power politics. But 
people of FATA argue that ethnic minorities have 
always been provided with equal opportunities 
to get education, employment, etc. 
40.94% agreed that ethnic minorities should 
have equal chance to participate in Jirga decision 
making process, including 16.87% who 'strongly 
agree' and 24.07% who 'somewhat agree'. While 
40.07% respondents disagreed with the notion, 
including 18.00% 'strongly disagree' and 22.07% 
respondents who were undecided, including 'somewhat disagree'. 
11.93% those who did not know the answer 
There were a considerable number of while 7.07% those who did not want to respond.  
Out of 179 respondents who did not know the 
answer, 136 were women. 
Keeping in view the data shown in figure 70, one 
can analyse that there is a potential for bringing 
reforms to the Jirga system by providing more 
space to the minorities. The data also shows that 
the respondents were not against the idea of 
letting minorities get involved in the Jirga 
process.
The respondents of focus-group discussions 
shared this view. After some discussions and 
probing they had accepted the fact that at some 
point, these minorities should be involved, 
making Jirga more acceptable to all. 
Religious minorities should have an equal 
chance to participate in Jirga decision making 
processes
There are a few religious minorities that have 
been living in FATA for a long time. They include 
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Figure 71. Religious minorities should have an equal
chance to participate in Jirga decision making
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Figure 72. Houses of those people who
disobey Jirga decision should be burnt
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Figure 70. Ethnic minorities should have an equal
chance to participate in Jirga decision making processes
Sikhs in Waziristan, Khyber and Orakzai Agencies, Pakistan is not extended to FATA therefore the 
while the Christian community mainly lives in local communities/tribes take the law into their 
Khyber and Kurram Agencies. There is also a own hands. In some cases, if an individual or a 
small Hindu population in Waziristan Agency. As family does not obey the decision of a Jirga, the 
per the local perception, Sikh and Hindus have community will have to take action against them 
lived in these areas for the last few centuries and in the form of either setting fire to their houses 
they haven't encountered any trouble from the and property or expelling that family from the 
local tribes when practicing their own religious community, etc., depending on the magnitude of 
rituals and resolving their civil disputes. the crime. 
Nonetheless, their criminal offences are dealt 
Majority, 61.56%, of the respondents opposed 
with under the local Jirga system  both FCR and 
the idea of burning houses if a decision of a Jirga 166 
Olasi, depending on the gravity of the crime.
was not obeyed by a party to the dispute, 
Again, the results are quite encouraging, which including 47.53% 'strongly oppose' and 14.00% 
indicates that the tribes in FATA may allow the 'somewhat oppose'. Less than a quarter of the 
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human rights standards, the Constitution of 
The results show that people oppose the idea of 
Pakistan, democracy etc., which proves that 
burning houses, which was also reflected during 
there is a need for education on these issues. 
the focus-group discussions where a majority of 
Houses of those people who disobey Jirga respondents opposed this tradition. 
decision should be burnt
The participants of regional consultations and 
Since the police system of settled areas of key informants during in-depth interviews also 
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FATA should be given the right to judicial 
autonomy
Judicial autonomy and judicial independence are 
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concept that is difficult to define let alone to 
measure and that lies at the crossroads of 
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different perspectives.  
For the sake of clarity, judicial autonomy here 
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powers of the state. Judicial independence is the 
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branches of government or from private or 
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independence, administrative and financial 
autonomy  and the right to a fair and expeditious 
trial.
minorities who migrated to FATA many decades 
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international standards. However, the local 
tribes do not accept this and consider them as 
second grade citizens in FATA.  
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40.94% agreed that ethnic minorities should 
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respondents who were undecided, including 'somewhat disagree'. 
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process.
The respondents of focus-group discussions 
shared this view. After some discussions and 
probing they had accepted the fact that at some 
point, these minorities should be involved, 
making Jirga more acceptable to all. 
Religious minorities should have an equal 
chance to participate in Jirga decision making 
processes
There are a few religious minorities that have 
been living in FATA for a long time. They include 
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62.20% 'strongly agree' and 19.80% 'somewhat 
agree'. Only 5.20% disagreed with the statement, 
including 1.60% 'strongly disagree' and 3.60% 
'somewhat disagree'.  
At present, there is no complete and 
independent judicial system in FATA and Experts and lawyers from FATA also stressed on 
therefore it is not autonomous at all. the need for 'the right to a fair trial' for the people 
of FATA. The FATA Reform package announced by 
Several voices were raised in favour of this 
President Asif Ali Zardari on 14 August 2009 also 
statement during the regional consultations 
provides the people of FATA with some degree of 
organised for this study. During focus-group 
free and fair judicial autonomy.  
discussions, men and women both supported the 
idea of giving judicial autonomy to the people of Without any hesitation, the respondents in 
FATA.  focus-group discussions also insisted that the 
people of FATA should be given this right. These 
The right to a fair trial
facts lead us to realise that the people of FATA 
FCR does not allow the people of FATA to have the understand the right to fair and free trial, and that 
right to a fair trial, making the FCR Jirga even they should be given this right. 
more incompatible with the fundamental 
The right to equality and non-discrimination
guarantees enshrined in the Constitution of 
Pakistan. Since we have discussed this in detail in Analysing this aspect on technical grounds, the 
the first chapter, we will now focus more on what entire administrative and constitutional 
the respondents said about this issue. arrangement for the FATA reflects the reality that 
the people of FATA have no right to equality and 
Out of 1,500 men and women respondents, 
that the response from the central government is 
82.00%, which constitutes overwhelming 
based on discrimination. 
majority, agreed with the statement, including 
the jurisdiction of superior courts (High Court 
and Supreme Court) is not extended to FATA. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Pakistan cannot 
protect the fundamental rights of the people of 
FATA enshrined in the Constitution.  
More than half of the respondents 53.07% 
supported the idea, including 35.47% 'strongly 
support' and 17.60% 'somewhat support'. Less 
than a quarter of the respondents, 23.60%, 
opposed the idea, including 9.27% 'strongly 
oppose' and 14.33% 'somewhat oppose'.
Support to this  question is  not very 
overwhelming compared to the responses 
received for 'the right to fair trial', 'the right to 
judicial autonomy' and 'the right to equality and 
non-discrimination'. This also reflects that 
people support other rights, but are not very 
eager to see superior courts being extended to 
FATA. However, half of the respondents favoured 
the extension of superior courts to FATA, which Extending the superior judiciary (i.e. High 
reflects that introducing reforms could be Court and Supreme Court) to FATA
materialised. Lawyers and civil servants from 
As stated in the first chapter of this study, Article FATA strongly recommended that the people of 
247 of the Constitution of Pakistan stipulates that FATA should be given the right to appeal in the 
High Court and Supreme Court of Pakistan 
against the orders and decisions of the Political 
168
administration.  This way the people of FATA 
would accept the extension of superior courts to 
FATA at some point in the future. 
Jirga decision should be officially recorded 
The participants of regional consultations with 
key informants as well as the respondents in 
focus-group discussions were not very clear as to 
whether Jirga proceedings and decisions are 
recorded in written form. Some said that only FCR 
Jirga decisions, but not the proceedings, are 
recorded, while Olasi Jirga decisions are not 
recorded at all. 
Lawyers, civil servants and Maliks emphasised 
the importance of codifying of Jirga decisions like 
formal courts' decisions in order to use the 
judicious decisions as reference in future Jirga 
169
proceedings.
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FATA.  focus-group discussions also insisted that the 
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facts lead us to realise that the people of FATA 
FCR does not allow the people of FATA to have the understand the right to fair and free trial, and that 
right to a fair trial, making the FCR Jirga even they should be given this right. 
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FATA enshrined in the Constitution.  
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than a quarter of the respondents, 23.60%, 
opposed the idea, including 9.27% 'strongly 
oppose' and 14.33% 'somewhat oppose'.
Support to this  question is  not very 
overwhelming compared to the responses 
received for 'the right to fair trial', 'the right to 
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non-discrimination'. This also reflects that 
people support other rights, but are not very 
eager to see superior courts being extended to 
FATA. However, half of the respondents favoured 
the extension of superior courts to FATA, which Extending the superior judiciary (i.e. High 
reflects that introducing reforms could be Court and Supreme Court) to FATA
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administration.  This way the people of FATA 
would accept the extension of superior courts to 
FATA at some point in the future. 
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key informants as well as the respondents in 
focus-group discussions were not very clear as to 
whether Jirga proceedings and decisions are 
recorded in written form. Some said that only FCR 
Jirga decisions, but not the proceedings, are 
recorded, while Olasi Jirga decisions are not 
recorded at all. 
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the importance of codifying of Jirga decisions like 
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welcomed the idea of having a proper police system 
in FATA, something which is considered contrary to 
their freedom and culture. 
The respondents in focus-group discussions did not 
However, the respondents of consultations 
support the idea either. They argued that the 
argued that the United Kingdom (UK) (a major 
Khasadar force, under FCR Jirga, could enforce 
power of the world) doesn't have a written 
Jirga decisions, while they opined that the 
constitution and runs the state's affairs on 
community's social pressure and lakhkar could be 
customs, conventions and traditions. 
other options for enforcing Jirga decisions. 
Tribesmen also process Jirga through their 
unwritten constitution of Pakhtunwali. Keeping in view the terrain of the area and the tribal 
However, this analogy is technically not way of life, it would be quite a daunting task for the 
relevant.   government to design a plan and then implement 
it, aiming at the enforcement of Jirga decisions 
Jirga decisions should be officially enforced 
through a proper and well-established security 
Nearly two-third of the respondents, 65.00%, apparatus.  
agreed that Jirga decisions should be enforced 
Powers of the Political Agent should be limited to 
officially, including 39.40% 'strongly agree' and 
executive matters
25.60% 'somewhat agree'.
As elaborated in the introduction the Political 
The data could lead us to a surprising revelation 
Agent holds the judicial, executive and revenue-
of tribesmen welcoming an internal security 
collection powers, making him very powerful. The 
system [such as a police system], however, one 
position of a Political Agent is under severe criticism 
should understand what was in the back of 
not only from the people of FATA, but also from the 
these respondents' minds when they replied to 
civil society including NGOs, the media and human 
this question. They might have supported this 
rights activists. 
s t a t e m e n t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  w a n t e d  
Khasadar/Levies force to enforce Jirga Compared to the level of criticism that we see 
decisions, since tribesmen have never against the Political Agent's powers, the response is 
respondents did not know whether they had the 
right to appeal to the High or Supreme Court of 
Pakistan. In the first chapter it has been elaborated 
in detail how and under what circumstances a FATA 
resident can file an appeal in the superior courts of 
Pakistan.  
16.00%, of the respondents did not know the 
answer or were not very clear while 5.47% did not 
reply. When cross-tabulated by gender, out of 240 
respondents who did not know the answer, 197 
were women and, while out of 82 respondents who 
did not reply, 77 were women. 
Final Jirga decisions need to be subjected to the 
approval of appropriate Human Rights bodies in 
Pakistan
At present, Jirga decisions are not subject to any 
scrut iny  by  independent  human r ights  
still not very overwhelming. This question was 
commissions in Pakistan and therefore remain 
also raised during the focus-group discussions 
subject to severe criticism. 
and consultations with FATA respondents, who 
severely criticised the role of the Political Agent The results in figure 81 are quite encouraging and 
and demanded that his powers be limited clearly convey the desire for due process of justice 
considerably. according to international human rights standards. 
Provision of a right to appeal to the High 
Courts and Supreme Court
During consultations and focus-group 
discussions, we realised that most of the FATA 
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During the focus-group discussions, we 
received the same level of response from both 
female and male respondents; however, 
participants of regional consultations found 
the idea  slightly unfavourable and argued that 
there was no need for an independent body to 
review the cases, as these may not be 
knowledgeable of, or sensitive to the culture of 
Pakhtunwali. 
The key informants and the elite of FATA were 
also supportive of the role of an independent 
human rights commission or body, which, they 
argued, would ensure due Jirga processes that 
follow and meet the human rights standards. 
The academics of Peshawar University argued 
that the people of FATA have a strong sense and 
knowledge of human rights, but that they are 
not fully aware of international human rights 
170
standards and justice mechanisms.
1. Swara means marriage of a woman 6. The terms Pukhtun, Pakhtun, 
from the offender's family/tribe to Pakhtoon, Pushtun, Pashtun, 
the victim's close relative without her Pashtoon, Pathan are used 
consent. interchangeably. For the sake of 
clarity, Pakhtun is used throughout 2. Here the term Sharia' was not very 
this report. clearly elaborated by the 
enumerators, and therefore, the 7. Caroe Olaf, The Pathans  (1983).
respondents might have attributed 8. Spain James W., The Pathan 
their responses to Taliban version of Borderland  (1963). 
Sharia'. However, Sharia' is well 
9. Caroe Olaf, The Pathans  (1983).
regarded in the tribal society. 
10. Mohmand Sher Muhammad, FATA A 
3. Most of the material in this chapter is 
Socio-cultural and Geo-Political 
taken from the introductory chapter 
History.
Understandig FATA: Attitudes Towards 
11. Ibid.
Governance, Religion & Society in 
12. Khan Dr. Azmat Hayat, The Durand Pakistan's Federally Administered 
Line  its Geo-Strategic Importance  Tribal Areas  Volume IV, written by 
(2005)  p. 41. Naveed Ahmad Shinwari. While this is 
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25.version introducing FATA and its 
systems. 14. Ibid.
4. Caroe Olaf, The Pathans, (London: 15. Ibid.
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Annex  I
dispute that arose from a transport business INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS WITH 
transaction between the parties mentioned 
DISPUTANTS
above. On 07/07/2008, Plaintiff Ali Akber filed a 
written complaint before the Political Tehsildar Interviewed in the District Courts, Peshawar 
(PT), Landikotal against the defendants and premises near the FCR Commissioner (Court), 
complained that his motorcar was impounded by Peshawar Division 12/2/2011
the defendant in connection with a money 
Ali Akber and his son Fahim R/o Khyber 
dispute between them over a truck and 
Agency KA (Plaintiff/Claimant) 
requested for recovery of his car from the illegal 
captivity of the defendants. The Line Officer was Versus 
directed for recovery of the motorcar. He 
Shah Madar, Siraj, Imam-ud-Din recovered the motorcar which was handed over 
to the plaintiff accordingly.  (Respondent) 
For facts finding and settling dispute between the Case No. 24-I/APA-LKL/2010 (Money 
parties, a Jirga was constituted for giving its Dispute) 
opinion on 16/07/2008. The Jirga gave its opinion 
Briefs Facts of the Case:  There was a money and award in favour of the plaintiff on 24/3/2010 
S. # Name  Nature of dispute  Type of jirga  Area  
1 Ali Akber and his son Money Dispute  FCR  KA  
2 Fahim (S/o Ali Akber – above) do  FCR  KA  
3 Shamir khan Akka Khel Arrest for Criminal 
Charges  
FCR  KA  
4 Haider Khan do  FCR  KA  
5 Nusrat do  FCR  KA  
6 Muhammad Sadiq Property Dispute  FCR  KA  
7 Zar Alam Do  FCR  KA  
8 Shaheen Arrest for Criminal 
Charges  
FCR  Orakzai 
Agency  
9 Akhtar Jan  Property Dispute  Olasi –  local  KA  
10 Muhammad Akram Khan Property Dispute  Olasi –  local  SW  
11 Sher Akber Afridi Money and Inheritance  Olasi –  local  KA  
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that was made the APA's court order on Commissioner FCR, Peshawar division and still 
4/12/2010. This order of APA has been pending adjudication. 
challenged before the commissioner FCR 
Although years have gone by the interviewees 
Peshawar Division which is still pending 
are still waiting for a fair and just decision of their 
adjudication.
relatives' fate. They complained that they are 
Both the litigants were discouraged by the poor people and spent considerable money to 
protracted period of litigation. They complained come to Peshawar on each date of hearing before 
that the case was filed in mid 2008 and still is in the Commissioner Court for pursuing their 
process and will remain in process for years (if relatives' cases. They alleged that Jirga members 
challenged before the FCR tribunal  last court of didn't give any opportunity of defence to the 
appeal for FCR litigation). Though the litigants accused and gave their award in their absentia. 
didn't allege the corruption charges against the They said that FCR system has made them sick. 
Jirga members but complained (by both) that We need justice, they pleaded!
they spent thousands of money (if not in lacks) 
for arranging food and logistics and gifts for Jirga 
members. The litigants complained against the Muhammad Sadiq and Zar Alam S/o Mir Alam 
Jirga members' nomination process by the APA. R/o Khyber Agency....Appellants / claimants   
They raised voice for the nomination of Jirga 
Versus 
members through their own free consent. They 
further recommended that there should be a Saifor S/o Hussain R/o KA
timeframe for decision of the cases under the 
Appeal vide diary No. 10386 dated 21-10-2010 
FCR (starts from the office of APA till the FCR 
(Land Dispute)  
tribunal). 
Brief Facts of the issue: The appellants alleged 
that they had a land dispute over ancestral 
Shamir Khan Akka Khel, Haider Khan, Nusrat property with the respondent (their cousins) 
R/o Khyber Agency since childhood. They alleged that due to this 
dispute the respondent killed his father when 
Case No. 14/APA. Bara 2010 (Criminal Charges) 
they were minors. Their uncle resolved the 
Brief Facts of the Case: The interviewees' sons dispute with the respondent through the 
and brother were arrested in the case noted. intervention of private Jirga  where more land 
They alleged that their relatives were arrested by than due share was given to the respondent. 
the security forces on the suspicion of having Moreover, arable land was given to the 
connection with banned terrorist organisation respondent while barren land was given to them 
Tanzeem Lashkar-e-Islam and other terrorist but still they remained silent. Now the appellant 
groups. They alleged that the detainees were started some houses construction on their own 
arrested on 19/03/2009 by the Mehsud Scouts share of the land, but the respondent is not 
and were handed over to the Political allowing them, therefore, they filed a complaint 
Administration of Khyber agency on 01/11/2009. before the APA on 13/06/2010. The Political 
But officially it is claimed that they were arrested Tehsildar (PT) recorded the statements of both 
on 12/01/2010. They were convicted and parties and made recommendation to APA for 
sentenced by the APA for 10 years rigorous dismissing their application, hence APA 
imprisonment and fined PKR 100,000 and in dismissed their application on 23/09/2010 for 
default of payment of fine further to undergo two the reason that already the matter decided by 
and half years simple imprisonment. This order of private Jirga.
conviction has been challenged before the 
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The interviewees were alleging that without easily influenced through many sources 
giving them an opportunity of establishing and therefore Jirga members along with APA should 
proving their claim, the dismissal of the case be made accountable for their wrong decisions. 
amounts to denial of justice. The PT has no He emphasized for formulating timeframe for 
authority to give opinion on their case; therefore conclusion of Jirga proceedings and questioned 
they have filed appeal before the Commissioner. that from whom I should ask to return my 3 years 
which I spent in prison without any guilt?
Shaheen of Orakzai Agency 
Akhtar Jan (A retired soldier of Frontier 
Acquitted in 2010 after his case was remand by 
Constabulary, aged 69 years) Khyber Agency 
the FCR Tribunal 
Property Dispute Resolution through Olasi Jirga
Charges: Kidnapping for ransom  
Brief Facts of the issue: After retirement from the 
Brief Facts of the Case: The interviewee was 
FC in 2005, I planned to start a business. With the 
charged for kidnapping for ransom in 2007. The 
advice of some elders I purchased a stone crusher 
APA constituted the Jirga after more than a year 
machinery and installed it on our communal 
and the APA convicted him for 14 years rigorous 
mountain for mining. Within a few months there 
imprisonment on the rai/award of the Jirga. As 
was a demand in the market and I began to earn 
the Jirga members were nominated by the APA, 
enough. Watching me do well, some of my 
the interviewee alleged that he raised repeated 
cousins said that they have money dispute with 
objections on the Jirga members but the political 
my brother and till its recovery they stopped my 
administration turned a deaf ear to those 
business through force. 
objections. The majority members of the Jirga 
were affiliated with the complainant and two of I raised the issue before the Olasi Jirga and 
them were close relatives of the complainant. requested them for resolving the dispute. The 
Therefore the Jirga gave rai/award against the Jirga called the opposite party but they bribed 
interviewee. Resultantly, he was convicted by the the Jirga, so instead of deciding the issue the 
APA without considering his objections. Against Jirga keeps delaying it, listening to the rival 
the order of APA an appeal was filed before the party's false and baseless claim. Neither have I 
Commissioner but the same was rejected and liked enmity blood-feud nor do I have the 
order of the APA was upheld. finances to bribe the Jirga, so I have left 
everything to Allah and my fate.          
Against the order of the Commissioner, appeal 
was filed before the FCR-Tribunal, Peshawar in He is of the view that the Jirga system can serve 
mid of 2008. The issue of the Jirga members' the tribal community best but now Jirga has 
biasness was argued in length before the Tribunal become corrupt [da dalaro Jirga- meaning Jirga 
to which the Tribunal agreed and sent back the became a commodity that can be purchased on 
case to the APA for retrial by constituting new better price]. In past Jirga used to resolve the 
Jirga and giving due weightage to the appellant dispute for the sake of Allah but now it has 
objections. Meanwhile, the then APA was become a proper business. The higher you pay 
transferred from the post and new APA assumed the more quickly you will get justice. He supports 
office. The new APA renominated Jirga and that Jirga system for the reason that tribal people do 
Jirga accepted his plea of innocence and gave not have an alternative system. But he does not 
award in his favour. The APA acquitted him from support the formal judicial system in FATA 
the charges in beginning of 2010. because they don't understand the technicalities 
of law and also don't have the resources for 
The interviewee said that a Jirga decision can be 
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litigation expenses.  He opined that Jirga is most requirements of Jirga are not bearable for poor 
viable because in most Jirga both sides to a for example to arrange grand feasts, and at times, 
conflict trust in the Jirga members and therefore to offer gifts to the Jirga members.
do not lie to them. This makes it easier for the 
Jirga to settle a dispute than the regular judiciary 
where people lie and bribe the prosecution. Sher Akber Afridi R/o Khyber Agency-KA (aged 
70 years) 
Money and Inheritance Dispute Resolution 
Muhammad Akram Khan R/o South Waziristan -
through Olasi Jirga
SW (aged 55)
Brief Facts of the issue: Mr. Sher has had money 
Property Dispute Resolution through Olasi Jirga
and inheritance dispute with his brother since 
Brief Facts of the issue: Muhammad Akram 2007 which has still not been resolved. He had a 
seems quite happy and optimistic about tribal vast business of importing-exporting clothing, 
Jirga system since the Jirga has resolved their and a travel agency in Dubai. He needed human 
property dispute in early 1950s. His forefathers resource for assistance and therefore in 2005 he 
along with their entire Khel (clan) migrated to arranged visas for his two younger brothers, 
Afghanistan from South Waziristan after the along with his brother in law to Dubai. After 
British took tribal belt (probably 1818-1849). sometime the brothers started embezzlement in 
They left their properties unclaimed-meaning business which Mr. Sher noticed but kept 
didn't handover to anyone for supervision etc. ignoring it since they were brothers. In mid of 
They lived almost for a century in Afghanistan 2007 both his brothers collected about PKR 35 
and returned to their area of origin after the lacks of business money from the different clients 
tribal areas had affiliated with Pakistan. The in the market and returned to Pakistan without 
entire property of his clan was occupied by two informing him. On the next day he came to know 
different families of the same territory. about the situation, and tried to contact both 
brothers but could not. The interviewee also 
According to him, his father told him that their 
returned to Pakistan after two weeks to know his 
family elders claimed the property from 
brothers' points of view. But instead of explaining 
concerned families but they denied their right 
the situation to him, they even occupied the 
over the property. Therefore they involved the 
ancestral joint property.
local Jirga elders of the area for resolution of 
their property dispute with the respondents. Mr. Sher approached elders of the locality to find 
Within three months the dispute was resolved a solution to the problem. The local Jirga initially 
without any bloodshed and enmity between the comprised of 12 members, but was later brought 
disputant parties. Therefore he strongly supports down  to 6 members. For more than a year the 
the Jirga system as dispute resolution Jirga held more than dozens of meetings and on 
mechanism since it provides quick justice each meeting the three of us (disputant) parties 
compared to the formal judicial system  where have to pay PKR 1000/- to each Jirga member in 
cases initiated by father remain in process addition to arrangements of hospitality and 
through generations without any positive results. logistics. But the local Jirga demanded a better 
price of bribe for the decision. According to him 
Though he does not admit the factor of bribe (i.e. 
the Jirga members said that “your brothers 
in cash) but he admits that most Jirga members 
offered us turban (Pagrri)  and if you can offer us 
now get fees (Ujrat) for delivering their services 
bull (Ghwae) then we will give decision in your 
of mediation. Moreover, he concurs that with the 
favour”. However Sher refused, which is why the 
passage of time Jirga has changed and now the 
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Jirga has left the dispute unresolved. 
Then Mr. Sher approached the Lashkar-e-Islam 
organisers and paid them PKR 7000/- but in the 
meanwhile military operation against militant 
groups started in Khyber agency, by the security 
forces therefore his matter couldn't be resolved. 
Later the above mentioned Jirga further advised 
him to resolve the dispute with his brothers on 
Shariat, hence he approached a famous religious 
leader from Peshawar Maulana Shahab-ud-Din 
Popalzai (Qasim Ali Khan Mosque) for Fatwa 
(religious verdict) about inheritance and 
resolving the dispute but his brothers denied to 
sit with the Jirga in settled area.                
According to him Jirga has become corrupt and 
expensive. He is in favour of the formal judicial 
system for the tribal areas. 
Some useful words that signify individual or  Tokhm-pasbani (Protecting the Pashtun 
collective Pakhtun tribal functions are given race)-Pashtuns with their distinct Iranic 
below in Pashtu language. features are often immediately recognisable. 
Pashtuns must take another Pashtun as a 
 Zmeka (land)-A Pashtun must defend his 
marriage partner. This stems from the general land/property from incursions wherever he 
belief that 'half-Pakhtuns' do not retain or she might reside. 
Pashtun language, culture, and physical 
 Nang (honour)-The various points below 
features. 
that a tribesman must observe to ensure his 
 De Pakhtunwali Perawano (Adhering to honour, and that of his family, is upheld. The 
Pakhtunwali)-In order to keep one's preservation of honour entails the defence of 
descendants from becoming "durvand" (Non-one's family and one's independence, while 
Pashtuns), a Pashtun must adhere to the u p h o l d i n g  c u l t u r a l  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  
Pakhtunwali principles of culture, kin and requirements. 
pedigree. Those who do not will ultimately 
 Namus (honour of women)-A Pakhtun must 
face revulsion and expulsion from Pashtun 
defend the honor of Pashtun women at all 
society. 
costs and must protect them from vocal and 
 Lashkar-The tribal army. It implements the physical harm. 
decisions of the jirga. 
 Hewad (nation)-Love for one's nation in 
 Jirga or Loya Jirga-An assembly of tribal Pashtun culture is not just important, it is 
elders called for various purposes whether essential. A Pashtun is always indebted to his 
waging war or composing peace, tribal or nation and must strive to perfect and improve 
inter-tribal. it. A Pashtun considers it his obligation to 
defend his country Pakhtara ("Pakhtun-  Salwekhti-Derived from the word for forty, 
khwa" in modern colloquial Pashtu) against this refers to the tribal force that would 
any type of foreign incursion. Defence of implement the decision of a jirga. Every 
nation means defence of honour, values, fortieth man of the tribe would be a member. 
culture, tradition, countrymen and self. A shalgoon is a force derived from the number 
twenty. 
 Dod-pasbani (Protecting Pakhtun culture)-It 
is obligatory for a Pashtun to protect Pashtun  Badragga-A tribal escort composed of 
culture from dilution and disintegration. members of that tribe through which the 
Pakhtunwali advises that in order to travelers are passing. If a badragga is violated 
successfully accomplish this, a Pashtun must a tribal feud will follow. 
retain the Pashtu language since Pashtu is the 
 Hamsaya-A non-Pashtun dependent group 
prime source of Pashtu culture and its who attaches themselves to a Pashtun group, 
understanding is therefore essential. Not usually for protection. The Pashtun protector 
being able to speak Pashtu in a Pashtun group is called a naik. Any attack on a 
society often translates to the inability to hamsaya is considered an attack on the 
understand the Pashtun culture, values, protector. 
history and community. 
Annex  II
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 Mlatar-Literally, tying the back or "support". 
This refers to those members of the tribe who 
will actually fight on behalf of their leaders. 
 Nagha-a tribal fine decided by the council of 
elders and imposed upon the wrongdoer. 
 Rogha-Settlement of a dispute between 
warring factions. 
 Hujra-A common sitting or sleeping place for 
males in the village. Visitors and unmarried 
young men sleep in the Hujra. 
 Lokhay Warkawal-Literally means 'giving of 
pot'. The idea that the tribe will do everything 
to protect an individual from an enemy.
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Annex  III
Agency/FR-wise list of villages for Jirga perception survey 2010-11
(January 10 - 26, 2010)
S #
Agency/
FR 
S# 
List of Villages 
Tehsil Khar 
S # 
List of Villages 
Tehsil Utman 
Khel  
S #  
List of 
VillagesTehsil 
Salarzo  
1
Bajaur 
Agency 
1 Khar City 
11 Sakindro  
18  Reghgan  2 Qazi Darai 
12 Qazafi  
19  Bar Raghgan3 Kala Kalay 
13 Graoye  
20  Pasht  4 Jaar 
14 Malu Darai
 
21  Brasht Gardai5 Mehrosa 
15 Karh  
22  Gasat Miytai6 Slum Bagh 
16 Bandagai  
23  Bargamat  7 Shah Naray 
17 Khyakay
24  Shahee Qeleha8 Aman Kot         
9 Banda
10 Gandawa
S # Agency/FR S # 
List of 
Villages(Haleem 
Zai/Ghalanai  
S #  
List of Villages Prang 
Ghar  
2 
Mohmand 
Agency 
1 Musa Kor  
9
 
Naway Kalay  2 Naway Kalay  
10  Keera Kalay  3 Ghunda Khel  
11  Bawacha  
4 Ranra Khel  
12
 
Abdu-ur-Rehman 
Kalay  5 Ghalnai  
13  Sra Shah  6 Haleem Zai  
14  Dew Derai  7 Sultan Khel      
8 Yousaf Khail
S # Agency/FR S # 
List of Villages 
Jamrud/Mala Gori  
S #  
List of VillagesLandi 
Kotal /Shalman  
3 Khyber Agency 
1 Jamrud 
13  Gagra  2 Shahkas 
14  Kam Shalman
 
3 Sur Kamar  
15  Loye Shalman
 
4 Ghundai 
16  Ayub Kalay
 
5 Samar Bagh  
17  Sultan Khel
 
6 Chinar Kalay  
18  Kandu Khel
 
7 Shikhanu Kalay  
19  Shakai  8 Nehar Ghara  
20  Ali Masjid  9 Sher Burj 
21  Piro Khel  10 Badshah Gul Kalay  
22  Bagh Kalay
 
11 Lora Mina      
12 Godhar Kalay
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S #  Agency/FR S #
List of Villages Tehsil 
Kalaya
4  Orakzai Agency  
1 Kuriz
2 Kalaya
3 Kalat
4 Ahmed Khel
5 Mast Ali Khel
6 Char Khaila
7 Tagha Mela Tarangi
8 Jameera Undi Khail
9 Bada Khail
 
S #  Agency/FR  S #  
List of Villages 
Upper Kurram 
Parachinar  
S #
 
List of Villages Lower 
Kurram Sadda
5
 
Kurram
Agency  
1  Parachinar Main  10  Sada Main
2  Agra  11  Khar Kalay
3  Sultan  12  Pir Qayum
4  Zaran  13  Kochee
5  Malana  14  Tirak
6  Shublan  15  Dorani
7  Mali Kalay  16  Shahshu
8  Luqman Khel  17  Sakhee Ahmad Shah
9  Shalozan  18  Sateen
 
  
S #  Agency/FR  S #  
List of Villages 
Tehsil WANA  
S #  
List of Villages 
Tehsil Birmal
7  
Sourth 
Waziristan 
Agency  
1  Kari Kot  10  Zari Noor
2  Karay Khel  11  Azzam Warsak
3  Ashraf Khel  12  Dazza Ghodai
4  Mughal Khel  13  Dera Ghundo 
5  Ghowa Khowa  14  Shah Alam
6  Tanai  15  Raghzai  
7  Speen  16  Angoor Adda
8  Taran  17  Goora  
9  Dab Kot      
S #  Agency/FR  S #  
List of Villages 
Tehsil Miransha  
S #  
List of Villages 
Tehsil Mir Ali
6  
North  
Waziristan 
Agency  
1  Darpa Khel  9  Tappi  
2  Miran Shah Kala  10  Mussaki  
3  Danday Darpa Khel  11  Eppi  
4  Chashmay Kala  12  Molagan  
5  Hassu Khel  13  Mirali  
6  Haidar Khel  14  Essori  
7  Eidak  15  Zarraki  
  8  Hurmaz      
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S #  Agency/FR  S # List of Villages 
8  FR Peshawar  
1 Jannah Kor
2 Mattani
3 Sama Badabera
4 Musa Dara
5 Arbat Baba
S #  Agency/FR  S # List of Villages 
10  FR Bunnu  
1 Jani Khel
2 Khawjadar Khel
3 Wali Noor Wazir Kalay
4 Tanchi Kalay
5 Said Khel Wazir
 
S #  Agency/FR  S # List of Villages 
11  FR Lakki  
1 Ghundi Hussain Khel
2 Gabbar Betani
3 Masti Khel
4 Hussain Khel
5 Barram Khel
S # Agency/FR S #  List of Villages
12 FR Tank 
1  Jhandula  
2  Kariwam  
3  Sra Ghar  
4  Chini Machan Khel
5  Manzai  
S #  Agency/FR  S # List of Villages
13  FR D.I. Khan  
1 Darazinda
2 Chudwan
3 Mughal Kot
4 Landi Balouch
5 Anwar Kalay
S #  Agency/FR  S # List of Villages 
9  FR Kohat  
1 Dara bazzar
2 Tor Chapper
3 Suni Khel
4 Azad Mela
5 Shah Nawaz Kalay
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S.#  Name of Participant  Agency/FR
25  Malik Dawood Khan  Bajaur Agency
26  Haji Habib Ullah Khan  Bajaur Agency
27  Qazi Abdul Manan  Bajaur Agency
28  Syed Salim Syed  Orakzai Agency
29  Khyal Meen Gul  Orakzai Agency
30  Najmal Hassan  Orakzai Agency
31  Ameenullah Khan  Orakzai Agency
32  Syed Alam Jan  Orakzai Agency
33  Wasi Syed  Orakzai Agency
34  Yousaf Jan  Orakzai Agency
35  Mehboob Ali  Orakzai Agency
36  Ibn-e-  Ali  Orakzai Agency
37  Malik Gul Hussain  Orakzai Agency
38  Syed Akbar Jan  Kurram Agency
39  Ahmad Bangash  Kurram Agency
40  Atta Ullah  Kurram Agency
41  Munir Hussain Bangash  Kurram Agency
42  
Haji Muhammad 
Ghulam  
Kurram Agency
43  Saifullah Khan  Kurram Agency
44  Kabir Khan  Kurram Agency
45  Haji Syed Abbas  Kurram Agency
46  Shuiab Nabi  Kurram Agency
47  Iqbal Hussain  Kurram Agency
48  Mula Janat Shah  Kurram Agency
S.#  Name of Participant Agency/FR  
1  Malik Razaq Afridi  Khyber Agency
2  Malik Khalid Afridi  Khyber Agency
3  Taj Mahal  Khyber Agency
4  
Ikram Ullah Jan Koki 
Khel  
Khyber Agency
5  Said Nazir  Khyber Agency
6  Hasam-ud-Din  Khyber Agency
7  Haji Badshah  Khyber Agency
8  Wahid shah  Khyber Agency
9  Malik Ibrahim Shinwari  Khyber Agency
10  M. Zahir Shah Safi  Mohmand Agency
11  Jalil Khan  Mohmand Agency
12  Haji Shahzar Khan  Mohmand Agency
13  Arshad Khan  Mohmand Agency
14  Irshad Khan  Mohmand Agency
15  Tajamul Hussain  Mohmand Agency
16  Dr. Zia-ul-Haq  Mohmand Agency
17  Yasir Khan  Mohmand Agency
18  Aftab Khan  Mohmand Agency
19  Malik Ihsan Ullah  Mohmand Agency
20  Shekh Jehan Zada  Bajaur Agency
21  Bahadar Nawaz  Bajaur Agency
22  Khan Badshah  Bajaur  Agency
23  Khair Mohammad Khan  Bajaur Agency
24  Mohammad Iqbal  Bajaur Agency
Annex  IV
List of participants of the four-day stakeholders consultation
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S.#  Name of Participant  Agency/FR  
49  Malik Sawab  Kurram Agency  
50  M. Khan Marjan  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
51  Mr. Zabihullah  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
52  Haji Farid  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
53  Malik Salam Tappi  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
54  
Haji Malik Qadreen 
Khan  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
55  Malik Sarfaraz Khan  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
56  Farhat Ullah  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
57  Malik  Mohd Qaderun  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
58  Umar Daraz Wazir  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
59  Aurang Zeb Khan  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
60  Fakhar nishad baber  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
61  Kamal Khan Wazir  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
62  Haji Daraz  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
63  Malik Ayaz Dawar  
North Waziristan 
Agency  
64  Liqman Khan Afridi  FR Peshawar  
65  Akbar Hussain Afridi  FR Peshawar  
66  Sultan Hussain  FR Peshawar  
67  Asgher Ali  FR Peshawar  
68  Malik Habib Ullah  FR Peshawar  
69  Malik  Shamroz  FR Peshawar  
S.#  Name of Participant  Agency/FR
70  Abdul Salam  FR Peshawar
71  Malik Waqas Sharaki  FR Kohat
72  Javed Sharaki  FR Kohat
73  
Malik Zar Mohammad 
Bosti Khel  
FR Kohat
74  
Malik Shakeel Afridi,  
Zarghoon Khel  
FR Kohat
75  Fahim Alam  FR Kohat
76  Malik Akbar Khan Afridi  FR Kohat
77  Noor Zaman  FR Bannu
78  Malik Liyaqat Ali  FR Bannu
79  Gul Andaz Khan  FR Bannu
80  Malik Taj Mohd Khan  FR Bannu
81  Zahoor Ul Islam  FR Bannu
82  Noor Muhammad  FR Bannu
83  
Malik Kher Nuhammad 
Khan  
FR Bannu
84  Riuaz Musa Khel  FR Bannu
85  Zafar Yaar Khan  FR Bannu
86  Gohar Wazir  FR Bannu
87  M shukat  FR Lakki
88  Mir dil Khan  FR Lakki
89  M Matloob Jan khan  FR Lakki
90  Dr Kifayat Khan Betnni  FR Lakki
91  Hamyun Khan  FR Lakki
92  Noor Muhammd  FR Lakki
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S.# Name of Participant Agency/FR
93 Salam Shah
 
F R D.I.Khan
94 Sawar Shah
 
F R D.I.Khan
95 Namat Allah
 
F R D.I.Khan
96 Malak Abdul Haleem
 
F R D.I.Khan
97 Maulavi Shafi Ullah
 
F R D.I.Khan
98 Malak Awal Khan
 
F R D.I.Khan
99 Haji Ghafar Shah F R D.I.Khan
101 Sanatullah  Khan F R Tank
102 Ahmed Munir
 
F R Tank
103 Nazir Ahmed
 
F R Tank
104 Abdul Rehman
 
F R Tank
105 Gul Rehman
 
F R Tank
106 Sheer Nawaz
 
F R Tank
107 Hayatullah
 
F R Tank
108 Akbar Shah
 
South Waziristan 
Agency
 
109 Dilawar Khan
 
South Waziristan 
Agency
 
110 Alam Gul
 
South Waziristan 
Agency
 
111 Salam Khan
 
South Waziristan 
Agency
 
112 Malik Bir Mala Khan
 
South Waziristan 
Agency
 
113 Najib ullah
 
South Waziristan 
Agency
114 Mian Gul Khan South Waziristan 
Agency
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A Regulation further to provide for the 1
[ (3) It shall extend to the areas specified in the 
suppression of crime in certain frontier districts
Third Schedule, but the Governor may, by 
Whereas it is expedient further to provide for 
2
notification   in the official Gazette, exempt any 
the suppression of crime in certain frontier 
such area from the operation of all or any of its 
districts;
provisions.]
It is hereby enacted as follows: ________
(4) Section 1to 5, 10, 20, 21, 26 to 28, 31, 32, 
CHAPTER I
36, 56 and 60 to 64 are of general application, 
PRELIMINARY 
but the remaining sections may be enforced, in 
whole or in part, as the case may be, only 
1.  Short title, commencement and 
against Pathans and Biluchis, and against such 
extent._______ (1) This Regulation may be 
3 4
other classes as the  [Provincial Government]   
called the Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901; 
[…] may by notification in the  5[Official 
and 
Gazette], declare to the subject thereto.
(2)  It shall come into force at once.
Annex  V
Laws Extended to the Tribal Areas with Jirga Laws
REGULATION NO. III OF 1901
THE FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION, 1901
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1
Substituted by West Pakistan Ordinance XLIII of 1963, S.2 for sub-sections (3) and (4) which were earlier substituted by 
Central Ordinance VIII of 1962, for the original sub-section (3).
2
Exempted vide Government of West Pakistan, Home Department Notification No. Judl-1-1(72)/64(1), dated 17th 
December, 1964, Gazette of West Pakistan, Extraordinary, 17th December, 1964.
3
Substituted for “Local Government” by the A.O., 1937.
4
The words “with the previous sanction of the Governor- General in Council” omitted, ibid.
5
Substituted Ibid for “local official Gazette”.
(5) A notification under sub-section (4) may in writing to exercise all or any of the 
declare a specified class only to be subject to all functions or powers specified in the 
or any of the provisions of this Regulation in a first part of the first Schedule, and also 
district or a part of a district. any magistrate appointed by the  
7
Explanation._____ The word “class”, as used in [Provincial Government] to exercise all 
sub-sections (4) and (5) includes any persons or any such functions or powers;
8
who may be collectively described in a  ( c ) “Commissioner” in relation to the 
notification under this section as persons Federally Administered Tribal Areas or 
subject to all or any of the provisions of this any part thereof shall mean the 
Regulations. Commissioner of the Division to which 
2. Definitions.____ In this Regulation unless such areas or part thereof is attached 
there is anything repugnant in the for administrative purposes or such 
subject or context,_____ other officer as the Governor may 
6
 [(a) “ Council of Elders” means____ appoint in this behalf; and]
9
i) In relation to Quetta and Kalat Divisions  [(d) “ Governor” means the Governor of 
ad District Lasbella, a Council of three the North- West Frontier Province as 
or more persons convened according to Agent to the President of Pakistan 
the Pathan, Biluch or other usage, as under Article 145 of the Constitution of 
the Deputy Commissioner may in each the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the 
case direct; and Federally Administered Tribal Areas.]
ii) In relation to other areas, a 3.    Relation of Regulation to other 
Council of three or more persons enactments._____(1) The Provisions of 
whether officials or otherwise this Regulation shall take effect in case 
convened by the Deputy to which they apply, notwithstanding 
Commissioner and presided over by anything in any other enactment.
a Magistrate invested with powers 
under section 30 of the code of    (2) the Powers conferred by this Regulation 
Criminal Procedure, 1898);] and may be exercised in addition to any 
(b) “ Deputy Commissioner” includes any power conferred  by or under any other 
Magistrate of the first class appointed enactment, and where the contrary is 
by the Deputy Commissioner by order not expressed or implied, other 
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6
Substituted for clause (a) by W.P. Ordinance XII of 1962.
7
Substituted for “ Local Government” by the A.O., 1937.
8
Substituted by Regulation No. II of 1997.
9
Added by Regulation No. II of 1997.
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enactments in force in any place in which 5. Power of District Magistrate to withdraw or 
all or any of the provisions of this recall Cases._____(1) The District Magistrate 
Regulation are for the time being in force may withdraw any case from, or recall any case 
shall, so far as may be, apply to cases which he has made over to, an Additional district 
dealt with in that place under this Magistrate, whether the Additional District 
Regulation. Magistrate is exercising jurisdiction with respect 
to the case as a Magistrate or as a Deputy 
CHAPTER II Commissioner. 
POWERS OF COURTS AND OFFICERS (2) If the case may, under the Code of Criminal 
4. Additional District Magistrate._____(1)  In Procedure, 1898, be refereed to another 
any district in the whole or any other part of Magistrate competent to inquire into or try it, the 
which all or any of the provision of this Regulation District Magistrate may, instead of disposing of 
10
are for the time being in force the  [ Provincial the case himself, refer it to such other magistrate 
Government] may appoint any Magistrate or for inquiry or the trail as the case may be. 
Magistrates of the first class to be an Additional 6.    Power to pass sentences of whipping 
District Magistrate or Additional District in certain cases.____ Where any person against 
Magistrates, without any limit of time. whom, under section 1, sub- section (4), this 
 (2) Every Additional District Magistrate so section may for the time being be enforced is 
appointed shall have all the ordinary powers of a convicted by a Criminal Court of an offence 
District Magistrate specified in the fifth part of punishable under any of the following sections of 
11
the third schedule to the Code of Criminal the  Indian Penal Code, namely, sections 304, 
Procedure, 1898. 307, 324, 325, 326, 376, 377, 382, 392 to 399, 
 (3) When exercising any of the powers of a 427, 428, 429, 435, 436, 448 to 460, the Court 
Deputy Commissioner under this Regulation, an may, subject to the provisions of section 393 of 
Additional District Magistrate shall be deemed, the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1898, pass 
for the purposes of this Regulation to be the upon him a sentence of whipping in addition to 
Deputy Commissioner. any other punishment to which he may be 
(4) Every Additional District Magistrate shall sentenced. 
12
exercise his powers in subordination of the  [7. Tender of pardon to accomplices._____ 
District Magistrate, and in such cases or classes of Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
cases, and within such local limits as the District 1898, shall for the purposes of this Regulation, be 
Magistrate may, by order in writing, direct. construed as if___
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Substituted for “ Local Government” by the A.O., 1937.
11
Now the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860.
12
Substituted by Regulation VII of 1926.
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(a) The words in sub-section (1) “ triable making such inquiry as may be necessary and 
exclusively by the High Court or the Court of  after hearing the parties. The members of the 
Session or any offence punishable with Council of Elders shall in any case, be nominated 
imprisonment which may extend to ten years or and appointed by the Deputy Commissioner.
any offence punishable under section 211 of the   (2) The order of reference made under sub-
13
Indian Penal Code with imprisonment which section (1) shall state the matter or matters on 
may extend to seven years or any offence under which the finding of the Council of Elders is 
any of the following sections of the Indian Penal required.
Code, namely, sections 216-A, 369, 401, 435 and (3) On receipt of the finding of the Council of 
477-A,” and Elders under this section, the Deputy 
Commissioner may___
 (b) the whole of sub-section (2-A) were a) remand the case to the council for a 
omitted. further finding; or 
b) refer the case to a second council; or
CHAPTER III c) refer the parties to the Civil Courts; or
COUNCILS OF ELDERS d) pass a decree in accordance with the 
finding of the Council, or of not less than 
8. Civil References to Council to Elders._____ (1) three-fourth of the members thereof, on 
Where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied, any matter stated in the reference; or 
from a police report or other information, that a e) declare that further proceedings under 
dispute exists which is likely to cause a blood- this section are not required.
feud or murder, or culpable homicide not 9. Effect of decree on finding of Council._____ A 
amounting to murder, or mischief or a breach of decree passed under section 8, sub-section (3), 
the peace, or in which either or any of the parties clause(d), shall not give effect to any finding or 
belongs to a frontier tribe he may, if he considers part of a finding which in the opinion of the 
that the settlement thereof in the manner Deputy Commissioner is contrary to good 
provided by this section will tend to prevent or conscience or public policy, but shall____
terminate the consequences anticipated, and if a a) be a final settlement of the case so far as 
suit is not pending in respect of the dispute, make the decree relates to any matter stated in the 
an order in writing, stating the grounds of his reference, although other matters therein stated 
being so satisfied, refereeing the dispute to a may remain undisposed of; and
council of Elders, and requiring the Council to b) have, to that extend and subject to the 
come to a finding on the matters in disputes after provisions of this regulation with respect 
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Now the Pakistan Penal Code
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to revision, the same effect as  a decree any objection which he may then make to the 
of a Civil Court of ultimate resort, and be nomination of any such member shall be 
enforced by the Deputy Commissioner in recorded. The Deputy Commissioner shall 
the same manner as a decree of such a consider every objection made by an accused 
Court may be enforced. persons under this sub-section, and may, in his 
discretion, either accept or reject the objection, 
10. Restriction on jurisdiction of Civil provided that, in the case, he shall record his 
Courts._____ No Civil Court shall take cognizance reasons for so doing. The Deputy Commissioner 
of any claim with respect to which the Deputy shall, after disposing of any objection made by 
Commissioner has proceeded under section 8, the accused person appoint the members of the 
sub-section (3), clause (a), clause (b) or clause (d). Council.
11. Criminal references to Council of (3)  On receipt of the finding of the Council of 
Elders._____(1) Where, in the opinion of the Elders  under this section, the Deputy 
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, it is Commissioner may____
inexpedient that the question of the guilt or a) remand the question to the Council for a 
innocence of any person or persons accused of further finding; or
any offence, or of any several persons so accused, b) refer the question to a second Council; or
should be tried by a Court of any of the clauses 
mentioned in section 6 of the Code of Criminal c) acquit or discharge the accused person 
Procedure, 1898, the Deputy Commissioner may or persons, or any of them; or
or if the Commissioner so directs, shall, by order 
in writing, refer the question to the decision of a d) in accordance with the findings on any 
Council of Elders, and require the Council to matter of fact of the Council, or of not 
come to a finding on the question after such less than three-fourths of the members 
inquiry as may be necessary and after hearing the thereof, convict the accused person or 
accused person. The members of the Council of persons or any of them, of any offence of 
Elders  shall, in each case, be nominated and which the facts so found show him or 
appointed by the Deputy Commissioner. them to be guilty;
 
  (2) Where a reference to a Council of Elders is   Provided that a person discharged under 
made under sub-section (1) and the members of clause(c ) shall not be liable to be retired for any 
the Council have been nominated, the names of offence arising out of the same facts after the 
the members so nominated shall, as soon as may expiry of two years from the date of such 
be, be communicated to the accused person, and discharge.
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shall not be for a longer term than that ( if any ) 
12. Punishment on conviction on finding of prescribed for the offence and; 
C o u n c i l . _ _ _ _ _ ( 1 )  W h e re  t h e  D e p u t y  Provided,  thirdly,  that a sentence of  
Commissioner convicts a person under section transportation shall not be passed for an offence 
11, sub-section (3), clause (d) he may pass upon which is not punishable with transportation or 
him any sentence of fine. with imprisonment for a term which may extend 
  (2) Where the Deputy Commissioner so convicts to seven years or more.
15
a person of an offence mentioned in the second  [(3) in cases of convictions under section 302 or 
schedule, he may, whatever may be the 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code, the immovable 
punishment prescribed for the offence, sentence property of the accused shall be liable to 
the person, in lieu of or in addition to fine, to be forfeiture to the Government.]
imprisoned for a term which may extend to seven 13. Manner of enforcing sentences._____(1)  
years, or, subject to the provisions of section 393 Any sentence passed under section 12 shall be 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to be executed in the manner provided for the 
whipped and imprisoned for a term which may execution of sentences passed by a Court of any 
extend to five years, or to be transported for a of the classes mentioned in section 6 of the Code 
term which may extend to seven years; and, of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
where he so convicts a person of an offence (2) For the purposes of sections 64 to 67 of the 
punishable with transportation or with Indian Penal Code in reference to a sentence 
imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years, under section 12 of this Regulation ___
he may, subject to confirmation by the a) An offence punishable with death or 
Commissioner, sentence the person to a term transportation for life shall be deemed to be 
either of transportation or of imprisonment punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a 
exceeding seven years but not exceeding term which may extend  to ten years.
fourteen years: b) The imprisonment in default of payment 
 Provided first, that a sentence of whipping shall of fine may be rigorous or simple at the discretion 
not a passed on any person so convicted of an of Deputy Commissioner.
offence under sections 121, 121-A, 122, 123, 14. Time for exercising power of reference to 
124-A, 125, 126, 127, 144, 150, 216, 216-A, 400, Council of Elders._____  The powers conferred 
 14
401, 402, 494, or 495 of the Indian Penal Code; by section 11 on the Commissioner and Deputy 
Provided secondly, that a sentence of Commissioner, respectively, may be exercised by 
transportation or imprisonment for an offence them, in cases committed to the Court of Session, 
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Now the Pakistan Penal Code
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Added by W.P. Ord.XII of 1962,s.3. 15 A. Now the Pakistan Penal Code.
at any time before the trial before that Court b) refusing to make such a reference.
has commenced, and, in cases pending before 18. Recommendations of   Counci ls  of  
any Court inferior to the Court of Session, at Elders._____(1) Where a Council of Elders to which 
any time before an order of conviction or a reference has been made under this Regulation, 
acquittal has been made. makes any recommendation to which effect might 
15. Motion by Public Prosecutor in view to be given if it were a finding on a matter or question 
reference to Council of Elders._____(1)  In, any referred to the Council under this Regulation, the 
trail before a Court of Session, the Public Deputy Commissioner may, if the recommendation 
Prosecutor may, when instructed in writing in effects a person mentioned in the order of 
that behalf by the Commissioner or the Deputy reference and is relevant to the matter or question 
Commissioner, at any time before an order of actually referred, deal with the recommendation or 
conviction of acquittal has been made with any part of it as if it were a finding under section 8 or 
respect to any accused person, withdraw from section 11:
the prosecution of such person in order that Provided that no decree or sentence may be passed 
the case may be referred to Council of Elders. or any such recommendation as aforesaid against 
 (2) The Session Judge shall thereupon stay any person who has not had the claim or charge 
proceeding with respect to such person, and fully explained to him and been given an 
the Deputy Commissioner shall refer the case opportunity of entering upon is defence in regard 
to a Council of Elders. thereto.
16. Case of persons jointly accused of an (2) Where the Deputy Commissioner deals with a 
offence_____ The powers conferred by section recommendation under sub-section (1), he may 
11, as limited by section 14, may be exercised pass any such decree as is authorized by section 8, 
against and withdrawal of a prosecution under or any such sentence as is authorized by section 12, 
section 15 may have reference to one or some sub-section (1), and the decree or sentence shall 
only of two or more persons jointly accused of have the same effect and be enforced in the same 
an offence. manner as if it were a decree or sentence passed 
17. Powers to set aside orders making or under section 8 or section 12, sub-section (1), as 
refusing to make references to Councils of the case may be .
Elders._____ The Deputy Commissioner may, if 19. Record of Deputy Commissioner._____ Where 
he thinks fit, at any time reconsider and set the Deputy Commissioner passes, under this 
aside any order of the Deputy Commissioner Chapter a sentence of fine exceeding two hundred 
under this Regulation ____ rupees, or of imprisonment for a term exceeding 
a) directing reference to a Council of three months, or of transportation, he shall make a 
Elders, or record of the facts of the case of the offence 
150 Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
committed and of his reasons for passing the of the Commissioner, by order in writing, direct___
sentence a) the seizure, wherever they may be found, 
  (2) The record shall be made by the Deputy of all or any of the members of such tribe and of all 
Commissioner in English and in his own hand, or any property belonging to them or any of them;
unless for any sufficient reason he is prevented b) the detention in safe custody of any person 
from so making it, in which case he shall record or property so seized and;
the reason of his inability and shall cause the c) the confiscation of any such property; and 
record to be made from his dictation in open may, with the like sanction by public 
Court. proclamation;
20. Attendance of Parties and witnesses d) debar all or any member of the tribe from 
before Deputy Commissioner Councils of all access into British India; and
Elders._____ Where a reference is made to a e) prohibit all or any persons within the limits 
Council of Elders under this chapter, the of British India from all inter-course or 
Deputy Commissioner may exercise all or any communication of any kind whatsoever, or 
16
of the powers conferred by the  Code of Civil of any specified kind or kinds with such 
Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure, tribe or any section or members thereof. 
1898, respectively, as the case may be , for the 
purpose of compelling the attendance, before 22. Fines on communities accessory to 
himself or the Council of Elders, of the parties, crime._____ Where, from the circumstances of any 
and witnesses, or any of them, in any case and case, there appears to be good reason to believe 
at any stage of the proceedings. that the inhabitants of any village, or part of village, 
or any of them, have___
 CHAPTER IV a) connived at, or in any way abetted, the 
PENALTIES commission of an offence; or
b) failed to render all assistance in their 
21. Blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribe___ power to discover the offenders or to effect 
In event of any frontier tribe, or of any section their arrest;
or members of such tribe, acting in a hostile or c) connived at the escape of, or harboured, 
unfriendly manner towards the British any offender or person suspected of having 
Government or towards persons residing taken part in commission of an offence; or
1 7
within   Br i t i sh  India ,  the Deputy  d) combined to suppress material evidence of 
Commissioner may, with the previous sanction the Commission of an offence;
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See Now the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908).
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Now to be constructed as referring to all Provinces of Pakistan, see G.G.O. 20 of 1947. 
perpetuity, any remission of land revenue of 
The Deputy Commissioner may, with the which it may be in joint enjoyment, and the 
previous sanction of the Commissioner, impose a members of the village-community or part 
fine on the inhabitants of such village or part of thereof, as the case may be, shall in like manner 
village, or any of them as a whole. be liable severally to forefeit any assignment or 
remission of land-revenue or allowance paid out 
 23 . Fines on communities where murder or of public funds which they, or any of them, may 
c u l p a b l e  h o m i c i d e  i s  c o m m i tte d  o r  enjoy.
attempted._____ Where, within the area 
occupied by a village community or part of a 26. Forfeiture of public emoluments etc., of 
village-community, a person is dangerously or persons guilty of serious offences or of 
fatally wounded by an unlawful act, or the body is conniving at  crime.____ Where it is shown to 
found of a person believed to have been the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner, 
unlawfully killed, the members of the village that any person who is in the enjoyment of an 
community or part thereof shall be deemed to assignment or remission of land revenue or 
have committed an offence under section 22, allowance payable out of public funds, has been 
unless the headmen of the village-community or guilty of a serious offence, or has colluded with or 
part thereof can show that the members thereof- harboured any criminal, or has suppressed 
a) had not an opportunity of preventing the material evidence of the commission of any 
offence or arresting the offender; or offence, or has failed, on the investigation of any 
b) have used all reasonable means to bring criminal case, to render loyal and proper 
the offender to justice. assistance to the authorities, to the best of 
24. Recovery of fines._____ Fines imposed ability, the Deputy Commissioner may, in 
under section 22 shall, in default of payment, be addition to any other penalty to which such 
recoverable as if they were areas of land revenue person may be liable under any law for the time 
due by the members of the community or part being in force, direct the forfeiture, in whole or in 
thereof upon whom the fine is imposed. part and for a term or in perpetuity, of such 
assignment or remission of land- revenue or 
25. Forfeiture of remissions of revenue etc., in allowance, as the case may be.
the case of communities and persons accessory 
to crime._____ Where a village-community or Explanation____ For the purpose of this section 
part of a village-community has become liable to the expression “ serious offence” means any 
fine under section 22, it shall further be liable to offence punishable with transportation or with 
forefeit, in whole or in part and for a term or in imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
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three years or more.
30. Adultery._____ (1) A married woman who, 
27. Powers to direct forfeiture._____ For section knowingly and by her own consent, has sexual 
25 or under section 26 may be adjudged by intercourse with any man who is not her 
orders of the Deputy Commissioner for a term husband, is guilty of the offence of adultery and 
which may extend to three years, and by order of shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
the Commissioner for any longer term or in which may extend  to five years, or with fine, or 
perpetuity. with both.
19
28. Powers of Provincial Government  [(2) Cognizance shall not be taken of an offence 
saved._____ Nothing in sections 25, 26 and 27 under this section unless a complaint has been 
18
shall affect the powers of the  [Provincial made by the husband of the women, or in his 
Government] with respect to the grant, absence, by a person who had care of the women 
continuance or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of on his, behalf at the time when the offence was 
any assignment or remission of land- revenue or committed.]
of any allowance paid out of public funds.
CHAPTER V
2 9 .  P r e p a ra t i o n  t o  c o m m i t  c e r t a i n  PREVENTIVE AND OTHER AUTHORTY AND 
offences._____ Where a person is found carrying JURISDICTION
arms in such manner or in such circumstances as 
to afford just grounds of suspicion that the arms 31.  Power to prohibit erection new villages or 
are being carried by him with intent to use them towers on frontier._____(1) No new hamlet, 
for an unlawful purpose, and that person  has tower or walled enclosure shall, without the 
taken precautions to elude observation or evade previous sanction in writing of the Commissioner, 
arrest, or is found after sunset and before sunrise who may either grant or refuse such sanctions as 
within the limits of any military camp or he thinks fit, be erected at any place within five 
 20
cantonment or of any municipality, he shall be miles of the frontier of British India.
punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to five years, or with fine, or with (2) Where the Commissioner refuses to sanction 
both, and the arms carried by him may be the erection of any such hamlet, village-
confiscated. habitation, tower or walled enclosure, as the 
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Substituted for “ Local Government” by the A.O., 1937.
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Sub-Section (2) omitted in its application to the Districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Bannu, Mardan and Dera Ismail 
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case may be, he shall record his reasons for so the owner or occupier thereof from so using such 
doing. building, and, if the order is not obeyed, may, by a 
like order, direct that the building be demolished. 
32. Power to direct removal of villages._____ Such further order shall be without prejudice to 
Where it is expedient on military grounds, the [ any punishment to which the owner or occupier 
Central Government] may, by order in writing, of such building may, under any law for the time 
direct the removal of any village situate in close 
being in force, be liable for disobedience of the 
proximity to the frontier of British India to any 
prohibitory order.
other site within five miles of the regional site, 
and award to the inhabitants such compensation 
(2) No person shall be entitles to any for any loss which may have been occasioned to 
compensation in respect of the demolition of any them by the removal of their village as, in the 
21
building under sub-section (1)opinion of the  [Central Government], is just.
35. Naubati Chaukidari system._____(1) 33. Regulation of hujras and chauks._____ (1) Where, 
No building of the kind commonly known as “ in the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner, the 
hujra” or “ chauk”, and no building intended to be custom of providing for watch and ward by what 
used as a “hujra” or “ chauk”, shall be erected or 
are commonly known as “ Naubati chaukidras” 
built, and no existing building not now used as a 
exists in the case of any village- community, and 
“hujra” or “ chauk”, shall at any time be used as 
the village- community, or any part thereof fails 
such, without the previous sanction in writing of 
to provide for the due performance of such the Deputy Commissioner.
service, or any member of the village- 
community fails to perform his duty of watch and (2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-
ward according to the customary rotation in sect ion (1)  shal l  be punishable with 
respect of such duties, the Deputy Commissioner imprisonment for a term which may extend to six 
months, or with fine, or with both. may impose a fine, which may extend to one 
hundred rupees in any one case, upon the village- 
34. Demolition of buildings used by robber community or part or member thereof so failing 
etc._____(1) Where the Deputy Commissioner is as aforesaid.
satisfied that any building is habitually used as a 
meeting place by robbers, house-breakers,  (2) The provision of section 24 shall be applicable 
thieves or bad characters or for the purpose of to the recovery of fines imposed on any village- 
gambling, he may, by order in writing, prohibit community or part thereof under this section.
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37. Penalty for breach of certain orders._____ 
(3) Where such custom as aforesaid has not Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 31, 
existed or has fallen into disuse in any village- or disobeys an order under section 21 or section 32 
community, the Deputy Commissioner may, , or a prohibition under section 34, or a requisition 
wi th  the  prev ious  sanct ion  o f  the  under section 36, shall be punishable with 
Commissioner, by order in writing, direct its imprisonment for a term which may extend to six 
introduction or revival, as the case may be; and months, and shall also be liable to fine which may 
thereupon the provisions of sub-section (1) extend to one thousand rupees.
shall apply in respect of the village community.
38. Powers of arrest._____ In any place in which all 
36. Power to require persons to remove in or any of the provisions of this Regulation are for 
certain cases._____ Where, in the opinion of the time being in force____
the Deputy Commissioner, any person, ____ i) Any private person may. without an order 
a) is a dangerous fanatic; or from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest or 
b) belongs to a frontier tribe and has no cause to be arrested, and make over or cause to be 
ostensible means of subsistence or made over to a police officer or take or cause to be 
cannot give a satisfactory account of taken to the nearest police station, any Person who 
himself; or has been concerned in any cognizable offence or 
c) has a blood feud; or against whom a reasonable complaint has been 
d) has occasioned cause of quarrel likely made or credible information has been received, or 
to lead to blood-shed; a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so 
concerned; and 
The Deputy Commissioner may, by order in 
writing, require him to reside beyond the limits ii) Section 48 of the Code of Criminal 
of the territories to which this Regulation Procedure, 1898, shall be read as if the following 
extends, or at such place within the said sub-section were added thereto namely:-
territories as may be specified in the order:
“(4) But this section gives a right to cause the death 
Provided that, if the person has a fixed of a person against whom those portions of the 
habitation in the place which the Deputy Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901, which are not of 
Commissioner requires him to leave, an order general application, may be enforced___
under this section shall not be made without a) if he is committing, or attempting to 
commit an offence, or resisting or evading arrest, in the previous sanction of the Commissioner.
such circumstances as to afford reasonable ground 
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for believing that he intends to use arms to effect 
his purpose; and 40. Security and surveillance for the prevention 
of murder or culpable homicide or the 
dissemination of sedition._____ (1) Where the 
b) if a hue and cry has been raised against 
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner is of 
him of his having been concerned in any 
opinion that it is necessary for the purpose of 
such offence as is specified in clause (a) 
preventing murder, or culpable homicide not 
or of his committing or attempting to 
amounting to murder, or the dissemination of 
commit an offence, or resisting or 
sedition, to require a person to execute a bond, 
evading arrest, in such circumstances as 
for good behavior or for keeping the peace as the 
are referred to in the said clause.” case may be, he may order the person to execute 
a bond with or without sureties, for his good 
behavior or for keeping the peace, as the case 39. Arrest without warrant in cases under 
may be, he may order the person to execute a section 498, Indian Penal Code._____ (1) Where 
bond with or without sureties, for his good there is reason to believe that a person has 
behavior or for keeping the peace, as the case 
committed or attempted to commit an offence 
may be, during such period not exceeding three 22
punishable under section 498 of the  Indian 
years, as the Commissioner or the Deputy 
Penal Code, an officer in charge of a police station 
Commissioner, as the case may be , may fix.
may, without an order from a Magistrate and 
without a warrant, arrest that person on the 
(2) The Deputy Commissioner may make an order requisition of the husband of a woman, or, in his 
under sub-section (1)____absence of a person having the care of her on his 
behalf, or, in the absence of both the husband 
a) on the recommendation of a Council of and any such person as last aforesaid from the 
Elders, orvillage in which the woman resides, on the 
requisition of a headman of the village. b) after inquiry as hereinafter provided.
(2) A police officer making an arrest under sub-
23section (1) shall, without unnecessary delay, take  [(2-A)____Pending the completion of an 
or send the person arrested to the nearest enquiry for the purposes of sub-section(2), the 
Magistrate having jurisdiction. Deputy Commissioner may, if he considers that 
immediate measures are necessary for 
preventing any offence referred to in sub-section (3) The Magistrate, may in default of bail being 
(1) direct the person in respect of whom the furnished to his satisfaction, detain the person 
enquiry is to be held, to execute a bond, with or arrested for such period, not exceeding fifteen 
without sureties, for keeping the peace  or days, as may be necessary to enable the husband, 
maintain good behavior for a period not or, in his absence, a person who had care of the 
exceeding one month, and detain him in custody woman on his behalf to make a complaint.
till such bond is executed.]
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Subsection (2-A) of section 40 inserted by W.P. Ordinance XXXVII of 1963, S.2. shall apply to Quetta and Kalat divisions only
order all or any of the members of both families 
or factions or of either family or faction to (3) Where a person has been convicted in 
execute a bond, with or without sureties, for their accordance with the finding of a Council of Elders 
good behavior or for keeping the peace, as the of an offence mentioned in section 106 of the 
case may be, during such period, not exceeding Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or punishable 
three years as he may fix.under section 302,section 304, section 307 or 
24
section 308 of the Indian Penal code, the 
42. Procedure in inquiry._____ (1) An inquiry Deputy Commissioner at the time of passing 
for the purposes of section 40 sub-sentence, or the Commissioner at the time of 
section(2), or section 41, may be 
revising the sentence, may make an order under 
conducted, so far as may be necessary, 
sub-section (1) with respect to that person.
out of Court: 
Provided that a person from whom it is (4) Where the Deputy Commissioner makes an 
proposed to require a bond under o rd e r  u n d e r  s u b - s e c t i o n  ( 1 )  o n  t h e  
section 40, or the principal members of 
recommendation of a Council of Elders, he shall 
the family or faction from which it is 
record his reasons for acting on the 
proposed to require a bond under 
recommendation.
section 41, shall be given an opportunity 
of showing cause in Court why a bond 
should not be required, and of having his (5) Where the Commissioner or the Deputy 
or their witnesses examined there and of 
Commissioner is of opinion that sufficient 
cross-examining any witness not called 
grounds exist for making an order under sub-
by himself or themselves who may 
section (1), he may, either in lieu of or in addition 
testify there to the necessity or 
to such order, by order in writing, direct that otherwise for the execution of a bond.
person concerned shall notify his residence and (2)  Sections 112,113,115 and 117 of the 
any change of residence in the manner Code of a Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall 
not apply to an inquiry under this prescribed by section 565 of the Code of Criminal 
section, but the Deputy Commissioner Procedure, 1898, during such term, not 
shall record his order with the reasons 
exceeding three years, as may be specified in the 
for making it.
order.
  
43. Breach of bond.______________ (1) A 
41. Security from families or factions in case of bond executed under section 40 shall be 
blood-feud._____ Where a blood-feud or other liable to be fortified if the person bound 
thereby to be of good behaviour or to cause of quarrel likely to lead to blood-shed 
keep the peace, as the case may be, exists, or, in the opinion of the Deputy 
commits or attempts to commit, or abets Commissioner, is likely to arise between two 
the commission of, any offence 
families or factions, the Deputy Commissioner 
punishable with imprisonment. 
may, on the recommendation of a Council of 
Elders, or after inquiry as hereinafter provided, 
(2) A bond executed under section 41 shall be 
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liable to be fortified, if the person bound again be required to give security unless a fresh 
thereby to be of good behaviour or to order is passed in accordance with the provisions 
keep the peace, as the case may, 
of this Chapter or of the Code of Criminal 
commits or attempts to commit, or 
Procedure, 1898.
abets the commission of, any offence 
punishable with imprisonment in 
respect of any member of the opposite 46. Further Security._____ (1) where a person 
family or faction to which the bond has, under the provision of this Chapter, given 
related. security or been imprisoned for failure to give 
security, he may be brought before the Deputy 
(3) If, while a bond executed under section 41 
Commissioner, if on the expiry of the period for 
is in force, the life of any member of 
which security was  required to be given, the 
either family or faction is unlawfully 
Deputy Commissioner so directs.taken or attempted, the Deputy 
Commissioner may declare the bond of 
(2) Where the Deputy Commissioner thinks it all or any of the members of the other 
family or faction and their sureties (if necessary, for the purpose of preventing blood-
any) to be fortified, unless it is shown to shed, to require security for further period from 
his satisfaction that the homicide or 
any person so brought before him, he shall 
attempt was not committed by, or in 
record proceeding to that effect.
consequence of the abetment of, any 
member of that family or faction. 
(3) The proceedings may be founded on the facts 
on which the original order to give security was 4 4 .  I m p r i s o n m e n t  i n  d e f a u l t  o f  
founded, and it shall not be necessary to prove security._____________ (1) Where a 
person ordered to give security under any fresh facts to justify an order to give security 
section 40; or section 41 does not give for a further period under this section; but such 
security or  before the date on which the an order, if passed shall have the same effect and 
period for which the security is to be 
be enforced in the same manner as an original 
g iven commences;  he shal l  be 
order to give security under section 40 or section 
committed to prison, or, if he is already 
41.
in prison, be detained in prison until that 
period expires, or until within that 
(4) Notwithstanding anything in this section, no period he furnishes the required 
person shall suffer, for failure to give security security. 
under this Chapter, continuous imprisonment for 
(2) Imprisonment for failure to give security more than six years or, without the sanction of 
under this Chapter may be rigorous or 
the Commissioner, for more than three years.
simple as the offence requiring the 
security directs in each case. 
47. Modified applications of Chapter VIII and 
XLII, Act V of 1898._____(1) Where, within the 
45. Length of Imprisonment._____ Where a territories in which all or any of the provisions of 
person has suffered imprisonment for three this Regulation are for the time being in force, it is 
years for failure to give security under section 40 found necessary or expedient to take security 
or section 41, he shall be released and shall not 
under this Regulation from Pathans or Baluchis 
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or any other classes against whom all or any of the  Appellate Court by sections 195, 423, 426, 427 
provisions of section 40 to 46 may for the time and 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 
being be enforced , the provisions of Chapters VIII and may also enhance any sentence:
and XLII of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 
1898, shall be read as if for the words “High Provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be 
Court”, “Court of Session” and “Sessions Judge” deemed to authorise the Commissioner to set 
wherever they occur, the word “ Commissioner” aside the finding on any question of fact of a 
were substituted, and all references to any such Council of Elders, where such findings has been 
Courts shall be deemed to refer to the Court of accepted by the Deputy Commissioner, unless he 
the Commissioner. is of opinion that there has been a material 
irregularity or defect in the proceedings or that 
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of the proceedings have been so conducted as to 
section 42 and sub-section (1) of this section, the occasion a miscarriage of justice.
provisions of the said Chapters of the Code of 51. Sentences which may not be passed on 
Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far as they are revision._____ No sentence shall be passed by 
consistent therewith, be applicable to every the Commissioner in the exercise of his 
proceeding under this Chapter relating to the [appellate] jurisdiction which the Deputy 
taking of security; but all applications for revision Commissioner could not have passed under this 
in respect to any such proceeding shall be made Regulation.
to, and be disposed of by, the Commissioner. 52. Powers in exercise of civil revisional 
jurisdiction._____ Nothing in this Chapter shall 
CHAPTER VI be deemed to authorize the Commissioner to 
APPEAL AND REVISION vary or set aside any decision, decree or order 
given, passed or made in any civil proceeding 
25
 [48. Appeal._____ An appeal shall lie to the under the Regulation, unless he is   of opinion 
Commissioner within thirty days from the date of that there has been a material irregularity or 
any decision given, decree or sentence passed, or defect in the proceedings or that the proceedings 
order made by the Deputy Commissioner under have been so conducted as to occasion a 
this Regulation.] miscarriage of justice or that the decision, decree 
or order is contrary to good conscience or public 
26
 [49. Omitted] policy.
53. Record of reasons.____ Where, in the 
50. Powers in exercise of criminal [appellate] exercise of his [appellate] jurisdiction in any 
jurisdiction._____ The Commissioner may, in proceeding under this Regulation, the 
  27
exercise of his  [appellate] jurisdiction in any Commissioner varies or sets aside any decision, 
criminal proceeding, exercise the power to direct decree, sentence or order, he shall record his 
tender of pardon conferred by section 338, and reasons for so doing.
any of the powers conferred. On an 
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[54. Procedure where the decision, etc., to be criminal proceeding, the Tribunal shall have 
revised was given by the officer invested with  [ powers under section 338 and any of the powers 
a p p e l l a t e ]  j u r i s d i c t i o n  a s  D e p u t y  conferred on an appellate authority under 
Commissioner_____(1)  No officer shall revise sections 195, 423, 426, 427 and 428 of the Code 
any decision, decree, sentence, or order given, of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), and may 
passed or made by himself in the capacity of also enhance any sentence:
Deputy Commissioner.
  Provided that nothing in this section shall be 
(2) Where any such decision, decree, sentence or deemed to authorize the Tribunal to set aside the 
order is brought to the notice of an officer finding or any question of fact of a Council of 
invested with [appellate] jurisdiction under this Elders, where such finding has been accepted by 
Regulation with a view to the exercise by him of the Deputy Commissioner, unless the Tribunal is 
[appellate] powers, such officer shall report the of the opinion that there has been a material 
case to the Provincial Government and it shall be irregularity or defect in the proceedings of that 
disposed by the Provincial Government or by an the proceedings have been so conducted as to 
officer, other than the reporting officer, occasion a miscarriage of Justice.
appointed by the Provincial Government.]
55.  Enforcement of  orders  made on (4) Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to 
revision._____ Every order made by the authorise the Tribunal to vary or set aside any 
Commissioner in exercise of his [appellate] decision, decree or order given, passed or made 
jurisdiction shall be enforced as if it were an order in any civil proceeding under this Regulation, 
of the Deputy Commissioner or District unless the Tribunal is of the opinion that there 
Magistrate, as the case may be and the Deputy has been a material irregularity or defect in the 
Commissioner or District Magistrate shall do all proceedings or that the proceedings have been 
acts and things necessary to give effect thereto. so conducted as to occasion a miscarriage of
29
  [55 A. Revision._____ Subject to sub- justice, or that the decision, decree or order is 
section(2) a revision against any decision given, contrary to good conscience or public policy.
decree or sentence passed, or order made by the 
Commissioner under section 48 shall lie to the (5) Where, the Tribunal in the exercise of its 
Tribunal consisting of____ revisional jurisdiction in any proceeding under 
a) Home Secretary, NWFP; and this Regulation varies or sets aside any decision, 
b) Law Secretary, NWFP. decree, sentence or order the Tribunal shall 
record its reasons for so doing.
(2) If the members of the Tribunal shall differ in 
opinion, the case shall be referred to Chief (6) Every order made by the Tribunal in exercise 
Secretary, NWFP and the case shall be decided of its revisional jurisdiction shall be enforced by 
according to the opinion of the majority. the Deputy Commissioner or the District 
Magistrate, as the case may be, and the Deputy 
(3) In exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in any Commissioner or the District Magistrate shall do 
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all acts and things necessary to give effect compensation based on  the same injury. 
thereto.]
58. Maintenance of registers._____ 
CHAPTER VII Registers shall be kept up, in forms to be 
3 0
SUPPLEMENTAL  PROVISIONS approved by the  [Provinc ia l  
Government], of all cases dealt with by 
56. Recovery of fines , etc , from relatives of the Deputy Commissioner and by the 
person liable ._____ Where , by a decree Commissioner under this Regulation. 
passed under sections 8 or by a sentence  
passed under section 12 , any person 59. Jurisdiction of ordinary Courts in cases 
belonging to a frontier tribe becomes under sections 29, 30 and 37._____ An 
liable to pay a fine or other sum of money Offence punishable under section 29 or 
, the Deputy Commissioner may , on the section 30 may be tried by a Court of 
recommendation of a Council of Elders Session or by the Court of a Magistrate of 
and on satisfying himself , that such a the first class. An offence punishable 
course is in accordance with local tribal under section 37 may be tired by any 
custom , by order in writing , direct that Magistrate of the first Class. 
the amount shall be recovered from the 
property , movable or immovable , of 60. Finality of proceeding , under the 
such of the relatives of fellow tribesmen Regulation_____ Expect as therein 
of the person so liable as may be otherwise  provided , no decision , 
specified in the order . decree, sentence or order given , passed 
or made, or act done , under Chapter III 
57 Power of Deputy Commissioners to order ,Chapter  IV ,Chapter V or Chapter VI , 
disposal of certain fines._____ (1) The shall be called in question in, or set aside 
Deputy Commissioner may make such by , any Civil or Criminal  Court . 
order as he thinks fit for the disposal of 
the proceeds of any fine imposed under 61. Application of provisions of Indian Penal 
section 18 or section 22, and subject to C o d e  r e s p e c t i n g  f i n e s  a n d  
any order made by the Commissioner imprisonment ._____ The provisions of 
under Chapter VI , the proceeds shall be section 61 , and those of sections 63 to 
31
disposed of accordingly . 74, of the   Indian Penal code , shall 
subject  to the provisions of section 13 of 
(  2 ) Where , in pursuance of an order made this  Regulation , apply to sentences 
under sub  section ( 1 ) , a person has passed under this  Regulation .
received compensation for an injury out 
of the proceeds of a fine , no Civil Court  62. Powers to make Rules._____ The  
32
shall take cognizance of a claim to [Provincial Government] may make  
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rules to carry out the purposes and functions of a Deputy Commissioner. 
objects of this Regulation. 
(b) In any other case  all or any of the 
34
 [62A Power to make rules for the issue and following powers, namely: -  
safe custody of rifles and ammunition i) power to make orders of reference to 
and for the imposition and recovery of Councils of Elders under section 8, sub-
f ines ._____   The  35[Central  section(1):
Government] may make rules for the ii) power to nominate and appoint 
issue and safe custody of rifles and the members of the Council when an 
ammunition for border village defense, order of reference to a Council has 
and for the imposition and recovery of been made under section 8, sub-
fines for any breach of such rules. section(1);
Fines imposed for a breach of the rules made iii) p o w e r  t o  n o m i n a t e  t h e  
under this section may be recovered in members of the Council when an 
the manner laid down in section 386 of order of reference to a Council has 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898] been made under section 11, sub 
section (1); 
63. No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie iv) power to consider and dispose 
against any person for anything done, or of objection made by an accused 
in good faith intended to be done, under person to members so nominated , 
this Regulation. and to appoint the member of a 
Council of Elders under section 11 , 
64. Protection for persons acting under sub section  ( 2 ) ; and 
Regulation._____ [Repeal] Repealed by v) power to take security under 
the Repealing Act, 1938 (1 of 1938), section 40.
section 2 and Schedule 1. 
 PART II._____ -POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
THE FIRST SCHEDULE WITH WHICH MAGISTRATES MAY BE 
36
[See section 2, clause (b)] INVESTED BY THE  [PROVINCIAL 
PART 1 ._____ POWERS AND FUNCTIONS WITH GOVERNMENT]  
WHICH MAGISTRATES OF THE FIRST CLASS MAY a) power to nominate and appoint the 
BE INVESTED BY DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS. members of a Council of Elders where an 
order of reference to a council has been 
(a) In the case of an additional District made under section 8, sub- section (1); 
Magistrate   - all or any of the powers and b) p o w e r  t o  n o m i n a t e  t h e  
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members of the Council when an  [ 2B Any offence punishable under any of 
order of reference  to a Council  has the provisions of the Employment of 
been made under section 11 , sub- Children Act  ( V of 1991) ] . 
 43
section  ( 1 ) ; and  [2C Any offence punishable under the 
c) power to consider and dispose Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 
of objections made by an accused 1997] 
person to members so nominated , 3 Abetment of any of the offences aforesaid. 
and to appoint the members of a 
Council of Elders under section  11 , 4 Attempt to commit any of the offence 
sub section  ( 2 ).  aforesaid which are not themselves 
expressed to be attempts to commit 
THE SECOND SCHEDULE offences. 
[See section 12, sub-section (2)]
THE THIRD SCHEDULE 
1. Any offence punishable under any of the [See sub-section (2) of Section 1] 
37
following sections of the  Indian Penal 
Code , namely sections  121,121-A , 122 , 1. The Divisions of Quetta and Kalat. 
123 , 124-A , 125,126,127, 131, 144, 2. The District of Lasbela. 
148,150,193,194,195,196,201,211,212, 3. Nasirabad Sub- Division of Jacobabad 
3 8
2 1 6 , 2 1 6 - A  ,    2 9 5 - B  District.
,302,304,307,308,324,325,326,,328,354 4. The Added Areas of the Hazara District 
,363,to 369 ,376,377,379 to 382 specified in the First Schedule, to G.G.O 
,386,387,392 to 399,400 401,402,411 to No. 1 of 1952. 
414,427to429 ,435,436,440, 448 to 460  5. The Added Areas of Mardan District, 
39
[ 489-B,489-C ], 494 ,495,497,and 498.  specified in Schedule 'A' to G.G.O No VII 
2. Any offence punishable under section 29 of 1953. 
or section 30 of this Regulation. 6. The Added Areas of Hazara District, 
40
  [2 A. Any offence punishable under any of specified in the First Schedule to G.G.O 
the provision of the Customs Act, 1969 No XIII of 1955. 
(Act No. IV of 1969) ] 7. The former excluded Areas of Upper 
 41
[2AA . Any offence punishable under the Tanaval and the Baluch Areas of Dera 
Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Ghazi Khan, specified in the Schedule to 
Order, 1979 (President's Order No. 4 of President Order No III of 1961.]
1979).] 
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Questionnaire
Assessing the Tribal Jirga system in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
Sources of Information
Response Code Response Code 
Pakistani press 1 Friends & family  11  
Pakistani radio 2 Work colleagues  12  
Pakistan TV 3 Neighbours 13  
British press 4 Friday sermon 14  
British TV channels 5 Communal gathering  15  
British radio 6 Government officials  16  
American press 7 Tribal elders  17  
American TV 8 None  66  
American radio 9 Other (specify)  77  
Internet, books & films  10 Don’t know  88  
Response Code Response Code 
Pakistani press 1 Internet, books & films  10  
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family  11  
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12  
British press 4 Neighbours 13  
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14  
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15  
American press 7 Government officials 16  
American TV 8 Tribal elders 17  
American radio 9   
Q.1 What sources of information do you have access to? (Multiple responses are allowed)  
Q.2 Which sources of information do you value the most? 
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Response Code Response Code 
Ausaf 1 Express 12 
Daily Times 2 Pakistan 13 
The Dawn 3 The Post 14 
The Frontier Post 4 Aaj Kal 15 
Jang 5 Aaj 16 
Khabrain 6 Mashriq 17 
The Nation 7 Wahdat 18 
Nawa-e-Waqt 8 UK newspapers  19 
The News 9 Afghan newspapers 20 
Observer 10 Other (specify)  77 
The Statesman  11 Don’t know 88 
Q.3  Which newspapers do you read regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Response Code Response Code 
Aaj   1 Waqt  12 
ARY 2 Bolan  13 
AVT Khyber  3 CNBC 14 
ATV 4 Star  15 
Pakistan Television (P TV)  5 Century TV 16 
Hum  6 Al Jazeera 17 
Dunya  7 BBC 18 
Samma  8 CNN 19 
Express News  9 Sky News  20 
Din 10 Other (specify) 77 
Dawn News 11 Don’t know 88 
Response Code Response Code 
BBC Pashtu 1 FM 101 8 
Radio Pakistan  2 FM 100 9 
BBC Urdu  3 FM 103 10 
FM 104 Buraq 4 BBC English  11 
FM 88 Lakki  5 Dewa (Voice of America) 12 
RADIO Pak MW 6 Other (specify) 77 
FM 106 7 Don’t know 88 
Q.4  What television stations do you watch regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)
Q.5  Which radio stations do you listen to regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)
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Annex VII
LEGAL DIMENSIONS  AND LEVEL OF AWARENESS
OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS
Response Code 
All Jirga members should be selected by disputants without any say 
from the PA  
01 
All Jirga members should be selected by the PA without any say from 
the disputants  
02 
Most Jirga members should be selected by disputants, and only some 
by the PA 
03 
Most Jirga members should be selected by the PA, and only some by 
disputants  
04 
One half of Jirga members should be selected by disputants and the 
other half by the PA 
05 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
Response Code 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
Response  Code 
Very often 01 
Often 02 
Rarely 03 
Never 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
Q.6  In your view, how should Jirga members be selected? 
Q.7  Could any party to a dispute disobey Jirga decision?
Q.8  If yes, how often does this happen?
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Issues Experienced Don’t 
Know 
No 
Response 
Victim of theft or fraud 1 88 99 
Victim of assault 1 88 99 
Victim of domestic abuse 1 88 99 
Victim of forced marriage 1 88 99 
Family member has gone missing or 
disappeared 
1 88 99 
Arrested without warrant by the political 
administration under FCR 
1 88 99 
Accused of an offence under the Anti-
Terrorism Act 
1 88 99 
Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault 
(under the Hudood Ordinances or the 
Pakistan Penal Code) 
1 88 99 
Accused of committing any other crime 1 88 99 
Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the 
political administration  
1 88 99 
Bribery by Khasadar or Levies force 1 88 99 
Assault or torture by FC or Army  1 88 99 
Money Recovery, or Debt/Obligation 
Settlement 
1 88 99 
Contract enforcement in business dealings 1 88 99 
Purchase or sale of movable property 1 88 99 
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction 
etc. 
1 88 99 
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, 
child custody, guardianship, inheritance 
1 88 99 
Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 1 88 99 
Debt bondage 1 88 99 
Found involved in sectarian violence 1 88 99 
Found involved in tribal/family clashes 1 88 99 
Injured in an accident (Motor Vehicle) 1 88 99 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Q.13  Have you or your household members experienced any of the following in the
last 10 years - which was the one you dealt with most recently?
(Choose one response only from those identified in previous question)
Q.14 Have you been involved in a dispute during the past 2 years?
Response Code  
Civil dispute 01 
Criminal dispute 02 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
Q.15. If yes, what was the dispute about? (Please add appropriate answer categories)
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Response Code  
State Court 01  
Jirga 02  
Local leaders (Khans or Maliks) 03  
Mullah (s)/ Imam (s) 04  
Taliban 05  
Other (specify)  77  
Don't Know  88  
Response 
Very 
Satisfied 
Somewhat 
Satisfied  
Somewhat 
Unsatisfied  
Not 
Satisfied  
State Court 1 2  3  4  
Jirga 1 2  3  4  
Local leaders (Khans or Maliks) 1 2  3  4  
Mullah (s) Imam (s) 1 2  3  4  
Taliban 1 2  3  4  
Other (specify)  1 2  3  4  
Don't know  1 2  3  4  
No response 1 2  3  4  
Response Code  
State Court 01  
Jirga 02  
Local leaders (Khans or Maliks) 03  
Mullah (s) Imam (s) 04  
Taliban 05  
Other (specify)  77  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.16 Who did you take the dispute to? 
Q.17 How satisfied were you with their involvement?
Q.18 Who resolved the dispute? (May select more than one) 
Response 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Somewhat unsatisfied 
Not satisfied at all 
Code  
01  
02  
03  
04  
Q.19 How satisfied were you with the outcome of the proceedings?
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Response Code 
Efficient and effective at resolving the dispute 01 
Close to where I live 02 
Fair and trusted 03 
Follows accepted local norms/values 04 
Less expensive 05 
Less corrupt 06 
Other (Specify )  77 
Q.20 What were the reasons you chose the institution/individual to deal with the dispute?
(Multiple Choice)
Trust on the types of Jirga systems:
Q.21  In your opinion, what type of Jirga is most trusted for resolving disputes in this area? 
Q.22 More specifically, what type of Jirga is more effective in resolving different disputes?
22a: FCR Jirga
22b: Olasi or Qaomi Jirga
22c: Other forms of Jirga (i.e. Taliban Jirga)
Response Code 
FCR Jirga 01 
Olasi Jirga or Qaomi Jirga  02 
 Other (Specify)  77 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
Response Code 
Criminal cases 01 
Civil cases 02 
Don’t know 88 
Response Code 
Criminal cases 01 
Civil cases 02 
Don’t know 88 
Response Code 
Criminal cases 01 
Civil cases 02 
Don’t know 88 
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The institution/individual is:
Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Q.23 How fair do you think each one of the following dispute resolution systems is?
Type of DR 
System 
Very 
Fair  
Somewhat 
Fair  
Somewhat 
Unfair  
Very 
Unfair  
DK  NR  
FCR Jirga 01  02  03  04  88  99  
Olasi Jirga 01  02  03  04  88  99  
Taliban style Shari'a 01  02  03  04  88  99  
Other (specify) 01  02  03  04  88  99  
Q.24  Is it true that Jirga plays proactive role in preventing conflicts?
Q.25 How strongly do you agree with the statements listed below? Please tell me whether 
you, strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree (don't read 
DK and NR).  
Response Code  
Yes 01  
No 02  
Don’t know  88  
No response  99  
Response 
Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree  
DK  NR  
FCR Jirga decisions  
are influenced by the 
more powerful  party 
to a dispute 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
Jirga elders/members 
take bribes 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
Jirga members are 
intimidated  by the 
more powerful  party 
to a dispute 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
Jirga members are 
influenced by Political 
Administration  
01 02 03  04  88  99  
Jirga members 
remain impartial 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
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Q.26 How strongly do you support the ideas listed below? Please tell me whether you strongly 
support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose (don't read DK and NR).  
Response 
Strongly 
Support 
Somewhat 
Support 
Somewhat 
Oppose  
Strongly 
Oppose  
DK  NR  
FCR Jirga should be 
conducted under 
Shari’a law 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
FCR Jirga should be 
conducted under 
local Riwaj (local 
customs) 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
FCR Jirga should be 
conducted under a 
mixture of both 
Shari’a law and local 
Riwaj 
01 02 03  04  88  99  
Response Code  
Strongly support 01  
Somewhat support 02  
Somewhat oppose 03  
Strongly oppose 04  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
 
Q.27  How strongly do you support the involvement of government  officials in Jirga
proceedings?
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Q.28 How strongly do you agree with the statements listed below? Please tell me whether 
you, strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (Read the 
list but don't read DK and NR)
Response Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Dsiagree 
Strongly 
Disagree  
DK  NR  
Jirga fails to resolve disputes 
effectively 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga violates women’s rights 01 02 03 04  88  99  
Jirga violates minorities’ 
rights 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga violates basic human 
rights 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga provides a fair and 
public hearing opportunity 
to key parties involved in the 
dispute 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga has the potential to 
prevent violation of 
women’s and minorities 
rights  
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga maintains social order 
and restores harmony in a 
village 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga is well placed to 
resolve civil disputes only 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga reintegrates offenders 
into the community 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga is well placed to 
resolve both civil and 
criminal disputes 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga contributes to rule of 
law 
01 02 03 04  88  99  
Jirga resolves serious crimes 01 02 03 04  88  99  
Jirga is organised, well 
established, transparent and 
an efficient institution 
01 02 03 04  88  99
 
Jirga makes lasting peace 
among disputants  
01 02 03 04  88  99
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Q.29 Do you support/oppose the punishment of collective responsibility [under the FCR  for the
implementation of Jirga decision?
Response Code  
Strongly support  01  
Somewhat support  02  
Somewhat oppose  03  
Strongly oppose  04  
Don’t know  88  
No response  99  
 
Q.30 How strongly do you agree with the statements list below? Please tell me whether you
 strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.
Response Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewehat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
DK  NR  
During FCR Jirga 
proceedings, every 
member of the Jirga has 
the right to express his 
views in a democratic way 
01 02 03 04 88  99  
During Olasi Jirga 
proceedings, every 
member of the Jirga has 
the right to express his 
views in a democratic way 
01 02 03 04 88  99  
Besides settling disputes, 
Jirga plays the role of a 
training academy for tribal 
youngsters about the 
teachings of restorative 
justice 
01 02 03 04 88  99  
Q.31 What should be the criteria for becoming a Jirga elder? 
Response Code 
Good level of Formal Education 01 
Good level of religious  Education 02 
Wealth  03 
Piety (taqwa) 04 
Conventional wisdom and expertise in dispute resolution 05 
Hereditary  06 
Political influence 07 
Age 08 
Good family reputation and  honour (izzet) 09 
 Other (specify)  77 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
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Economic Aspects of Jirga
Q.32 How strongly do you agree with the statement: 'Jirga is a speedy and less expensive 
mechanism of dispute resolution'? Please tell me whether you, strongly agree, agree, 
somewhat agree, or disagree.
Response Code  
Strongly agree 01  
Somewhat agree 02  
Somewhat disagree 03  
Strongly disagree 04  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.33 How strongly do you agree with the statement: 'One of the main outcomes of Jirga 
decision is a fair compensation to victims'? Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, 
somewhat agree, or disagree.
Response  Code  
Strongly agree  01  
Somewhat agree  02  
Somewhat disagree  03  
Strongly disagree  04  
Don’t know  88  
No response  99  
Q.34 Do disputants pay fee when their disputes are resolved through Sarkari (FCR) Jirga?
Response  Code  
Yes  01  
No 02  
Don’t know  88  
No response  99  
If yes, who are the fees paid to? Please specify ………………………….
Q.35 Do disputants pay fee to Jirga members, when their disputes are resolved 
throughOlasi Jirga?
Response Code  
Yes 01  
No 02  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
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Q.36 If yes, how do Jirga members receive fees for their services?
Response Code  
As travel/food expenses  01  
As a widely accepted and agreed upon fee 02  
As a bribe 03  
Other (specify)
 66  None of the above
 77  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Human Rights and Jirga
Q.37 Is it true that Jirga also takes cognizance of matrimonial disputes including 
guardianship/ custody of children?   
Response Code  
True 01  
Not true 03  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.38 How strongly do you agree with the statement that: 'Women should have an equal 
chance to participate in Jirga decision making processes?' Please tell me whether you, strongly 
agree, agree, somewhat agree, or disagree? 
Response Code  
Strongly agree  01  
Somewhat agree  02  
Somewhat disagree  03  
Strongly disagree  04  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.39 Do you believe that Swara resolves some very complex disputes?
Response Code  
Yes 01  
No 02  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
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Q.40 To what extent do you support Swara as a way for resolving conflicts between two 
families/parties?
Response Code  
Strongly support 01  
Somewhat support 02  
Somewhat oppose  03  
Strongly oppose 04  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.41 Do you think that Swara violates women rights?
Response Code  
Yes 01  
No 02  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.42 How strongly do you agree with the statement that: 'Ethnic minorities should have an 
equal chance to participate in Jirga decision making processes?' Please tell me whether 
you, strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, or disagree? 
Response Code  
Strongly agree 01  
Somewhat agree 02  
Somewhat disagree 03  
Strongly disagree 04  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
Q.43 How strongly do you agree with the statement that: 'Religious minorities should have 
an equal chance to participate in Jirga decision making processes?' Please tell me whether 
you, strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, or disagree? 
Response Code  
Strongly agree 01  
Somewhat agree 02  
Somewhat disagree 03  
Strongly disagree 04  
Don’t know 88  
No response 99  
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Q.44 How strongly do you support the idea that the houses of those people who disobey Jirga 
decision should be burnt? Please tell me whether you, strongly support, support, somewhat, 
support or do not support at all
Response Code 
Strongly support 01 
Somewhat support 02 
Somewhat disagree 03 
Strongly disagree 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
Q.45 Do you agree/disagree that the people of FATA should be given; 
Response 
Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
DK NR 
The right to judicial 
autonomy 
01 02 03 04 88 99 
The right to fair trial 01 02 03 04 88 99 
The right to equality 
and non-
discrimination 
01 02 03 04 88 99 
Q. 46 How strongly do you support the idea of extending the superior judiciary (i.e. High Court 
and Supreme Court) to the FATA? Please tell me whether you, strongly support, somewhat 
support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose?
Response Code 
Strongly support 01 
Somewhat support 02 
Somewhat oppose  03 
Strongly oppose  04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
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Q.48 How strongly do you agree with the statements listed below? Please tell me whether 
you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree.
Response Strongly 
Agree  
Somewhat 
Agree  
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
DK NR 
Jirga decision should be 
recorded officially 
01 02 03 04 88 99 
Jirga decision should be 
enforced officially 
01 02 03 04 88 99 
The powers of the 
Political Agent  should 
be limited to executive 
issues  
01 02 03 04 88 99 
Provision of a right to 
appeal to the High and 
Supreme Courts 
01 02 03 04 88 99 
Final Jirga decision need 
to be subject to the 
approval of appropriate 
Pakistan Human Rights 
bodies 
01 02 03 04 88 99 
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D 1: Gender of respondents (On observation): 
Male       1    Female     2   
D 2: Age group of respondent
Response Code Response Code  
18 – 29 years 1 50 – 64 years 3  
30 – 49 years 2 65 + years 4  
D 3: Education level of respondent
D 3a:Education level of head of the household
Response Code Response Code  
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Bachelor level  7  
Religious education only  2 Master degree  8  
Schooled up to Primary level 3 Specialisation: MBBS/doctor  9  
Schooled up to Middle level 4 Specialisation: Engineering  10  
Schooled up to Secondary 
Certificate level 
5
 Those up to professional 
education 
11  
Schooled up to Intermediate level  6   
D 4: Monthly income of respondent's family in PKR?
Response Code Response Code  
Up to PKR 3000 1 PKR 7,001 – PKR 10,000 4  
PKR 3,001 – PKR 5,000 2 PKR 10,001 – PKR 15,000 5  
PKR 5,001 – PKR 7,000 3 More than PKR 15,000 6  
D 5:Occupation of respondent
Response  Code  Response  Code  
Agricultural labourer  1  Provincial civil servant  11  
Chowkidar  (watchman)  2  Skilled labourer  12  
Civil servant of FATA  3  Small business owner  13  
Clerical employee  4  Teacher  14  
Farm owner  5  Technician  15  
Home-based worker  6  Unskilled labourer  16  
Lady health worker (LHW)  7  White colour employee  17  
Large business owner  8  Unemployed  18  
Management/supervisor  9  Other (specify)  77  
Military, police, security personnel  10    
Demographics
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Response Code Response Code  
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Bachelor level  7  
Religious education only  2 Master degree 8  
Schooled up to Primary level 3 Specialisation: MBBS/doctor  9  
Schooled up to Middle level 4 Specialisation: Engineering 10  
Schooled up to Secondary 
Certificate level  
5
 Those up to professional 
education 
 
Schooled up to Intermediate level  6   
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D 6:Marital status of respondent
Response Code Response  Code  
Married 1 Single  4  
Widowed 2 No response  99  
Divorced 3   
D 7:How many people live in your household/compound?
Number of People:___________________
Male 
(adult) 
Code Female 
(adult) 
Code Male 
children  
Code  Female children  Code  
1-5 
persons 
1
 1-5 
persons 
3
 1-5 
children  
5  1-5 children  7
 
6 and 
above 
persons 
2
 6 and 
above 
persons 
4 
6 and 
above  6  6 and above  8
 
D 8: Religion of respondent
Response Code Response  Code  
Christian 1 Hindu  4  
Sikh  2 Other (specify)  77  
Muslim 3 No response  99  
(Ask if answer is 3 in D8)
Shiite        1          Sunni          2
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)
D 9:Please tell me whether you regularly, sometimes, or never engage in the
following religious practices?
Response 
Regularly Sometimes Never  
Not 
Asked  
No 
Response  
Pray five times a day   1 2 3 4  99  
Fast during Ramadan 1 2 3 4  99  
(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)
D 10:How often do you pray at the mosque?
Response Code Response  Code  
Five times a day/daily 1 Several times a year  5  
Several times a week 2 Once a year or less  6  
Once a week 3 Never  7  
Monthly 4 No response  99  
D 11:Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year?
Response Code  Response  Code  
Yes 1  No  2  
Don’t know 88    
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Read Closing Statement 
to the Respondent: "Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you 
have any questions about the interview, or about its 
results?  In the next few days my supervisor may 
contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and 
answer any other questions you may have about the 
interview. To help him do that, could I have your 
telephone number, please?"
Respondent Information: Name:  _______________
Address:_______________
______________________
Tel No. _______________
NIC Number ___  ___  ___  ___
Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview 
according to the instructions provided to me. 
Name:  _______________
Signed: _______________
Date: _______________
To be completed by the Supervisor:
Interview subject to Back-check/Control 
1.  Yes
2.  No
Method of Back-check/Control  
1.  Direct supervision during interview
2.  Back-check in person by supervisor
3.  Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office  
4.  Not subject to back-check 
Initial Questions (for Interviewer only)
Name of surveyor ------------------------------ Date of interview -------------------------
Agency/FR -------------------------------------- Tehsil ----------------------------------------- 
[1] Rural. [2] Urban
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Annex 
In-depth interviews Legal Professionals  
S.#
 
Name 
 
Organization 
 
Area 
 
Date & Place 
 
1
 
Muhammad 
Iqbal Momand
 
Deputy Attorney 
General of Pakistan, KPK
 
Mohmand 
Agency 
 10/2/2011
 
Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General of Pakistan, 
 
Peshawar High Court Building, 
Peshawar
 
2
 
Muhammad 
Rafiq Khan 
Momand
 
Deputy Advocate 
General KPK
 
Mohmand 
Agency 
 
20/1/2011
 
Office of the Deputy Advocate 
General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
Peshawar High Court building, 
Peshawar  
 
3
 
Fida Gul 
Advocate
 
Former vice President, 
Peshawar High Court Bar 
Association and Former 
President District Bar 
Association, Peshawar   
 
Peshawar 
  
19/1/2011
At his chamber, Bobi Arcade, 
Peshawar 
 
4
 
Karim Mehsud 
Advocate
 President FATA lawyers 
Forum
 
South-
Waziristan 
Agency
 
21/1/2011
 
Peshawar Law College,
 
Peshawar 
 
5
 
Abdul Wali 
Khan Afridi 
Advocate 
Former General 
Secretary, High Court 
Bar Association, 
Peshawar 
Khyber 
Agency
 
21/1/2011 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar 
6
 
Habib-ur-
Rehman 
Advocate 
 
Khyber 
Agency
 
21/1/2011 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar 
7 Jhangir Khan Advocate 
Khyber 
Agency 
21/1/2011 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar 
8 Inyat Khan  Advocate 
Khyber 
Agency 
21/1/2011 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar 
9 
Muhammad 
Qubaiz 
 
Advocate 
Khyber 
Agency
 
26/1/2011 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
10
 Muhammad 
Bakhtiyar
 
Advocate
 
Khyber 
Agency
 
26/1/2011
 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
11
 
Saifullah
 
Advocate
 Mohmand 
Agency  
26/1/2011
 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
12
 
Behroz Khan
 
Advocate
 Mohmand 
Agency 
26/1/2011
 
Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
13 
Muhammad 
Ismael
 
Advocate 
Mohmand 
Agency
 
26/1/2011
 Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
14 
Muhammad 
Bashir
 
Advocate 
Orakzai 
Agency
 
26/1/2011
 Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
15 Attaullah Khan  Advocate 
FR-
 
D.I. 
Khan 
 
26/1/2011
 Peshawar Law College, 
Peshawar
 
 
185Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Disputants
S.# Name   Nature of dispute   Type of Jirga  Area  Date & place  
16
 
Ali Akber and 
his son 
 
Money Dispute
 
FCR
 
Khyber 
Agency
 
12/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
17
 
Fahim (S/o Ali 
Akber – above) 
do
 
FCR
 
Khyber 
Agency  
12/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
18
 
Shamir Khan 
Akka Khel,  
Arrest for Criminal 
Charges  
FCR
 
Khyber 
Agency  
19/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
19
 
Haider Khan
 
do
 
FCR 
Khyber 
Agency  
19/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
20
 
Nusrat
 
do
 
FCR
 
Khyber 
Agency  
19/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
21 
Muhammad 
Sadiq 
 
Property dispute 
 
FCR 
Khyber 
Agency  
19/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
22
 
Zar Alam do FCR 
Khyber 
Agency  
12/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
23
 
Shaheen
 
Arrest for Criminal 
Charges  
FCR
 
Orakzai 
Agency  
12/2/2011  
Commissioner FCR, 
Judicial Complex, 
Peshawar  
24 Akhtar Jan  Property Dispute Olasi –
 local  
Khyber 
Agency  
28/1/2011  
Institute of 
Management and 
Professional Studies, 
Peshawar  
25 
Muhammad 
Akram Khan 
Property dispute Olasi – local  
South 
Waziristan
25/1/2011  
Institute of 
Management and 
Professional Studies, 
Peshawar  
26 
Sher Akber 
Afridi 
Money and 
Inheritance 
Olasi – local  
Khyber 
Agency  
4/2/2011  
Bangash villa, Warsak 
road, Peshawar  
186 Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
187
Women Rights Activists:
S.#
 
Name 
 
Organization 
 
Area 
 
Date & Place 
 
27
 
Maryam Bibi – Chief 
Executive 
Khwendo Kor (KK), meaning 
‘Sisters' Home’ 
Peshawar 
 11/2/2011  
Office of the 
Khwendo Kor 
Phase-3,Hayatabad, 
Peshawar  
28
 
Shad Begum – 
Executive Director 
Association for Behaviour and 
Knowledge Transformation - 
ABKT 
Malakand 
 25/1/2011  
Office of ABKT, Old 
Bara road, 
university town, 
Peshawar  
29
 
Fakhr-u-Nisa 
Advocate 
Former vice President Peshawar 
High Court Bar Association, 
Peshawar
FR-Lakki  
22/1/2011  
District Court, 
Peshawar  
30
 
Shakeela Ellahi  
 
 
Manager Programs - Khwendo 
Kor (KK), Peshawar  
 11/2/2011  
Office of the 
Khwendo Kor 
Phase-3,Hayatabad, 
Peshawar  
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Tribal Community Elders
S.# Name 
 
Organization 
 
Area 
 
Date & Place 
 
31
 
Malik Ghulam Rasool 
 
Community Elder 
 
FR-
 
D.I. Khan
 
28/1/2011
 
Bangash property, 
Charsadda, 
Peshawar  
 
32
 
Malik Inam Bangash
 
Community Elder
 
Kurram Agency
 
28/1/2011
 
Bangash property, 
Charsadda, 
Peshawar
 
33
 
Munir Bangash 
 
Community Elder
 
Kurram Agency
 4/2/2011
 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar 
 
34
 
Malik Fida Hussain
 
Community Elder
 
Kurram Agency
 
4/2/2011
 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar
 
35
 
Malik Syed Ghafar Shah 
 
Community Elder
 
FR, D.I Khan
 
3/2/2011
 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar 
36
 Eng. Malik Muhammad 
Zaman Khan Daur  
Former chief engineer 
WAPDA  
North 
Waziristan  
8/2/2011 
Phase 4, 
Hayatabad, 
Peshawar   
37
 
Malik Khan Marjan
 Community Elder 
North 
Waziristan  
9/2/2011 
Phase 3, 
Hayatabad, 
Peshawar  
38 Umer Hayat Khan Umerzai  Community Elder FR-Bannu 
3/2/2011 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar 
39 Haji Alla Khan  Community Elder FR-Lakki 
3/2/2011 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar 
40 Malik Liaqat Ali Bettani  Community Elder FR Bannu 
3/2/2011 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar 
41
 
Malik Jalal Khan
 
Community Elder
 South 
Waziristan
 
4/2/2011 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar
 
42 Malik Pir Mullah Khan  Community Elder 
South 
Waziristan  
4/2/2011
 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar
 
43 Malik Luqman Afridi  
Community Elder
 FR Peshawar 
1/2/2011
 
Kohat road, 
Peshawar 
 
44
 
Malik Dawood Jan 
 
Community Elder
 
Bajaur Agency
 
2/2/2011
 
At his home-phase 
6 Hayatabad, 
Peshawar  
 
45
 
Malik Haji Habib Ullah 
 
Community Elder
 
Bajaur Agency
 
19/2/2011
 Peshawar 
 
46
 
Malik Badshah Afridi 
 
Community Elder
 
Khyber Agency
 
8/2/2011
 Peshawar 
 
47
 
Aftab Momand 
 
Community Elder
 
Mohmand
 
9/2/2011
 Peshawar 
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Mullahs (Religious leaders) 
S. #
 
Name 
 
Organization  Area 
 
Date & place 
 
51
 
Mufti Sanaullah
 
In charge of Maddrasa 
Tawed-ul-Quran, 
Peshawar   
Mohmand Agency 
 16/1/2011 
at Maddrasa 
Tawed-ul-
Quran, 
Charssada road 
Peshawar   
52 Maulvi Ahmad Khan  Teacher  FR-Lakki 
19/1/2011 
at Maddrasa Pir 
Langot baba, 
Nothia, 
Peshawar 
53
 
Maulana Shafiullah 
Sherani  
Pesh Imam (Incharge of 
local mosque) 
Dera Ismail Khan
 3/2/200 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar  
54
 
Qazi Abdul Manan 
 
Pesh Imam (Incharge of 
local mosque)
 Bajaur Agency
 1/2/2011 
At SS-club, 
Peshawar  
55
 
Maulvi Jan Muhammad 
 
Pesh Imam (Incharge of 
local mosque) 
South Waziristan
 3/2/200 
At Hotel Grand, 
Peshawar 
56
 
Qari Arshad 
 
Pesh Imam (Incharge of 
local mosque) 
FR
-
Peshawar 27/1/2011 
Al-Qalam Bait-
ul-elm school, 
Kohat road, 
Peshawar  
 
Academics
S. # Name  Organization Area  
57
 
Prof. (Associate) Dr Ijaz Ahmad 
Khattak   
 
Chairman, Department of 
International Relations, 
University of Peshawar  
31/1/2011 
Department of 
International 
Relations, 
University of 
Peshawar  
58
 
Prof. (Assistant) Muhammad 
Zubair   
Law College, University of 
Peshawar   
26/1/2011 
Law College, 
University of 
Peshawar  
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48 Ikram Ullah Jan Kokikhel Community Elder Khyber 
8/2/2011 
Peshawar  
49 Malik Akbar Jan Community Elder FR Kohat 
28/1/2011 
Peshawar  
50 Syed Akbar Jan  Community Elder Orakzai Agency 
17/2/2011 
Peshawar 
S. # Name 
 
Organization 
 
Area 
 
Date & Place 
 
Journalist 
S. # Name  Organization  Date & Place 
59
 
Rahimullah 
Yusufzai
 
Resident Editor, The News 
International, Peshawar
 
27/1/2011 
Regional Office, The News, 
Bacha Tower, Qayum stadium 
super market 
Peshawar  
60
 
Saleem Safi
 
Anchor/Analyst and Columnist 
 29/1/2011 
Geo, Jang Plaza, Fazl-e-Haq 
Road, Blue Area, Islamabad   
61
 
Shamim Shahid
 
Bureau Chief, Pakistan Today
 25/1/2011 
Regional Office, Pakistan 
Today, Al -Amir plaza, Qayum 
stadium super market 
Peshawar  
62
 
Rokhan Yousafzai 
 
Editorial In charge, Magazine 
Session, Daily Express 
 
21/1/2011 
Head office, Daily The Express 
Gulbahar, Peshawar   
 
Social Workers 
S. # Name  Organization  Area  Date & Place  
63 Dr. Said Alam Mehsud   Social worker   South Waziristan 
3/2/2011 
Khattak Medical plaza, 
Dabgari garden, 
Peshawar  
64 Sajjad Bangash    Social worker    Kurram Agency   
4/2/2011 
Bangash villa, Warsak 
road, Peshawar   
65 Ayesha Gulalai Wazir  Social worker  FR-Bannu  
14/2/2011 
FATA Residential Colony, 
Warsak road, Peshawar  
 
Political Leaders 
S. # Name  Organization  Area  Date & Place  
66
 
-ur-Sahibzada Haroon
Rashid
 
-e-Islami, 
Former MNA and Naib 
Ameer Jamat
KP 
 
Bajaur 
Agency
 
12/1/2011 
Jumat-e-Islami 
Markaz, Chamkani 
road, Peshawar   
67
 
Razaullah Khan Advocate 
 
District Peshawar 
President of Awami 
National Party (ANP) 
 
Peshawar 
 10/2/2011 
Bacha Khan Markaz, 
Pajagai road, 
Peshawar  
 
Former Judges
S. # Name  Organization  Area  
68
 
Justice (R) Saleem Khan
 Former Justice of Peshawar High 
Court, former provincial Law 
Secretary, KP (by virtue of office, 
member of FC tribunal) Former 
Chairman Provincial Service Tribunal, 
KP    
16/3/2011 
Bar Room at the 
Supreme Court of 
Pakistan, Islamabad   
69
 
Ameer Gulab Khan 
Former provincial Law Secretary, KP 
(by virtue of office, member of FC 
tribunal) 
18/3/2011 
Bar Room at the 
Peshawar High 
Court, Peshawar   
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PDF version of
'Understanding Jirga'
can be downloaded from
www.camp.org.pk
Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP) is a registered 
Pakistani NGO dedicated to working on peace and security, sustainable 
development, human rights, and emergency response at the national and 
regional level. CAMP's activities range from research and analysis, policy 
advocacy and implementation of multi-sectoral  projects.
